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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the problem of providing policy and budget oversight of 
Ukrainian intelligence organizations in accordance with norms and practices developed in 
contemporary Western democracies.  As Ukraine continues the process of democratic 
consolidation, the issue of intelligence oversight remains vital, to ensure political 
accountability and financial efficiency.  Oversight of intelligence is also important to the 
political initiatives Ukraine has undertaken to improve ties to NATO and the EU.  
Official government documents, news reports and other literature on the intelligence 
system in Ukraine, as well as studies of intelligence oversight within democracies are the 
primary sources of data.  This thesis reviews the principles and problems involved in 
parliamentary and executive oversight of intelligence in western and transitional 
democracies.  It details the organizations and budgets of the Ukrainian intelligence 
agencies, as well as the legislative and executive systems for providing financial 
resources to them and for conducting oversight of them.  The most important problems 
identified include the needs to separate intelligence functions from security and law- 
enforcement tasks within Ukrainian intelligence organizations, create an all-source 
intelligence analysis agency and establish independent and well-staffed bodies in 
legislative and executive branches dealing exclusively with intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight functions.         
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Intelligence oversight is an important indicator of the democratic character of a 
state.  After achieving independence on August 24, 1991, Ukraine started building a 
sovereign, democratic, and law-based state.  To affirm and ensure human rights and 
freedoms became the main duty of the State.1  Reform of its intelligence sector was an 
important aspect of this process. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left in place a huge intelligence and security 
apparatus that needed to be reformed and controlled properly. This had to be done sooner 
rather than later because the new leadership understood from the past the potential for 
political abuse of intelligence services as an instrument in the hands of the state.  
Supporters of Ukrainian democracy did not want to return to these practices.  Therefore, 
it was essential to secure effective parliamentary and executive oversight of the 
intelligence services.  The young state and its democratic leaders followed the idea that 
structures and practices for conducting stringent oversight of the intelligence services 
would be a major prerequisite for establishing a stable democracy.  
In an open and free society, there is a tendency among the citizens to mistrust the 
intelligence community.2  Mistrust can be avoided if the citizens are ensured, mainly via 






                                                 
1 Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. Article 3. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm 
(accessed March 28, 2007).  
2 Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, The American Experience: One Model for Intelligence Oversight in a 
Democracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Project on Justice in Times of Transition, 
2001) 12. Available at https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article02.html (accessed March 12, 2007).    
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democratically accepted objectives.  Thus it is important that the citizens believe that the 
intelligence services operate within the law and are subjected to legal standards and 
independent oversight.3   
Studying and analyzing the best norms of western democracies, Ukraine took 
major legislative actions to reform its intelligence sector.  By adopting the laws on March 
25, 1992 “On the Security Service of Ukraine” (#2229-XII), on March 22, 2001 “On the 
Intelligence Organs of Ukraine” (#2331- III), on October 20, 2005 “On Organization and 
Total Strength of the Security Service of Ukraine” (#3014-IV), and on December 1, 2006 
“On the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine” (#3160-IV), the new Ukrainian 
democracy established the primary missions of the intelligence and security 
organizations, their functions and responsibilities.  Those laws put into effect the term 
“Ukrainian Intelligence Community” (UIC) and laid the foundation for the establishment 
and further development of the system of intelligence oversight and public awareness 
regarding intelligence activity.  Moreover, specialized offices for conducting effective 
parliamentary and executive intelligence oversight were established in the Ukrainian 
Parliament, the President’s Secretariat and the Cabinet of Ministers.   
The Ukrainian intelligence services are growing in importance as an area of 
governmental activity.  Indeed, this sector in Ukraine has now become a multi-million-
dollar governmental entity, involving human and signal intelligence units, high-tech 
equipment, economic, political, social, and military analysts, as well as recruited agents 
around the world.  As it was announced in December 2006, according to estimates by 
international experts, Ukrainian intelligence was ranked among the ten most efficient 
intelligence communities in the world.4  Thus, the budget of such an important and costly 
sector needs to be subjected to democratic oversight as well.  In addition, the involvement  
 
                                                 
3 Hans Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services: Best Practices 
and Procedures,” Geneva, May 2002, 2. Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/dossiers/ssg/pubs/ 
Working%20Papers/20.pdf (accessed March 28, 2007). 
4 Interview of the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine to the National Newspaper 
Facts, December 2, 2006. Available at http://www.fisu.gov.ua/article.php?lang=en&root=7&item=86 
(accessed March 28, 2007).   
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of parliamentarians and members of the President’s Secretariat and the Cabinet of 
Ministers can help ensure that the use of public money in the defense and security sector 
is properly authorized and accounted for.5  
Unfortunately, information regarding the budget of intelligence organizations is 
mostly classified in western democracies.  Many observers argue that with the disclosure 
of intelligence spending, unfriendly countries and terrorist organizations can take 
advantage of information about trends in intelligence spending to develop effective 
countermeasures against democracies.6  Ukrainian intelligence is no exception to this 
concern.  Information concerning intelligence expenditures is a state secret according to 
the Ukrainian law “On State Secrets of Ukraine,” and not available to the public.   
However, suffering from economic stagnation, and financial and political 
instability, some in Ukraine raise the issue that expenditures for the intelligence and 
security sector should be reduced.  They propose that funds cut from the intelligence 
budget could be utilized in other policy areas, due to the low likelihood of future military 
conflicts.  Most people think that the peaceful position of Ukraine in the international 
arena and national aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, which have been 
the public declarations of Ukrainian presidents since 2004, minimize the probability of 
Ukrainian participation in continental wars and regional conflicts.   
Additionally, Ukrainian willingness to be an important part of the European 
security architecture raised the issue of the conformity of Ukrainian budget processes 
with EU-NATO standards.  This suggests that sooner or later, appropriate information 
regarding the UIC budgeting is going to be disclosed and shared with the intelligence 
organizations of countries with which Ukraine has already started planning and 
conducting joint activities abroad to maintain world peace and security.  The limited 
intelligence budget data need to be also declassified before sharing with those countries 
with which Ukraine does not have bilateral agreements regarding the state secret 
                                                 
5 Ian Leigh, Democratic Control of Security and Intelligence Services: A Legal Framework, 122.  In 
Bryden, Alan and Fluri, Philipp. Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance. 
Nomos. Verlagsgesellshaft, Baden-Baden. No. 34, August 2003.  
6 Richard A. Best Jr. and Elizabeth Bazan, February 15, 2007. Intelligence Spending: Public 
Disclosure Issue, 1. CRS Report for Congress.    
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protection.  Thus, this information becomes a non-secret and, according to the Ukrainian 
Constitution, should be provided to the public.  Some intelligence expenditures should be 
made public as well.  
The fundamental issue for the Ukrainian intelligence budget oversight system is 
whether adequate resources are being committed to intelligence, to the right sectors of the 
UIC, and whether those resources are properly managed.  It is the responsibility of 
elected officials, cabinet members and military commanders to ensure that these 
requirements are met.  A more immediate issue is how to ensure that there is enough 
information available to inform public debate without placing the UIC’s sources and 
methods at risk.                                                       
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the existing system of parliamentary and 
executive oversight of the Ukrainian Intelligence Community in general, and the 
intelligence budget in particular.  This case study also describes the common principles 
(norms) of intelligence and intelligence budget oversight in western democracies and 
determines the main factors that have influenced the intelligence budget oversight in 
Ukraine. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
First of all, due to the secret nature of this topic, there are few English language 
sources available regarding the parliamentary and executive oversight mechanisms of 
Ukrainian intelligence, and intelligence budget oversight in particular.  Political events in 
Ukraine, including security and foreign policy, continue to evolve, with major differences 
of opinion being evident.  Some favor continued and accelerated partnership with the 
European Union and NATO countries.  Others prefer improved relations with Russia.  
Ukraine is once again at a political crossroads.  Whether Ukraine moves east or west, it 
will be important for the citizens and government of Ukraine to understand the role 
played by their intelligence agencies and the cost involved in that role.  However, if 
Ukraine is to continue its initiatives aimed at improving ties to NATO and the EU, the 
issue of parliamentary and executive oversight of the UIC and its budget is critical.   
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The dramatic events of September 11, 2001 accelerated security sector reform in 
many countries that had already begun this process and certainly provided an impetus to 
European security sector integration.7  If the foreign policy of Ukraine continues seeking 
closer relationship with the European Union, NATO, and the United States, with the goal 
of eventual NATO and EU membership, further budget transparency is important.8  
Partners should know more about each other in order to be successful while performing 
joint military and security tasks in a complex defense environment.  This thesis will 
benefit both Ukraine and its potential partners in the West in terms of further 
transparency in the intelligence sector.  
Secondly, intelligence oversight is an important indicator of the attitude of a state 
toward its democratic processes.  By conducting this case study the author hopes to 
demonstrate the extent to which Ukraine has moved toward democratic policies and 
practices in this important policy area, as well as the areas where further work is needed. 
Thirdly, this thesis will benefit Ukrainian policymakers.  For a country with acute 
needs in non-security policy areas such as health and education, appropriate budget 
oversight procedures and reasonable transparency can be valuable tools for policymakers 
who are allocating scarce resources. 
Finally, no independent case study regarding Ukrainian intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight has yet been written.  One of the purposes of this research is 
to provide additional information regarding current intelligence oversight mechanisms 
and processes in Ukraine to international institutions, such as the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces.  This case study will allow those international 
institutions to update their understanding and information regarding the Ukrainian model 
of intelligence oversight and, as a consequence, assist Ukrainian transitional democracy 
and its parliamentary and executive bodies to analyze and correct existing mistakes, 
while merging with the European security architecture.  
                                                 
7 Alan Bryden and Philipp Fluri, Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance, 
9. Nomos. Verlagsgesellshaft, Baden-Baden. No. 34, August 2003.   
8 Steven Woehrel, April 1, 2005. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and U.S. Policy, 2. RL32845. CRS 
Report for Congress.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question to be addressed in the thesis is: how does the 
system of parliamentary and executive oversight of the Ukrainian Intelligence 
Community in general, and intelligence budget oversight in particular operate in 
Ukraine? 
Subsidiary research questions include the following:   
• What are the common norms and problems of intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight in western and transitional democracies?  
• How are the Ukrainian Intelligence Community and its intelligence 
agencies organized? 
• How does the intelligence budget process operate in Ukraine? 
• How is the intelligence budget controlled by the Ukrainian parliament and 
executive branch? 
• How does the system of parliamentary and executive oversight of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community operate? 
• What mechanisms exist in Ukraine regarding intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight and what are the current problems with enhancing this 
type of control? 
D. METHODOLOGY  
Firstly, taking into consideration the classified nature of intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight, the sensitivity of this topic and the lack of open sources of 
such information, this thesis will identify the key aspects of common intelligence 
oversight systems in western democracies.  Then, data will be obtained from a 
comprehensive literature review of Ukrainian legislation, governmental official reports, 
journals and Internet-based materials (interviews, publications related to the Ukrainian 
Intelligence Community, its budget, oversight mechanisms, as well as Websites of the 
intelligence organizations).  After that, the existing system of parliamentary and 
executive oversight of the UIC, and of the intelligence budget in particular, will be 
evaluated.  The thesis will also emphasize the current problems of intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight and possible solutions.   
 7
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized as follows: the first chapter explains the rationale for and 
logic of this thesis.  The first part of this chapter provides background information and 
the importance of the issue of intelligence oversight in Ukraine.  It also gives a brief 
history of important legislation passed by the Ukrainian parliament to advance this type 
of control.  It is followed by the significance and importance of this case study, the 
research questions to be addressed and a description of the methodology to be employed 
to develop answers. 
The second and the third chapters describe common principles (norms) of 
intelligence and intelligence budget oversight in western and transitional democracies.  
They also underline current problems related to establishing and enforcing this type of 
control. 
The fourth chapter examines the Ukrainian Intelligence Community.  The chapter 
is subdivided into four main sections.  First, it discusses the Foreign Intelligence Service 
of Ukraine, its organization and main tasks.  The next section presents the structure of the 
Main Directorate for Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and functional 
responsibilities of its departments.  Then, the major functions and organization of the 
Intelligence Body of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine will be introduced.  
Finally, the main tasks and structure of the Security Service of Ukraine will be 
considered.  This chapter also provides data regarding the evolution of the budgets of 
these intelligence organizations for the period of fiscal years (FY) 2003-2007.  
The fifth chapter covers the existing system of parliamentary oversight of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community.  It examines the intelligence budget process and 
parliamentary committees conducting oversight, their jurisdictions and responsibilities.  
Special attention will be given to parliamentary oversight mechanisms and controlling 
functions performed by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.  
The sixth chapter examines executive oversight of the UIC.  The organization and 
oversight activities of the Secretariat of the President, the National Security and Defense  
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Council, the General Inspectorate under the President of Ukraine, as well as the role of 
the Cabinet of Ministers and its Office of Vice Prime Minister on the Issues of National 
Security and Defense will be discussed.   
The seventh chapter will conclude the thesis with an overall picture of intelligence 
oversight of the UIC followed by the author’s observations, conclusions, and 




II. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY IN WESTERN 
AND TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to continue building a stable democracy and not backslide into 
authoritarianism, Ukraine has attempted to improve control and transparency of its 
intelligence systems.  In a democracy, the representatives of a people hold the supreme 
power and no sector of the state should be excluded from their control.  They exercise 
this power through elected representatives.  These representatives, in both the executive 
and legislative branches of government, play a vital role in conducting oversight of 
intelligence systems.9 The judicial system and the civilian sector contribute to the 
oversight of intelligence in other ways.   
Western democracies provide oversight of their intelligence communities for 
several reasons.10  Firstly, it is crucial for democratic states to find a balance between 
security and liberty.  Intelligence agencies provide services to protect the society and do 
this by using methods that are not revealed to the public. Those secret means create 
conditions that may lead to abuse and threaten civil liberties.  Liberty refers to privacy 
and civil rights, which are vital elements of any democracy.  If an intelligence service 
becomes too powerful, it could threaten these rights.     
Secondly, people in an open and free society do not trust intelligence 
organizations.  Mistrust can be minimized if the citizens are ensured that proper 
constraints are in place.   
Thirdly, oversight systems help to provide information to citizens that their 
intelligence community is following and operating within the law and is subject to legal 
standards and independent supervising.   
                                                 
9 Hans Born, August 2003. Representative Democracy and the Role of Parliaments: An Inventory of 
Democracy Assistance Programs. In Alan Bryden / Philipp Fluri (eds.). Security Sector Reform: 
Institutions, Society and Good Governance,  67. Nomos, Verlagsgesellshaft. Baden-Baden. No. 34.  
10 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 2.  
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Fourthly, taxpayers want assurance that the intelligence budgets are being 
properly managed.  Intelligence communities in many states are multi-billion-dollar 
governmental enterprises.  This means that financial accountability is crucial.  Financial 
accountability for intelligence spending may become an important factor during the 
planning and conduct of joint multinational operations.  International intelligence 
partners may need to disclose limited information regarding intelligence budget resources 
before each operation while acting together.    
Finally, democratic oversight of intelligence in transitional democracies can 
contribute to the transformation of intelligence communities toward the principles of a 
free and open society.  This process involves moving away from a closed and repressive 
state apparatus toward a transparent and democratically accountable government.   
To avoid an “independent security state” inside a democratic society, effective 
techniques of legislative and executive oversight over intelligence communities must be 
established.  This requirement for the accountability of the intelligence community is 
congruent with democratic rules of good governance and the protection of human rights 
and freedoms, as well as state security.  
There is no one best way or practice of intelligence oversight.  Accepted and 
common practices in one established democracy may not be applicable in another modern 
or emerging democracy.  The variety of rules and systems of oversight in western 
democracies reflects the nature of those democracies.  Democratic governments are free 
to build any system of intelligence and security oversight they choose.   
The oversight of intelligence is an ongoing process in democracies.  The security 
environment constantly changes, and with it, intelligence organizations must evolve.    
Governments, in turn, adapt their oversight standards and methods.  The process is 
dynamic and persistent.  For example, “the nature of threats to U.S. security has changed 
since 1978 when Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
which governs intelligence agencies’ ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the 
United States.  The law has been amended repeatedly since then, including after the 9/11 
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attacks.”11  Major events affecting the evolution of oversight of intelligence in the U.S. 
are depicted in Figure 1 below.12  Thus, the consensus is that these oversight systems 
should be clear, workable, efficient and transparent for political leaders and the public.   
Figure 1. Evolution of Congressional Oversight
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Figure 1.   Evolution of Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community 
 
This chapter describes the common principles of legislative and executive 
oversight used by western and transitional democracies to regulate the activities of their 
intelligence agencies.  Major oversight problems will also be identified.  These principles 
are worth studying and implementing by emerging democracies that wish to build an 
effective system of intelligence oversight.  
                                                 
11 Fixing FISA. May 7, 2007. The rules for domestic electronic surveillance need a careful updating. 
The Washington Post Company. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/06/AR2007050600847.html (accessed May 7, 2007).  
12 Created by Professor Richard Doyle. 2007. Naval Postgraduate School. Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy. Monterey. California. From: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report. 
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence. Current Structure and Alternatives. Intelligence Spending: Public 
Disclosure Issues. Updated February 15, 2007.      
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B.  PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IN 
WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES  
Thomas Jefferson, one of the principle architects of American democracy, was 
concerned about the dangers of concentrated power in the new American republic.13  His 
concerns were based upon the power of government bureaucracy.  By its very nature, 
bureaucracy has a tendency to accumulate immense power over time.  This also applies 
to intelligence organizations. There is evidence that it is dangerous for a country to give 
the intelligence and security community autonomous power within the state or power to 
shape important parameters of civil and political society.14  Intelligence communities 
should be politically neutral.  Politicization of the intelligence community can jeopardize 
the integrity of their product as well as the political system itself.     
In western democracies, laws are developed regarding the activity of intelligence 
communities.  Intelligence legislation usually defines the status, purview, operations, 
cooperation, tasking, and reporting duties of intelligence agencies.15  For example, the 
U.S. was one of the first countries that enacted a public law for its intelligence agencies; 
this act was unprecedented.16  In Argentina, the law prohibits intelligence agencies from 
conducting activities related to domestic political affairs.17  The use of specific means of 
acquiring information and keeping records containing personal details, as well as the 
status of the intelligence services employees, are addressed by law in Germany, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic.18  Thus, the law is the major prerequisite for effective legislative 
and executive oversight of the intelligence community.  It achieves this by separating 
intelligence from law enforcement and by professionalizing intelligence practices.      
                                                 
13 Loch Johnson, “The CIA and the Question of Accountability,” Intelligence and National Security, 
Summer 1998, 178.    
14 Alfred Stepan, 2005. Brasilia’s Case: The Brazilian Intelligence System in Comparative 
Perspective, Ch. 2. Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press) 18.  
15 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” Chapter III, 4.  
16 Rindskopf Parker, The American Experience, 15. 
17 Hans Born, Loch Johnson and Ian Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2005) 162.  
18 Intelligence Services Act of the Czech Republic. Available at 
http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/699/place (accessed April 3, 2007).  
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1.  Functional and Structural Changes in Intelligence Communities 
a.  Separation of Intelligence and Law Enforcement  
Tasking is an important tool for elected authorities in directing intelligence 
services to focus their attention on gathering information within desired areas of 
intelligence.  That is, for better oversight, western democracies separate national 
intelligence (foreign and domestic [security] intelligence) from the functions of the law-
enforcement agencies (national police).   
Law enforcement agencies such as the police have different purposes from 
intelligence agencies, and thus their functions should be separated.  Intelligence services 
collect relevant information regarding the potential threats to national security, while the 
police maintain law and order.  Police work should not be intermingled with intelligence 
work and police personnel should not be allowed to practice “preventive intelligence 
activities” before they have evidence that a crime is committed.  Intelligence services, 
likewise, should not arrest citizens they suspect, thus involving themselves in spying 
against their citizens.19   
This functional division has been practiced effectively in Germany.20  The 
separation of functions between foreign and domestic (security) intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies is enacted by law in that country.  Separation of intelligence and 
law enforcement functions is also typical for such western democracies as France, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, and the United States, as well as transitional 
democracies Bulgaria and Romania.21   
However, due to substantial threats posed by international groups, the 
United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has combined some of the law 
enforcement and domestic intelligence functions after the tragic events of 9/11.  The 
                                                 
19 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 5.   
20 Robert Livingston, “Germany’s Intelligence Failure,” The Washington Post, October 19, 2001.      
21 Intelligence Services. March 2006. Bibliographique Details,  7. DCAF. Available at 
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=F6E3356F-E85E-214F-40BD-
6E0D779248D3&lng=uk  (accessed April 26, 2007).    
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Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) involved various national defense 
units in domestic intelligence collection.22  An overlap of functions remained due to the 
necessity of increasing the level of security and public protection. 
Currently the FBI handles counterintelligence, law enforcement, and 
security intelligence functions within the U.S., while the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) maintains responsibility for intelligence gathering and counterintelligence outside 
the country.23  Although the Director of the CIA could be a military officer, the CIA is 
not placed under military control.  The CIA does not have any domestic role or police 
powers.24  
In order to separate domestic and foreign intelligence functions from the 
functions of law enforcement agencies, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia have 
created specialized intelligence agencies that are focused on domestic and international 
threats.25  Following this idea, both Canada and Romania created additional intelligence 
services: Criminal Intelligence Service (in Canada)26 and the Ministry of Justice’s 
General Directorate for Protection and Anticorruption (in Romania).27  Those agencies 
are responsible for collecting data on delinquency and organized crime within their prison 
system as well as corruption and the protection of state secrets.   
According to a national strategy to defeat serious crime and with the 
purpose not to mix intelligence and law enforcement functions, the British Intelligence 
                                                 
22 Report (online). 2003. Office of the Auditor-General of Canada. Chapter 10, section 10.121-10.137. 
Available at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20031110ce.html (accessed May 6, 2007).   
23 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of 
Control in New Democracies,” (proceedings from an international roundtable on intelligence and 
democracy, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August 
26-27, 2004), 15. 
24 Mark M. Lowenthal,  Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 2nd Ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2003) 20. 
25 Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’: Security Intelligence, the 
Police and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 
2004) Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Available at http//www.rand.org/ (accessed April 26, 2007).  
26 Canadian Criminal Intelligence Service is tasked with unifying criminal intelligence units of 
Canadian law enforcement agencies in the fight against the spread of organized crime in Canada. Available 
at http://www.cisc.gc.ca/about/about_cisc_e.htm (accessed April 26, 2007). 
27 Craig S. Smith, “Eastern Europe Struggles to Purge Security Services,” New York Times, December 
12, 2006. Available at http://majority.com/news/nyt12_12_6_1.htm (accessed April 26, 2007). 
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Community assists law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom through specialized 
services.  In this case, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) serves as the 
main interface between the national intelligence community and police criminal 
investigation departments.28   
The Directorate of Territorial Security (DTS) in France, which handles 
domestic intelligence, maintains an extremely close working relationship with French law 
enforcement agencies, the National Police and the National Gendarmerie.  However, their 
functions are reasonably separated.  The interaction between intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies is largely conducted through the Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit, 
a working-level coordination group that includes agencies from the Ministries of the 
Interior and Defense.29                 
b. Functional Professionalization of Intelligence Agencies 
A common norm of western democracies in the oversight of its 
intelligence is to separate it into different agencies, each with a different function.30  
“Where security and intelligence are combined in a single agency there is a fear that 
questionable techniques and operations may be undertaken domestically because much 
intelligence-related work is outside the law in any way.  The point is even stronger 
concerning separation of military intelligence.”31  Thus, each intelligence service should 
have just one mission.  If an intelligence agency performs too many missions, it 
accumulates power that is difficult to control.  
 Such separation divides tasks and responsibilities clearly among 
intelligence organizations in order to prevent any single agency from having a monopoly 
                                                 
28 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). June 2002. Annual Report 2001-2002. Cmnd.5542, 26. 
London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
29 Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’, 20.    
30 Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Introduction to Intelligence and Democracy: The Challenge of Control in 
New Democracies,” p. 16. (proceedings from an international roundtable on intelligence and democracy, 
Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August 26-27, 
2004), 16.   
31 Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies, 8-9.  
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on intelligence production or use.32  Foreign and domestic (security) intelligence 
functions are separated in many western democracies for precisely this reason.  It also 
precludes the emergence of multifunctional intelligence structures and the possibility of 
the appearance of a “state within the state.”33 
For instance, in order to enhance oversight, most western democracies 
organize intelligence functions so that only one intelligence agency in a country is 
responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT).34  In the U.S., the main agency that 
conducts SIGINT activity is the National Security Agency (NSA); in the United 
Kingdom, it is the Government Communications Headquarters;35 in Germany, it is the 
Federal Intelligence Service (BND);36 in Italy, it is the Intelligence and Military Security 
Service (SISMI);37 in Canada, it is the Canadian Forces Information Operations Groups 
(FIOG);38 and in Australia, it is the Defense Signal Directorate (DSD).39  
In an effort to make national intelligence agencies more accountable, both 
Canada and Australia enacted a division of the functions of their intelligence agencies in 
the early 1980s.40  The United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Austria, Belgium, 
                                                 
32 Bruneau  and  Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New 
Democracies,” 16.   
33 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Frank 
Cass, 1994) 82.  
34 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 199.  
35 Ian Leigh, “Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom.” Available in Who’s 
Watching the Spies, 80.   
36 Federation of American Scientists. Intelligence Services of Germany. Federal Intelligence Service 
(BND). Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/bnd/org.htm (accessed April 3, 2007). 
37 Information regarding the SISMI available at http://www.serviziinformazionesicurezza.gov.it/ 
pdcweb.nsf/pagine/ee_sismi (accessed April 26, 2007). 
38 Stuart Farson, “Canada’s Long Road from Model Law to Effective Political Oversight of Security 
and Intelligence.” Available in Who’s Watching the Spies, 101. 
39 Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’, 36.     
40 See Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act of 1984. Available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/ 
en/showdoc/cs/C-23/bo-ga:l_I//en (accessed April 18, 2007). Australian Security Intelligence Organization 
Amendment Act 1986. Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ 
asioaa1986n1221986586/ (accessed April 7, 2007). 
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Germany, and Sweden have also minimized the number of all-source intelligence 
agencies, establishing their functional professionalization.41   
Many transitional democracies use the experience of western democracies 
in making structural and functional changes.  Before joining the European Union and 
NATO, Romania reformed its intelligence system with the purpose of establishing better 
oversight and transparency.  It created the Special Telecommunication Service (STS),42 a 
single intelligence service that is responsible only for SIGINT.43  The Republic of 
Bulgaria and Czech Republic also minimized the number of their all-source intelligence 
agencies, having their SIGINT services separated from other members of the national 
intelligence community.44   
Intelligence oversight in democracies also requires functional 
professionalization in regard to covert and paramilitary operations.  This is important 
because these capabilities allow a government to be both a perpetrator and a target.45  No 
single solution exists regarding the best principle of establishing such oversight.  
However, as a general principle, only one agency should be assigned to conduct these 
operations, not the intelligence community as a whole.46  Moreover, it does not have to 
be done by intelligence.47  
Because of accountability problems with the CIA, which is responsible for 
conducting covert operations, some American experts argue that this activity should be 
                                                 
41 Intelligence Services. March 2006. Bibliographique Details: DCAF, 7. Available at 
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=F6E3356F-E85E-214F-40BD-
6E0D779248D3&lng=uk (accessed April 26, 2007).  
42 Information regarding the structure and tasks of the Romanian Telecommunication Service. 
Available at http://www.stsnet.ro/prezentation.htm (accessed April 27, 2007). 
43 Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies, 101.   
44 Intelligence Services. March 2006. Bibliographique Details. Table: Intelligence Services in Some 
European Countries, 7. DCAF. Available at  http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID= 
DCAF&fileid=F6E3356F-E85E-214F-40BD-6E0D779248D3&lng=uk (accessed April 26, 2007).  
45 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 263.  
46 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 8th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 55.  
47 Ibid., 54-56. 
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assigned to the Department of Defense. According to their point of view, this functional 
redirection would allow a better means of control over covert and paramilitary actions.48 
Among other agencies of the United Kingdom’s Intelligence Community, 
MI5 is assigned to fight “covertly organized threats to the nation” such as terrorism, 
espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.49  Some western 
democracies, such as Canada and Australia, have no experience in conducting such 
operations, so they do not have a specially assigned agency to perform such activity.  In 
ad hoc situations, the Canadian SIS has a close liaison with the Canadian Police, which 
can act inside the country by national law. 
Romania has a sour history in the conduct of covert actions.  Romanian 
intelligence agencies conducted covert operations both abroad and against their own 
people during the Communist period.  Officially, no information is available that 
specifies which organization of the Romanian Intelligence Community can conduct 
clandestine operations.  However, Romania still has some “secret” intelligence 
organizations that have not been made public, even after joining the Alliance and the 
EU.50   
c. Creation of All-Source Analysis Intelligence Organization 
The issue of oversight of the final intelligence product is crucial for a 
democracy, as it gives important knowledge and power in the decision-making process.  
It is clear that the greater the number of IC agencies, the more difficult it would be to  
 
 
                                                 
48 CRS Issue Brief for Congress. May 9, 2006. Intelligence Issues for Congress, 12. Library of 
Congress.  
49 Cabinet Office (UK). Security Service. The Security Service: MI5, n.d., 6. London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office.  
50 Cris Matei, “Romania’s Transition to Democracy: Civil Society and the Press’ Role in Intelligence 
Reform,” 4. Published in Naval Postgraduate School. Center of Civil-Military Relations. Monterey. 
California, 2005.  
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conduct effective oversight of their final intelligence products.51  In terms of effective 
control, it is better to have final intelligence produced in one place or by a single all-
source analysis agency.   
It is accepted in the West’s best-known intelligence institutions that it is 
vital and effective to first establish an organizational division between collection and all-
source analysis.52  Some western ideas of intelligence objectivity come from the fact that 
the collectors of intelligence should not have the final responsibility for evaluating their 
product.53  That separation allows better analysis and oversight of the final national 
intelligence estimation, which is sent to the policymakers.54  Moreover, the analysis of 
threats also requires that data from all intelligence sources (informational “pipes”) should 
be brought together so that analysts will have access to it on a timely basis.55   
After the tragic events of 9/11, western democracies realized the need for 
such a center in order to accumulate and control the flood of information and have a 
“single voice” assessment for policymakers.56  For example, the Integrated National 
Security Assessment Center was established in Canada in 2003 as an interagency analysis 
branch both to provide a single intelligence product and to enable Canada to respond 
more effectively to existing and emerging threats to its national security.57  That 
increased Canada’s capacity to oversee and analyze all-source foreign intelligence, which 
has traditionally fallen on organizations within the Privy Council Office and the 
Department of Foreign Affaires.58    
                                                 
51 Ian Leigh, “More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experience,” 9. Available in 
Who’s Watching the Spies.  
52 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War.  
53 Ibid., 112. 
54 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 
Commission Report. Washington. Government Printing Office.   
55 CRS Issue Brief for Congress. May 9, 2006. Intelligence Issues for Congress, 5. Library of 
Congress. 
56 Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. 2004. Washington. Government Printing Office.  
57 Information regarding the National Security Assessment Center. Available at http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder13.asp (accessed April 27, 2007). 
58 Canadian Security and Intelligence Community. 2001. Annual Report, 14. Privy Council Office.  
Ottawa. Government of Canada.  
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In the U.S., the creation of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) under the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence was a significant development with respect 
to oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  Actually, the position of Director of the 
Joint Intelligence Center was created to enhance the system of oversight over the final 
national intelligence product as well as to reduce data waste and unnecessary duplication 
within the intelligence community.59   
In Australia, the Office of National Assessments (ONA) was established 
in 2003. This all-source analysis think tank reports directly to the Prime Minister’s 
Office, which provides oversight of the final strategic intelligence product.60    
In Romania, its transitional democracy created a National Intelligence 
Community Center in 2005, which functions as an all-source analysis agency. The 
purpose of this reform was to increase control over the national intelligence estimations 
and report information promptly and directly to the National Defense Supreme Council 
and to the President.61   
Overall, functional division and structural changes inside intelligence 
communities are based on common principles that western and transitional democracies 
use to enhance the oversight of their intelligence agencies.  The separation of intelligence 
from the law enforcement function, professionalization of intelligence agencies, and 
creation of all-source analysis intelligence are common norms that help democracies to 
control organizations of the intelligence community.  This oversight is more effective if 
those norms are established within a legal framework and spelled out according to a 
national legislature.  
2.  Legislative Oversight 
Western democracies pay a great deal of attention to the effective conduct of 
legislative oversight of their intelligence communities.  Parliaments should make certain 
                                                 
59 Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform 
(Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 2006) 178.   
60 Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’, 36.   
61 Matei, “Romania’s Transition to Democracy,” 2.  
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that the civil rights of citizens are not impaired by the operations of the IC.  This 
oversight is vital for transitional democracies because it gives an elected government full 
power over the intelligence community and access to the information about intelligence 
agencies’ activities and their final intelligence product.   
Legislative oversight concerns the policies and administrative aspects of 
intelligence agencies, the efficiency of the intelligence community, and its budget, which 
gives a parliament power over intelligence.62  Western and transitional democracies look 
at this type of control through the prism of the common principles of intelligence 
oversight.63  The majority of these principles are identified and discussed in the following 
paragraphs of this chapter.  
a.  Organization and Mandate of Parliamentary Committees on 
Intelligence  
Permanent committee(s), usually termed in western parliaments the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), should be created by national legislatures to 
deal primarily with intelligence oversight.  This Committee should have a legal mandate 
where the power to control the entire intelligence community is emphasized.64 
For example, in Canada, the legal basis for the Intelligence Oversight 
Committee is the Parliamentary Act of February 3, 1995, and supplementary Instructions 
issued by the Parliament on May 30, 1995.  Together they form a detailed set of rules as 
to how oversight procedures are to be conducted, as well as the establishing the 
Committee’s powers of inquiry.65  The activities to be scrutinized by the Committee are 
defined functionally and not solely in reference to the agencies of the intelligence 
                                                 
62 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 199.  
63 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for 
Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (Oslo: Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005) 125-126. 
Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/legal_intel_oversight/Overview_of_Best_Practices.pdf (accessed 
April 26, 2007).  
64 Ibid. Overview of Best Practices. The Role of Parliament: The Mandate of Parliamentary Oversight 
Bodies, 125. 
65 Stuart Farson, “Canada’s Long Road from Model Law to Effective Political Oversight of Security 
and Intelligence.” Available in Who’s Watching the Spies, 124.  
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community. Should other governmental bodies conduct intelligence, they will also fall 
within the competence of the Committee.  This mandate also allows a parliamentary 
oversight body or other independent bodies of the state to conduct oversight, such as the 
National Audit Office, the Inspector General, an Ombudsman or a court.  
Source:  http://intelligence.house.gov, http://intelligence.senate.gov
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Figure 2.   Congressional Intelligence Committees, 110th Congress (2007-2008) 
 
In the U.S., the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) have broad jurisdiction over 
the national intelligence community.  The organization of these committees can be seen 
in Figure 2 above.66  Established in 1977 and 1978 respectively, both committees report 
authorization and other legislation for consideration by their chambers.  “Most of the 
jurisdiction of the current intelligence committees is shared.  The select committees hold 
exclusive authorizing and legislative powers only for the CIA, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the National Foreign Intelligence Program.  This leaves the intelligence 
                                                 
66 Created by Professor Richard Doyle. 2007. Naval Postgraduate School. Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy. Monterey. California. Available at http//intelligence.house.gov and 
http//intelligence.senate.gov (updated February 2007).       
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components in the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, 
among other agencies, to be shared with other standing committees of Congress,” notably 
the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee 
(HASC).67  These committees and their jurisdiction are displayed in Figure 3 below.68   
Source: CRS, Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues. Feb 15, 2007.
Figure 3. Oversight of Intelligence











Figure 3.   Oversight of Intelligence Authorization Legislation: House vs. Senate 
 
An Intelligence and Security Committee was also established in the United 
Kingdom under the Intelligence Services Act of 1994.69  The Committee is a statutory 
committee and has a task to examine the expenditures, policy, and administration of all 
three intelligence and security services.70  Its mandate also identifies periodicity to 
conduct oversight and time to report results.     
                                                 
67 Frederick M. Kaiser, February 15, 2007. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure 
and Alternatives. Chapter: House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, 2-3. CRS Report for 
Congress. Updated. Library of Congress.  
68 Created by Professor Richard Doyle. 2007. Naval Postgraduate School. Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy. Monterey. California. From: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report. 
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence. Current Structure and Alternatives. Intelligence Spending: Public 
Disclosure Issues. Updated February 15, 2007.      
69 The United Kingdom Intelligence Services Act of 1994. Available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
ACTS/acts1994/Ukpga_19940013_en_1.htm (accessed May 6, 2007).  
70 Leigh, “Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,” 87. 
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In both New Zealand and Australia, such committees have a statutory 
basis as well. New Zealand specifically established a parliamentary committee under the 
Intelligence and Security Committee Act of 1996 to examine the policy, administration, 
and expenditures of each intelligence agency.71 
The Norwegian model of intelligence oversight has a strong emphasis on 
legislative (as opposed to executive) oversight, conducted on behalf of the legislature by 
the Committee for Oversight of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Security Services.  
This Committee is appointed by and reports directly to the Norwegian parliament. Within 
its mandate, the Committee has extensive investigative powers over the whole of 
Norwegian intelligence.72   
In Romania, legislative oversight over intelligence agencies is carried out 
through the Committees for Defense, Public Order and National Security in both 
chambers of the Parliament.  The Senate committee is comprised of two   
parliamentarians.  Seven members make up the committee in the lower House of 
Deputies. These committees are empowered to verify constitutional and legal compliance 
of the services’ activities, investigate illegal intelligence collections, hold hearings on the 
presidential nominees for director positions, and assess the director’s annual reports, 
submitting their reviews to the full parliament.  Committees can also request data and 
investigate directors of intelligence agencies, and their staff members, as well as conduct 
unannounced visits with full access to the services.73   
In terms of enhancing parliamentary oversight of intelligence, some 
experts claim that a single (or joint) committee has the potential to be more effective than 
two (or separated) committees, due to its ability to concentrate and consolidate legislative 
and budgetary oversight authority.74  Accordingly, the U.S. 9/11 Commission proposed 
that Congress create a single Joint Intelligence Committee from the Senate and the House 
                                                 
71 Farson, “Canada’s Long Road,” 112.  
72 Frederik Sejersted, “Intelligence and Accountability in a State without Enemies: The Case of 
Norway.” Available in Who’s Watching the Spies, 120.  
73 Matei, “Romania’s Transition to Democracy,” 7.  
74 Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 2-3.  
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of Representatives.  This committee would have legislative and budgetary authority over 
the intelligence community.75  This proposed reform is also intended to “increase general 
oversight and force the CIA to meet planning and reporting obligations, as all other 
intelligence agencies do.”76  To date, however, Congress has not established such a joint 
committee.    
To be efficient, the ISC should also have the power to demand that heads 
of intelligence organizations, both civilian and military, testify at hearings.  Hearings are 
essential to intelligence oversight as a means of obtaining information from responsible 
officials and alternative views from outside experts.77  If necessary, hearings could be 
organized behind closed doors (for security purposes).   
In order to increase the effectiveness of oversight, intelligence committees 
use experts from the public, academia, and non-governmental organizations.  Committees 
such as these stimulate independent “think tanks” providing financial support and 
lowering the bureaucratic barriers for conducting research in this area of intelligence 
oversight and security studies.78   
Furthermore, legislative oversight systems frequently create independent 
agencies, such as the Bureau of Audit and Inspection in South Korea, the National 
Accounting Office in the United Kingdom and the Government Accountability Office in 
the U.S.  These agencies are tasked to check the intelligence community appropriations 
and management practices without having access to classified intelligence products.  For 
example, the creation of the institutionalized system (officers) of the Inspector General 
                                                 
75 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United states. July 22, 
2005, 420-421. 
76 Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 2-3.  
77 Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Bryan Pate, 2006, Rethinking Judicial Oversight of Intelligence: 
the Paradox of Foreign Intelligence Oversight. CRS Report for Congress. Library of Congress.   
78 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 12-13.  
 26
and Auditor General were very helpful in South Africa, aiding in investigations regarding 
intelligence activity and monitoring of the intelligence budget.79  
The ISC may also disclose information after determining that the public 
interest would better be served by such a disclosure.  It does not limit itself to the 
information that is requested.  On its own initiative, the intelligence organizations should 
provide information to the committee that is appropriate for complete understanding.   
b.  The Composition of the Oversight Committee and its Power to 
Obtain Information  
The representation of parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-
party.80  Parliament should be responsible for appointment and, where necessary, the 
removal of members of an oversight body exercising the oversight functions in its name.   
In the U.S., members of the congressional oversight committees are 
appointed by the House and Senate leaders.81   
The two panels also differ in size (21 on the House panel and 15 on the 
Senate counterpart, plus ex officio members on each), tenure, and other membership 
features, including partisan composition and leadership arrangements. Since its inception, 
the Senate panel has had only one more Member from the majority party than the 
minority (an eight-to-seven ratio); and its vice chairman, who takes over if the chair is 
unavailable, must come from the minority party. The House select committee, in contrast, 
reflected the full chamber party ratio when it was established in 1977: two-to-one plus 
one, resulting in an initial nine-to-four majority-minority party membership on the panel. 
In the meantime, however, the minority party has been granted additional seats on the 
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committee and the majority-minority party ratio in the full House has grown closer. The 
result is a select committee membership party ratio of 12-to-9 in the 1l0th Congress.82 
Comprised of members of both political parties, the Congressional 
oversight committees are authorized to fund intelligence activities, and to conduct 
investigations and audits.  The committees have a staff of around sixty members, and 
broad access to information.  The Director of National Intelligence has a statutory duty to 
keep the committees “fully informed of all intelligence activities.”  However, “the 
committees’ activity should not place intelligence sources and methods at risk.”83 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee is comprised of 
three to five members who are Privy Councilors (but not members of the House of 
Commons or Senate) appointed by the Canadian Governor.  It reviews the performance 
of the CSIS and investigates complaints.  It has a staff of twelve members and wide 
access to information under the control of the CSIS, except for Cabinet confidences.84 
A Parliamentary Control Panel is responsible for scrutinizing the work of 
the German intelligence community. The Bundestag itself decides on the number of its 
members, its composition and its working methods. At present, it is comprised of nine 
members from different political parties. The Panel can demand the submission of 
detailed information by the Federal Government on the general activity of the Federal 
Intelligence Services and on operations of particular importance.85 
The parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence Service is the main 
external oversight body for intelligence agencies in Australia.  The committee was 
established as part of the September 2001 Intelligence Service Act.  The new structure 
has been vested with vastly expanded powers of intelligence oversight and is mandated to  
 
 
                                                 
82 Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 4. 
83 Richard Best Jr. and Elizabeth B. Bazan, 2007, Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issue, 1.  
CRS Report for Congress. Updated February 15, 2007. 
84 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 18. 
85 Ibid., 18. 
 28
conduct investigations, either at its own behest or in response to a specific request from 
Parliament or the Attorney General into virtually all aspects of intelligence administration 
and finance.86   
The British parliament does not have a direct channel in monitoring the 
intelligence agencies.  Instead it monitors them indirectly by studying the reports of a 
statutory oversight committee — the Intelligence and Security Committee.  “Although all 
nine committee members are parliamentarians and representatives from different political 
wings, the committee does not report to the Parliament.  The committee instead reports to 
the Prime Minister who appoints the members of the committee.”87 
An interesting oversight system exists in France.  Actually, there is no 
separate parliamentary system of intelligence scrutiny in France. Accountability is 
provided through the Ministry of the Interior and is largely viewed as an ongoing, routine 
function of agency management instituted through the Interministerial Liaison 
Committee Against Terrorism.88  “This high-level body is empowered to establish ad hoc 
investigative commissions in the event that problems are found, but does not act as a 
conduit to the national legislature for the purposes of independent intelligence oversight.  
The lack of parliamentary control in France and difficulties with obtaining access to 
information is indicative of the country’s political structure and the degree of discretion 
that it contains across many areas of its governance.”89   
An Italian Parliamentary Committee is composed of four deputies and four 
senators.  They are appointed by the chairmen of the two chambers in proportion to the 
strength of parties in the two chambers.  The Committee may request that the President of 
the Council of Ministers and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Intelligence provide 
information on the essential issues of the Services.90 
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Many transitional democracies have established parliamentary oversight 
resembling the above mentioned principles.  For example, in South Korea, the ISC has 
both ruling and opposition party members.91  Each of the parties in the Romanian 
parliament is represented on Committees for Defense, Public Order, and National 
Security in both chambers of the Parliament.  However, “as members of committees have 
been selected more on political affiliation and less on professional interests, the activity 
of parliamentary oversight is sometimes affected by political interests.”92   
It is worth mentioning that the legislative oversight system works more 
effectively if members of the committee are empowered to have access to classified 
documents and a “black budget” of classified programs.93  In Canada, members of the 
SIRC decide upon their own work plan, when and how to conduct investigations of the 
intelligence sector and its budget programs. They have full access to intelligence 
agencies.94 
Members of congressional intelligence oversight committees in the U.S. 
and the Committee for Oversight of the Intelligence in Norway are very independent 
from executive bodies.  They can investigate what they choose to within their own 
mandate.  In addition to intelligence services, parliamentarians of these countries also 
have unlimited access to all intelligence service documents.95  In Argentina, the members 
of the intelligence oversight committee are appointed by the Parliament.  They are 
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completely independent from the executive branch and have full access to the intelligence 
agencies and their information without prior notification.96 
The process of the nomination of the chairman of the ISC is important for 
many democracies. In Western countries the chairman of the ISC should be elected by a 
parliament and approved by a president rather than appointed by the government.97  This 
allows the committee to be independent of the president.   
As a norm, the chairman should be a senior member of a parliament in the 
field of defense and security policy.  In some western democracies, the ISC chairman 
serves as a “watchdog” for the national intelligence community.  One of his primary 
tasks is to reduce political influence over the intelligence community.  For example, in 
Norway the chairman of the ISC should be politically “neutral” and, therefore, members 
of the ISC and its elected chairman are not members of the national Parliament.  The 
oversight they conduct is of a legalistic and professional rather than political nature.98   
Moreover, the period of duty should be increased and fixed for the 
members of the ISC in a way that their rotation will be in the midterm period between 
elections.  Parliamentarians assigned to serve in the ISC usually learn intelligence 
management in the beginning of their parliamentary career.  Once they have become 
knowledgeable and effective, they are nearing the end of their terms.99  This produces 
ineffective oversight.    
Finally, it is necessary to underline that in some western democracies 
parliamentarians may not be interested in serving on the ISC and supervising the 
intelligence community.   
For such parliamentarians, intelligence is a distraction from their other 
duties and from those issues likely to be of greatest interest to their 
constituents.  Once involved in scrutinizing intelligence activity, 
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parliamentarians can not discuss in public what they have accomplished.  
Dealing more with oversight issues, members on the committees have few 
opportunities to help their constituents.100   
Constituents usually prefer that parliamentarians address areas which are 
more understandable and relevant for them.  Furthermore, if something happened with 
intelligence and the situation went wrong, members of the ISC would be asked why they 
did not make important decisions to avoid this situation.  The case becomes even worse 
for them when a national disaster like 9/11 occurs.  Thus, the system of legislative 
oversight of intelligence could be jeopardized, except in cases of national emergencies 
and “soundness” scandals. 
3.  Executive Oversight 
In modern states, intelligence services play a vital role in serving and supporting 
the government in its foreign policy by supplying and analyzing relevant intelligence and 
countering specified threats.  However, it is essential that the agencies and officials who 
carry out these roles be under democratic control, rather than being accountable only to 
themselves.  “Executive oversight is needed in order to keep intelligence agencies 
effective and well-managed, like any other entity or public sector bureaucracy.”  For this 
particular purpose, it is vital for democracies to establish a centralized executive body to 
control the operations and management of the intelligence community, as well as access 
to the final intelligence product at different stages of the intelligence cycle.  
a.  The Establishment of a Centralized Executive Body (National 
Security Council) for Intelligence Oversight   
A centralized executive body should be established under the authority of 
the President in order to provide effective executive oversight of the intelligence 
community.101  In western democracies, such functions are performed by the National 
Security Council (NSC), which coordinates and controls all the activity of intelligence 
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agencies.  This body also serves as the highest-level organization within the executive 
branch that provides day-to-day oversight and policy direction of intelligence.102  In 
some countries, General Inspectors under the President and Cabinet of Ministers carry 
out these duties.  
The U.S. was the first country that established a NSC and provided a legal 
framework for its activity.   
The U.S. NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 
235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), and in two years was amended by the 
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 
et seq.).  In 1949 the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the 
President.  The U.S. NSC is chaired by the President.  Its regular attendees 
(both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.  The Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, 
and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor.103   
 
The NSC’s power over intelligence is considerable.  “The NSC evolved in 
symbiosis with the U.S. intelligence system, has a close working connection with it, and 
may perhaps have been influenced by it.”104  
Concerning executive oversight of intelligence, the Canadian Deputy 
Prime Minister (CDPM) is responsible not only for the Cabinet Committee (like the 
NSC) dealing with all matters of national security, but also for a new and expanded 
security and intelligence portfolio (like the chief of the intelligence community).  He is 
Canada’s first national security advisor and reports directly to the Prime Minister.105  The 
Canadian Security Service Act also established the Executive Directorate of the Inspector 
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General (EDIG), which reports to the Deputy Solicitor General, reviewing the 
performance of the intelligence services’ duties, functions, and funding.106  
Executive control of British intelligence is based on the Cabinet structure 
and its supporting Cabinet Office.107  The Prime Minister is responsible for all 
intelligence issues with the support of the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence 
Services, which serves an oversight and policy review function.  The Prime Minister 
chairs the committee, which also includes the deputy prime minister.   
Each Cabinet ministry has a permanent undersecretary, its senior civil 
servant who has power over administrative and budget issues. The 
relevant permanent undersecretaries make up the Permanent Secretaries’ 
Committee on Intelligence Services (something like the NSC), which is 
chaired by the Cabinet Secretary.  The Committee provides periodic 
advice on collection requirements, budgets, and other issues. A security 
and intelligence coordinator, who is also a career civil servant, supports 
the ministerial committee, assists the permanent undersecretaries in 
dealing with the intelligence budget, and oversees the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) and the Cabinet Office Intelligence and Security 
Secretariat. The JIC serves as a link between policy makers and the 
intelligence components to establish and order priorities, which are then 
approved by the ministers. The JIC also periodically reviews agency 
performance in meeting established requirements.108 
In France, there was no executive branch organization to coordinate the 
intelligence services until 1993.  Low effectiveness, poor quality analysis, and difficulties 
of acceptance by policy-makers had afflicted the intelligence community.109  After 
creation of the Committee of Ministers (like the NSC), coordination among national 
intelligence agencies has increased.   
In Romania, the NSC has supreme power in coordinating the activity of 
the national intelligence community.  The Council reports directly to the President.  
However, “the Prime Minister is empowered to exercise control over the intelligence 
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community in crisis situations.  He also may, in coordination with the President and the 
NSC, summon the directors of the agencies to solve important national issues where 
intelligence is needed.” 110  
In western democracies, the NSC tasks intelligence services to report to 
the relevant authorities, such as the President, Prime Minister, and relevant ministers.  
The intelligence services also send a public report to the Parliament, for debate during the 
plenary gatherings.  In the U.S., for example, Congress often mandates that the 
intelligence executives should report to Congress on a regular basis (usually annually).  
Usually, reports are related to the specific issues, such as human rights practices in 
foreign nations, the arms control impact of new weapon systems or, after 9/11, 
international terrorism.111   
In the Netherlands, the intelligence services provide an annual report to 
the Parliament (the Second Chamber) regarding their activity and final results.  The 
overall report, in the form of a hearing, is usually delivered behind closed doors.112  In 
Norway, by law, intelligence organizations can inform the parliament about certain 
issues.  According to the Parliamentary Act of February 3, 1995, reports to Parliament 
must be unclassified.113  In addition, in some western countries, the NSC is responsible to 
send a classified report to the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee.  In this 
case, the report should be reviewed behind closed doors.114       
Furthermore, many governments, such as the United Kingdom and 
Canada, have established boards of officers who oversee the intelligence services’ 
activities.  These governmental oversight committees are staffed with highly respected 
and qualified individuals, such as former members of parliament and experts from 
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ministries and academia.  They periodically review intelligence services in terms of 
efficiency, legality, and managerial decisions regarding information and expenditures. 
Some transitional democracies have been suffering from the lack of 
executive control.  For example, inadequate executive control at the ministerial level and 
absence of production of intelligence community final assessments, such as national 
intelligence estimates, negatively influences the decision-making process in the Russian 
Federation.115  The special clusters under the NSC and Cabinet of Ministers (inspectors, 
specialists) provide executive control over the intelligence agencies in South Africa 
(checking duties, responsibilities, spending, function coordination, etc).  However, these 
clusters do not have direct access to the intelligence agencies and cannot perform 
executive control duties over the intelligence process without prior notice to the chief of 
intelligence and authority to interrupt it.116 
b.  Control of the Final Intelligence Product  
Executive control usually seeks to determine if the intelligence 
agency/community functions efficiently and performs its duty properly according to the 
law.  To execute this type of control, executives should have access to the final 
intelligence product — information which goes to policy-makers.117  This data should be 
“locked” inside the intelligence organization.  One of the main issues involved in this 
type of oversight is the need to supervise information at each stage of the intelligence 
cycle (collection, processing, analysis and dissemination) to avoid situations where the 
data leaves the system without approval by the top organizational management.   
Leaks of intelligence information and classified data from intelligence 
organizations are the main features that indicate failure of intelligence executives to  
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control the final intelligence product.  Usually, civil society agencies (like the mass 
media) operate as an ad hoc form of accountability that “registers” these leaks and 
informs society about them.118 
Western democracies have been utilizing advanced informational 
technologies to protect intelligence data, as well as strict operational procedures to work 
with it, which had been established during the Cold War nuclear stalemate.  No leaks 
related to this issue were registered in Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom.119  
Occasionally, intelligence information or secret data leaks to the press from intelligence 
organizations in Poland.  Leaks happen very rarely in the U.S.120   
Inability to control the final intelligence product or intelligence data is a 
common weakness within intelligence agencies in transitional democracies.  Sometimes 
an agency’s management does not have strict regulations and computerized mechanisms 
for checking and controlling access to intelligence products.  The situation becomes even 
worse if this information can be easily “found” by hackers or corrupted officers and 
servicemen who oppose the democratically elected leaders and state interests. 
A situation of this kind took place in Ukraine in June 2006, when two 
million electronic files of top-secret and highly confidential information regarding the 
operational activity of the Secret Service of Ukraine (intelligence and law enforcement 
agency) were stolen by illegally copying from the main Service’s server.121  The internal 
investigation found that intelligence data protection should be part of strict executive 
control.  The lesson learned was that executive supervision over the intelligence product 
(as well as its archives) should be enforced at the different stages of the intelligence cycle 
in order to protect data acquired from highly sensitive sources.   
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C.  SUMMARY 
Analysis of common principles of intelligence oversight in western and 
transitional democracies suggests that these norms are workable and effective for 
political leaders, parliamentarians, and the public. Intelligence agencies must be 
increasingly transparent and accountable to the public through oversight.   
Western democracies have developed a set of common norms in conducting 
oversight of intelligence communities.  Those norms are related to the framework, 
functional definition and professionalization of intelligence agencies, as well as the 
establishment of strict legislative and executive oversight organizations and procedures.  
Most western and transitional democracies have separated national intelligence 
functions from the tasks of law-enforcement agencies.  It allows them to minimize the 
number of all-source intelligence organizations and establish functional definition and 
intelligence professionalization among agencies of the national intelligence community.  
The principles also show the importance of the creation of an all-source analysis 
intelligence agency that helps democratically elected leaders to control the final 
intelligence product and minimize different estimations in the decision-making process.   
Parliamentary oversight for intelligence is vital for democracy, as it provides 
legislative procedures for accountability.  Legislative oversight primarily concerns 
budgets and the scope and nature of intelligence gathering.  It gives elected officials 
power over the operations of intelligence agencies, as well as their products and their 
budget.   
As a norm, the democratic parliaments establish specialized committees that deal 
with intelligence issues.  The committee should have a legal mandate to conduct 
oversight and represent the views of all political parties.  Their views should not place 
methods and sources of intelligence at risk.  
Western democracies have strengthened executive oversight of their intelligence 
communities, which allowed them to obtain timely information regarding the usage of 
intelligence resources and allocation of their funds.  The most important principles of  
 
 38
executive oversight are the establishment of the national executive centralized body and 
enhancing control over the final intelligence product at the different stages of the 
intelligence process.   
Executives should periodically report to the parliament concerning intelligence 
activity and supervise clear tasking of intelligence agencies. Executive oversight also 
maintains strict managerial control of the intelligence community and administrative 
procedures regarding spending.   
The budget control mechanism is the key element of successful oversight of 
intelligence.  The next chapter will describe how some western and transitional 
democracies oversee the intelligence budget and what procedures they use to control 






III. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN WESTERN AND 
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES:  COMMON PRINCIPLES AND 
PROBLEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Budget control is one of the main tasks of parliamentary and executive oversight 
of the intelligence community (IC).  It is obvious that most western democracies have 
developed national systems of conducting this type of control and try to use it efficiently 
and continually.  No single answer exists as to which system of intelligence budget 
oversight is good and which is not.  The norms of this type of oversight in western 
democracies are different from country to country.  However, it is widely thought that the 
intelligence budget oversight mechanism is efficient if it provides correct and timely 
information to the parliament and executives regarding the effectiveness of allocation and 
usage of intelligence funds.  
Most western and transitional democracies conduct intelligence budget oversight 
primarily through their parliaments, because their intelligence oversight systems are 
usually designed to monitor executive decisions inside the IC.  Executives mainly 
perform managerial control over the appropriateness of intelligence budget spending.  
The level of political inventiveness and willingness to perform this role is also different 
among western democracies.  Quite different patterns of intelligence budget oversight 
have emerged in the established democracies of the U.S., the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.122  However, those patterns have common principles or key 
elements of effective intelligence budget oversight.  Those oversight principles are 
unique for the “majority of countries of the Euro-Atlantic area”123 and call for enhancing 
the level of intelligence budget transparency and accountability.  The principles will be 
outlined in this chapter. 
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B.  COMMON PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN 
WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES  
1.  Laws and Parliamentary Access to Obtain Intelligence Budget 
Information  
The rights of parliaments to oversee intelligence and security budgets should be 
clearly spelled out in the national laws.124  Based on these laws, most western 
parliaments have mandated special committees to execute this type of control and enacted 
official procedures to obtain information from the intelligence executives.   
In Australia, the Statutory Parliamentary Committee was established according to 
the Security Organization Act of 1979. This law gives the committee authority to oversee 
secret budgets and to obtain information regarding expenditures of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), as well as other agencies (DSD — the signal 
intelligence agency and ASIS — the secret intelligence service).125  
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act of 1984 established the Security 
Intelligence Review Committee.  This committee has an official mandate to conduct 
intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.126  It can monitor the intelligence budget 
and has the authority to request and obtain information regarding intelligence 
expenditures. 
The Intelligence and Security Committee was established in the United Kingdom 
under the Intelligence Services Act of 1994.  Its nine members, drawn from both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords, can examine the expenditures, policy and  
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administration of all three intelligence and security services.127  However, the committee 
scrutinizes intelligence finance issues together with the Public Accounts Committee and 
has no power of authorization.  
In Norway, a special committee was appointed in 1994 to draft legislation for 
intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.  In 1995, the Norwegian parliament 
adopted the Parliamentary Act of February 3, which established the new Intelligence 
Oversight Committee with a mandate for oversight of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Security Services. This committee began work in the spring of 1996 with legislative 
authority to also conduct intelligence budget oversight.128   
Article 13.9 of the Argentinean National Intelligence Law No. 25520 of 2001 
specifies that the established Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) has the 
right to approve the National Intelligence Plan and conduct control over expenditures for 
intelligence activities.129  According to this law, the Secretariat of Intelligence should 
submit its budget requirements to the JCOC and is responsible for executing the specific 
budget for intelligence. The law emphasizes that the Secretariat of Intelligence should 
also provide information to the JCOC regarding the classified appendix, comprised of the 
purposes of the intelligence program and its cost.  
In Belgium, the parliamentary Committee on Intelligence, by law, ensures the 
coordination and efficiency of intelligence and its budget.  Its staff is able to obtain the 
necessary information and documents from the intelligence services and has access to 
their installations without prior notification.  The intelligence services must disclose 
information to the committee.130    
“The House and the Senate committees on intelligence are responsible for 
oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community and, by law, must take very seriously their 
                                                 
127 Ian Leigh, “Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom.” In Who’s 
Watching the Spies, 87.  
128 Sejersted, “Intelligence and Accountability in a State without Enemies,” 124. 
129 Estevez, “Executive and Legislative Oversight of the Intelligence System in Argentina.” In Who’s 
Watching the Spies, 170.   
130 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 19. 
 42
obligation to hold intelligence officials accountable to the public for the activities they 
manage and conduct.”131  Only a small part of the U.S. intelligence budget is made 
public.  However, “spending for most intelligence programs is described in classified 
annexes to intelligence and national defense authorization and appropriation legislation.  
Members of Congress have access to these annexes, but must take special arrangements 
to read them.”132   
Thus, for successful budget oversight, a legal base should be adopted by a 
democratically elected parliament.  This legislation should give parliamentarians power 
to oversee an intelligence budget and the exclusive right to have access to obtain secret 
information regarding intelligence expenditures.  
2.  Oversight through Parliamentary Participation in the Intelligence 
Budget Cycle  
Western democracies have made transparency and accountability the most 
important constitutional requirements, especially with regard to the national and 
intelligence budget process.  This common principle is based on the assumption that 
parliamentarians can be effective in intelligence oversight through active participation 
and controlling the four main phases of the typical budget cycle: preparation, approval, 
execution, and audit (review).133  
a.  Budget Preparation  
Budget preparation is the phase when intelligence executives propose 
funding for intelligence programs.  In western and some transitional democracies, 
parliamentarians contribute to this process through different formal and informal 
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procedures.  Usually, they conduct informal consultations and hold official meetings with 
intelligence executives to discuss budget preparation issues. 
In the United Kingdom, members of the relevant committee and the 
government assist each other and sometimes work together on the issue of the preparation 
of the intelligence budget.  The committee can scrutinize intelligence finances and has 
access to information regarding general intelligence expenditures without authorization 
power.134   
One area in which the intelligence oversight committee and the 
government of the United Kingdom have had a long-running disagreement concerns 
publication of the intelligence budget.  The committee has consistently argued that 
publication of the information is not sensitive, as long as it is not done every year and has 
official agreement of the agency heads to publication.135 
In Poland, the parliamentary Commission for Secret Services does not 
check the effectiveness of intelligence services.  However, it has the power to participate 
in drafting the intelligence budget and checking its implementation.136 The commission 
also examines reports concerning annual intelligence budget expenditures.137 
A key feature promoted by Argentinean legislators is that parliament 
actively participates in oversight of the secret intelligence budget and expenditures.  For 
this purpose the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee may intervene in the 
discussion of the intelligence budget.138  The intelligence executives are obliged to 
submit every document, as needed, to responsible parliamentarians, as well as discuss 
with them the amount of money needed for approval.  They should also provide 
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information regarding the classified appendix, comprised of the purpose of the 
intelligence program and the subject of the future expenditures. 
According to Romanian law, a Special Commission over Intelligence 
Services can participate in drafting the intelligence budget.  Services submit reports to the 
commission at its request.139  
In the U.S., during the intelligence budget preparation stage, the 
intelligence executives have a certain freedom in planning and requesting the budgets of 
their intelligence agencies.  The formalized budget requests should be submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget, which reviews them before submitting the final 
intelligence budget proposals to Congress.   
Both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) possess authorization power over 
the intelligence budget.  By its nature, authorization is an oversight function.  That is, 
during this period, the committees are empowered to conduct consultations with 
intelligence executives, investigations, and even audits and inquiries as may be required.  
Moreover, HPSCI and SSCI both have exclusive oversight jurisdiction, in their respective 
chambers, over the CIA budget, including the CIA Programs and the CIA Retirement and 
Disability System.140  “Congress’s budgetary authority implies the authority to scrutinize 
how the money that Congress has appropriated is being spent – whether it is being spent 
prudently and on the activities for which it was appropriated.” 141  The House and Senate 
committees can not make an appropriate conclusion during the budget preparation stage 
on “how much money to appropriate for intelligence, or for particular intelligence 
agencies or programs…without knowing a great deal about how, and how well, the 
intelligence system operates.”142  
                                                 
139 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 19. 
140 Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 8-11. 
141 Posner, Uncertain Shield, 196.  
142 Ibid. 
 45
Despite the fact that the members of the respective committees do not 
influence the process of intelligence budget preparation (only intelligence executives are 
highly involved in this process), “the parliamentarians provide essential oversight 
responsibilities in the next budget phases, in order to assist the intelligence community in 
the establishment of priorities from the many possible ways to spend the annual 
intelligence dollar.”143 
The intelligence budget preparation phase is more important for countries 
which exercise a one year budget cycle.  Informal consultations and formal meetings can 
reduce time spent negotiating with parliamentarians during the approval stage of the 
intelligence budget process.     
b.  Budget Approval  
Budget approval is the phase when the parliamentarians should be able to 
study and determine public interest in the money allocation and may, in certain contexts, 
complement intelligence-related appropriations with specific guidelines.144 This phase 
requires highly qualified specialists and discussions inside the parliament’s committees.   
During this phase parliamentarians, particularly members of the 
responsible committees, can ask intelligence executives to explain the necessity of 
financing certain intelligence programs.  Hearings usually take place within the 
committees responsible for oversight.  If the justifications are not satisfactory, the 
parliamentarians can call executives to defend intelligence budget propositions during the 
open parliamentary session, or during closed meetings with representatives of 
intelligence, budget, appropriation, financial, and economic committees.   
It is important to obtain high-quality input during the intelligence budget 
approval process.  In the U.S., the intelligence budget oversight system is complicated 
but workable, as it provides significant amounts of information to the parliamentarians 
regarding the budgets of intelligence agencies.    
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For budgetary and oversight purposes, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 
spending is divided between the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP).  The national intelligence programs support “national-level 
decision making and are conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and 
other Washington-area agencies. The military intelligence programs are those undertaken 
by DOD agencies in support of defense policymaking and of military commanders 
throughout the world.”145   
The NIP budget is submitted and justified to the Congress by the Director 
of National Intelligence.  The MIP budget is developed and justified by the Secretary of 
Defense.  The budget requests for the NIP and MIP are very detailed funding plans, 
broken down into major program categories and, then, into specific elements under each 
major grouping.146   
While the House and the Senate select intelligence committees are the 
focal point for any discussion of congressional intelligence budget oversight (as noted in 
Chapter II), they are not the only committees involved in scrutinizing intelligence funds 
during the approval stage of the intelligence budget cycle.  In the U.S. Congress, four 
other committees are also heavily involved in this function.  These are the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC), and the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC).147   
The Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees have parallel 
jurisdictions.  Under the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, jurisdiction over 
appropriations for the sixteen agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community is split among 
                                                 
145 Richard A. Best Jr. and Elizabeth B. Bazan, February 15, 2007. Intelligence Spending: Public 
Disclosure Issue, 3. CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service.  
146 Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience. October 1994. Report. 
Prepared by The Select Committee On Intelligence. 103rd Congress. 2nd Session. The U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C.     
147 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 8-11.    
 47
five subcommittees.148  In the U.S., “all of the intelligence agencies and units are 
administratively part of various U.S. departments, except two: the CIA and the Office of 
the Director of the Central Intelligence.  Appropriations for all other intelligence agencies 
and units are reported by the subcommittees with jurisdiction over the parent 
department.”149  The major parts of intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdictions 
of the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, which have jurisdiction 
over all Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence programs, which account for 
approximately eighty percent of all U.S. spending for intelligence.150            
Thus, several congressional committees are involved in intelligence 
budget oversight and appropriations during the approval stage of the intelligence budget 
cycle in the U.S.  In order to enhance oversight during this stage,  
The House and Senate appropriations subcommittees hold hearings on the 
segments of the budget under their jurisdiction.  They focus on the details 
of the agencies’ justifications, primarily obtaining testimony from 
agencies officials.  After the hearings have been completed and the House 
and Senate appropriation committees have generally received their 
spending ceilings, the subcommittees begin to mark up the regular bills 
under their jurisdiction and report them to their respective full 
committees.151   
To help expedite the budget process, legislative and executive staffs can 
meet to discuss the economic outlook, projected spending and any other relevant issues.  
But the hearings for the intelligence budget are closed. 
Similarly, the Netherlands Second Chamber, which has a standing 
committee responsible for intelligence services, meets behind closed doors to discuss  
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intelligence budget appropriations.  The committee and the Chamber have a right to 
request any data regarding the intelligence budget and can influence the process of 
intelligence budget approval and execution.152       
c.  Budget Execution  
Budget execution (spending) is the phase when a parliament reviews and 
monitors government spending for the intelligence sector and may require procedures 
that allow for transparency and accountability.  Active participation in this phase allows 
parliamentarians to be familiar with the current intelligence programs and the processes 
of their funding.   
However, in practice, parliaments are not really involved in the execution 
stage and give intelligence executives broad power to manage intelligence funds.  Thus, 
parliament’s power to oversee and control the intelligence budget lies in reviewing 
intelligence agencies’ budgets when proposed (budget preparations), and then deciding 
what to approve (budget approval). 
For example, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland and Argentina 
provide intelligence budget oversight systems that allow parliamentarians to examine 
current intelligence service reports regarding budgets and to check their 
implementation.153  However, in practice, parliamentary influence during the execution 
phase is minimized in many western and transitional democracies.    
During the budget execution phase in the U.S., Congress controls the 
budget of the executive branch.  
But it does not follow that Congress can condition the grant of essential 
funds to executive agencies on the agencies’ submitting to congressional 
management of their activities.  Congress controls the budget of the 
federal courts too, but it could not say to them you may not have any 
money unless you agree to submit all your decisions to Congress for its 
approval before issuing them.  It is not as if congressional control of the  
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[intelligence] budget implied congressional control over the details of 
spending.  The contrary has long been assumed, specifically with 
reference to intelligence.154  
Thus, Congress requires certifying what sums intelligence agencies have 
spent, but allows intelligence executives to conceal both the purposes and recipients of 
payments from the funds.155  
d.  Budget Audit  
To get full information regarding the propriety of intelligence 
expenditures, the parliament can call for audits and additional reviews during or after the 
budget execution process.  Budget audit (or review) is the phase when parliamentarians 
determine whether there has been inappropriate use of money allocated by the 
government to the intelligence sector.  Parliaments should periodically evaluate the entire 
intelligence budget to ensure accountability, efficiency and accuracy of its spending.156   
For this reason, many western and transitional democracies have 
institutionalized Inspectors General or General Auditors — special parliamentary officers 
with statutory powers of access to information, staff and budgets — in order to check on 
the activities of intelligence agencies.157  The Auditor General should be appointed by 
the parliament and have resources to function independently.  As a rule, the Auditor 
General should have authority to report either to the parliament or its budget and 
intelligence oversight committees on any matter of suspicious intelligence expenditures at 
any time. 
In the U.S., each organization within the IC has an Inspector General (IG), 
either administrative (appointed by the agency) or statutory (established by law), with the 
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responsibility for insuring that funds made available to that organization are used 
properly.  These IGs usually carry out “inspections, investigations, and audits of the 
intelligence activities under his or her purview.  Large intelligence elements, including 
the CIA, have their own IG; smaller ones come under the IG of their parent organization.  
Several intelligence components of the Department of Defense have their own IG and 
also are within the purview of the DoD IG.”158    
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention (IRTP) Act of 
2004 provided the newly established Director of National Intelligence (DNI) the 
authority to establish an IG within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.159  
The DNI has, in fact, used this authority (see Figure 4).160  This IG is charged 
with planning, conducting, supervising and coordinating “inspections, audits, 
investigations, and other inquiries relating to the programs and operations of the ODNI 
and the authorities and responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence.”161   
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Figure 4.   The Organization of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence          
 
The office is also charged with “detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; 
evaluating performance; and making recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness in the ODNI and the Intelligence” as a whole.162  In addition, within the 
White House the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board “conducts independent 
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oversight investigations as required and reviews the oversight practices and procedures of 
the inspectors general and general counsels of intelligence agencies.”163   
One of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding the 
enhancing of intelligence budget oversight was “to expand the independent authority of 
the Government Accountability Office over the intelligence community, particularly the 
CIA, and increase the coordinative power among relevant inspectors generals improving 
their reporting capabilities to Congress, where needed.”164 
The GAO is an independent agency in the legislative Branch, headed by 
the Comptroller of the United States. It performs audits of executive 
agencies and departments to ensure accountability of funds appropriated 
by the Congress. Its staff also collects, tests, and analyzes data to provide 
oral briefings, testimony, and written reports to congressional committees. 
One of its main operational elements, the National Security and 
International Affairs Division (NSIAD), performs studies and analyses 
and issues reports covering a broad range of programs concerned with 
national security, international political, economic, and military interests 
of the U.S.  The NSIAD evaluators support congressional intelligence 
oversight through systems-oriented budget reviews of a wide range of 
contracts for intelligence and defense systems. They review the accuracy 
of estimates, the continuing validity of assumptions, the appropriateness of 
contract modifications, and the like, as well as adjudicating bid protests. 
The Division also does performance oriented, broad management reviews 
of entire intelligence agencies.165   
The work of GAO auditors includes compliance, operational, and financial 
audits.166  These assignments include audits of any governmental agencies, including 
intelligence organizations, to determine that their spending programs follow the intent of 
Congress and operational audits to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of selected  
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intelligence programs.  The auditors also conduct examinations of corporations holding 
government contracts to verify that contract payments by the government have been 
proper.       
The National Audit Office (NAO) in the United Kingdom monitors the 
execution of the intelligence budget.  The NAO responds to parliamentary requests for 
intelligence budget information and produces reports for public consumption.167 
In some transitional democracies, independent organizations outside the 
executive branch are established in the constitution to perform audits, such as the Court 
of Audit in Romania.168  The institution of the Auditors General is established and 
effective in South Africa.  Together with the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 
the Auditors General monitor the relevant intelligence budgets and have purview over the 
financial management of the services.169  Moreover, information regarding the 
intelligence budget and the proceedings of the committee is available to the public from 
the official intelligence Website.   
Western democracies have recognized that a modern Audit Office should 
ensure the proper use of public funds based on three criteria: “the value of money (to 
ensure that the resources used were put to optimal use, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively), effectiveness (to measure to what extent objectives and aims were met), 
and efficiency (to measure whether the resources used were used optimally to obtain the 
results obtained).”170  Based on these criteria, the Auditor General can approve or 
disapprove expenditures used for intelligence gathering.  For example, in 2003 the 
Canadian Auditor General identified three units within the Department of National 
Defense involved in intelligence gathering and their expenditures were approved for this 
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activity.171  Thus, the essence of these budget audits is that they help parliaments oversee 
and, if necessary, change the government’s policies regarding intelligence activity and its 
budget. 
Furthermore, an effective audit and intelligence budget oversight can 
occur if parliament requires that all expenditures for intelligence be presented in one 
single consolidated budget document.172  The principle of periodicity in Generally 
Accepted Accounting Rules also suggests the need for specifying the time-frame during 
which allocations for intelligence will be spent. 173   
For better audit and budget control, the number and description of every 
budget item should result in a clear overview of the government’s expenditures.174  Some 
western parliamentary systems (the German and Dutch) and initiate hundreds of 
budgetary amendments each year and review budget proposals in detail, including 
intelligence.175  In  other democracies (Denmark, Luxembourg), the parliament is even 
provided with information on the line items of the budget for the Armed Forces and 
intelligence agencies, the most detailed level of budgeting.  In France, Greece, and 
Poland, the parliamentary committee on security and defense is the only one to be 
presented with information on the intelligence budget items.176  No prior notification is 
required to check intelligence budget expenditures for members of the intelligence 
oversight committee in the parliaments of Argentina, Canada, South Africa, South Korea, 
and the United Kingdom.177   
                                                 
171 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report, 2003: Chapter 10 section 10.123. Available at 
www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20031110ce.html (accessed April 7, 2007).  
172 Handbook for Parliamentarians, 129. 
173 Charles H. Gibson, Financial Reporting Analysis: Using Financial Accounting Information, 10th 
ed. (Stamford, Connecticut: Thomson South-Western, 2007) 10-18.   
174 Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable, 129. 
175 Budget Influencing Parliaments. September 2006. Parliament’s Role in Defense Budgeting, 6. 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Backgrounder. Available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=25263&nav1=4 (accessed April 12, 2007).    
176 Ibid., 136. 
177 Born and Johnson, “Balancing Operational Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy. The Revolution 
in Intelligence Oversight. Table: Comparison of the External and Parliamentary Oversight Bodies in Eight 
Selected Democracies,” 230.  
 55
In the U.S., spending for intelligence programs is depicted in classified 
intelligence budget annexes.  All members of Congress, as well as authorized staff of the 
oversight committees, have access to these annexes.  Yet, they must make special 
arrangements to get this information.178     
Finally, in order to carry out an effective audit of intelligence 
expenditures, the parliament should provide an opportunity for experts from specialized 
audit offices to express judgments regarding the intelligence budget.  This means that all 
intelligence budget documents should have a user-friendly structure that allows reading 
by those individuals or organizations.  There is no information available on how this 
norm is achieved by western and transitional democracies.  An audit of intelligence 
spending along with intelligence budget oversight will be more effective if authorized 
qualified experts conduct analyses and provide their conclusions to the parliament.  
However, the user-friendly structure of the intelligence budget must not place the 
intelligence community’s sources and methods at risk.179   
Regarding the issue of IC budget transparency, the U.S. Congress recently 
considered new intelligence budget oversight procedures that would make information 
related to intelligence budgets more transparent to the public.  The Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence launched an effort to aggressively examine a full range of 
intelligence program spending in Iraq, Iran, North Korea and counter-terrorism programs 
of the CIA and NSA.  This procedure would streamline the budget process and improve 
oversight of key intelligence programs.180  This was part of the fiscal year 2007 
authorization bill “that called on the president to annually make public what the National 
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Intelligence Program costs.”181  However, that bill never became law — one of the few 
times that Congress failed to complete its annual intelligence authorization legislation.  
C.  COMMON PROBLEMS OF INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
1.  Lack of Information Regarding Intelligence Expenditures  
One common problem of intelligence budget oversight is a lack of transparency 
and information on intelligence expenditures. 
A lack of transparency in intelligence budgeting is often connected to 
archaic budget designs or poorly-defined intelligence objectives.  This also 
relates to the absence of multidisciplinary expertise in the national 
statutory audit organizations, weak constitutional requirements for the 
provision of information for the public examination of decisions, and a 
bureaucratic attitude, which prefers confidentiality to accountability.182  
In order to enforce transparency in intelligence expenditures, in 1998, Ravinder 
Pal Singh proposed that the U.S. parliamentarians established three levels of 
classification for intelligence budgets.  These three levels are as follows: “general budget 
information presented to Congress; classified capital and operating expenditures, which 
may be scrutinized by a special oversight subcommittee; expenditures relating to higher 
levels of military classifications, which may be scrutinized by a representative group of 
members of a scrutiny committee.  The scrutiny committee should be given access to 
classified documents according to established procedures set out in a national secrecy 
act.”183   
This three-level classification system of the budget of intelligence agencies can be 
adopted by most transitional democracies as a reasonable tool for disclosure and control 
of intelligence expenditures.  It should be in keeping with the law, more especially the 
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law on freedom of information, and help in finding the appropriate balance between 
secrecy and transparency.  This technique also allows avoiding negative public debates 
concerning intelligence budgets and providing an appropriate way to check that 
information “without placing the intelligence sources and methods of operational activity 
at risk.”184 
Some intelligence budget oversight problems are connected to difficulties in 
obtaining information regarding spending for intelligence.  Intelligence expenditures can 
be “hidden” inside non-intelligence budgets. Intelligence spending on infrastructure, 
transportation and logistics is often transferred to the budgets of other organizations and 
ministries, such as welfare, housing, acquisition, and supply.  These “hidden” 
appropriations misrepresent the data for the intelligence budget in some democracies and 
degrade the ability of the parliament to make valid assessments regarding the real 
expenditures for intelligence. 
The Romanian Intelligence Community has a complicated structure. “It is 
difficult to monitor the intelligence community’s funds because money for intelligence 
activity is sometime taken from non-budgetary resources.”185   
Finally, in some countries, the complicated intelligence budget structures can 
create cases where parliamentarians are not able to determine the exact amount of funds 
dedicated to the intelligence agencies.  Parliamentarians, in those cases, must make their 
decisions regarding final appropriations based on the data about defense and intelligence 
allocations that is mixed.  Such complexity raises the question of when and where 
parliamentarians in western and transitional democracies actually cast effective votes for 
the entire intelligence budget. 
2.  Lack of Clear Legislation 
Finding the right balance between secrecy and transparency is not the only 
problem confronted during intelligence budget oversight in western and transitional 
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democracies.186  By law, parliaments of western democracies have a key role to play in 
adopting and overseeing budgetary provisions related to intelligence.  But in practice, 
many of them are poorly equipped to exert any decisive influence on intelligence 
budgets, and their action is “further hampered by secrecy and opacity in relation to 
certain security allocations and spending.”187  A poor framework for overseeing the 
budgets of the intelligence sector and the use of strategic resources makes it difficult for 
parliamentarians to exercise oversight.  A few countries have clear legislation for 
intelligence budget oversight (the U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway, Belgium, Argentina, 
and Poland).188  In some transitional democracies, these legislative procedures are very 
poor and far from efficient.   
3.  Limited Time for Scrutiny of Intelligence Budget  
Many parliaments do a poor job of oversight of intelligence budgets due to their 
limited time for scrutiny.  This time constraint pushes parliaments to follow general 
budgetary routines and makes it difficult to investigate details of the complex intelligence 
budget structure.   
Most western and transitional countries have a one-year budget cycle.  Actually, it 
is enough time for the parliaments officially to go through all national budgetary 
procedures and oversee (analyze) the intelligence budgets in particular.  However, very 
often national budgets in some countries come to the parliaments for further scrutiny at 
the last moment, when the current fiscal year is almost over and the decision regarding 
the new budget must be made promptly.  In such situations, the oversight committees are 
“forced” by a minimized timeframe to accelerate the process of intelligence budget 
authorization and appropriation.  They also have difficulties in analyzing recent and  
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future intelligence expenditures.  Thus, some parliaments could fail to obtain clear 
understanding of intelligence budgets, diminishing their capacity to use the budget to 
provide appropriate policy guidance.    
According to Marina Caparini, intelligence oversight bodies generally aim to 
assess one of two things — either the “efficacy” of the intelligence service or the 
“propriety” of its activities.189  Due to the limited time for scrutiny of intelligence 
budgets, in some western and transitional democracies intelligence budget oversight is 
almost entirely focused on “propriety,” leaving “efficacy” to the intelligence executives 
and an Auditor General’s office.        
Moreover, sometimes parliamentarians have neither the competence nor the 
qualifications to evaluate the intelligence product presented by the intelligence agencies 
and the time constraint decreases their ability to understand intelligence budgets.  Thus, it 
is also crucial for parliaments to enhance parliamentary expertise in intelligence budget 
oversight through hiring professional staff who have special education, advanced 
knowledge and personal experience.     
D. SUMMARY 
An intelligence budget oversight system should require intelligence executives to 
disclose data regarding intelligence expenditures including classified intelligence 
programs.  As a norm, an effective parliament enacts laws and procedures for oversight 
mechanisms, giving the parliamentarians the power to enforce transparency and 
accountability. 190   
A national legislature should give parliamentarians the power to conduct 
intelligence budget oversight, as well as the access to obtain secret information.  The 
parliament ensures, by specified means, that all appropriate budget documents are 
available to the designated parliamentary committee on intelligence.  Members of the 
                                                 
189 Marina Caparini, October 2002. Challenges of Control and Oversight of Intelligence Services in a 
Liberal Democracy. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Available at 
https://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/legal_wg/ev_geneva_10.02_caparini.pdf (accessed April 11, 2007). 
190 Born, “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” 14.  
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intelligence oversight committee should also have access to secret budgetary appendices 
of the intelligence community, but must take special arrangements to read them.191   
Intelligence budget oversight will be successful if the parliamentarians have an 
incentive to participate in developing systematic approaches for the evaluation and 
approval of intelligence budget proposals.  To do this, an effective parliament participates 
at each stage of the intelligence budget cycle: budget preparation, approval, execution 
and review.  
Legislators, government officials, and the public need to know whether 
intelligence executives manage public resources and use their authority properly and in 
compliance with laws and regulations, intelligence programs are achieving their 
objectives and desired outcomes, and intelligence executives are held accountable for 
their use of public funds.192  In western and some transitional democracies, the 
parliamentary committee on intelligence can demand that external governmental auditors 
review the intelligence budgets and expenditures of the national intelligence community.  
This information also helps parliamentarians to appropriate or amend budgets (allocating 
funds), as well as approve or disapprove any supplementary budget proposals presented 
by the intelligence executives. 
A lack of accurate and complete information regarding intelligence budget 
expenditures, inefficient legislation and limited time for intelligence budget scrutiny are 
common problems that reduce the effectiveness of intelligence budget oversight.  To 
avoid these problems, transitional and emerging democracies should establish statutory 
procedures and a timeframe for scrutinizing intelligence budgets.  For better oversight, it 
is also important that all intelligence budget articles should have a clear structure and be 
presented in one single document understandable to the parliamentarians.  Moreover, 
intelligence spending should not be “hidden” inside other national budgets.   
                                                 
191 CRS Issue Brief for Congress. May 9, 2006.  Intelligence Issues for Congress, 6. Congressional 
Research Service. 
192 Government Auditing Standards. January 2007 Revision. Chapter 1: Generally Accepted 
Government Auditing Standards, 5. United States Government Accountability Office. GAO-07-162G. 
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These common principles of intelligence budget oversight are adhered to in most 
western democracies and could be adopted by emerging and transitional democracies.  
The essence of budget oversight of the IC is that the parliament can oversee and, if 
necessary, change the government’s policies regarding intelligence activities by adjusting 
the budget.  By changing the governmental budget proposals and conducting hearings, 
the parliament is able to redefine the priorities of the intelligence agencies.  Parliaments 
can simply block the intelligence services from certain activities by denying funds.  They 
can also qualify or limit funds granted to the intelligence services. 
The next chapter will describe the organizational and functional structure of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community and its intelligence agencies, as well as their main 
tasks and responsibilities.  The roles and position of intelligence agencies in the system of 
Ukrainian national security and defense will be emphasized.  Further chapters will 
examine the model of oversight of the Ukrainian IC.  Thus, it will be possible to see how 
far Ukraine has improved in developing a system of intelligence oversight and how close 
it has approached the principles of democratic oversight that exist in western and 
transitional democracies.   
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IV.  THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UKRAINIAN 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet Union’s collapse left Ukraine with an enormous intelligence and 
security apparatus in need of reform.  Division of functions among intelligence agencies’ 
tasks and responsibilities was the first major problem to address in developing advanced 
oversight mechanisms.  The leading agency with regard to intelligence and 
counterintelligence in Ukraine was the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the successor 
of the Soviet KGB.  In addition to the political intelligence duties performed by the SSU, 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense conducted military intelligence operations and the 
Ministry of Internal Affaires had responsibility for criminal intelligence activities.  
Moreover, many other structures like the Tax Police, the State Border Service, the State 
Guard Administration and the Customs Service also had, and currently have, some 
intelligence functions within their narrow specializations.  All these organizations are 
considered highly conservative institutions and, as such, highly resistant to reform.  
However, they have undergone certain structural changes since Ukraine declared 
independence.   
The SSU lost the function of border control in 1992.  The function of conducting 
intelligence and counterintelligence operations along Ukraine’s border and border 
crossings and in Ukraine’s territorial waters was given to a new intelligence organization 
— The Intelligence Body of the Specially Authorized State Executive in the Issues of 
State Border Protection of State Border Guard Service.193  At the same time, the SSU 
also lost some of its powers and authorities in conducting foreign intelligence activity.   
This reform preceded the establishment in 2004 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service of Ukraine (FISU).  It also allowed the SSU to focus on counterintelligence 
activities and created an additional powerful component to fight terrorism and corruption.  
                                                 
193 Information available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/ukraine/org.htm (accessed 
April 13, 2007).  
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As far as reform of military intelligence is concerned, the Main Directorate for 
Intelligence (MDI) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukrainian has optimized its structure 
and has been given new functions, tasks and responsibilities, especially after the tragic 
events of 9/11.   
The new iteration of the law “On the Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine” (#2331-III), 
adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on March 22, 2001 defines intelligence agencies as 
“Special agencies that have a right to conduct intelligence activity by law and may 
function as an independent state body, as well as within executive bodies of central 
government.”194  The law defines three agencies that are allowed to conduct intelligence 
related activities.  According to Article 6 of the law  
intelligence agencies conduct intelligence activities in the following 
spheres:  (1) The Foreign Intelligence Service – in political, economic, 
military-technical, science-technical, informational, and ecological;   (2) 
Intelligence Organ of Ministry of Defense – in military, military-political, 
military technical, military-economic, informational, and ecological;  (3) 
Intelligence Body of the Specially Authorized State Executive in the 
Issues of State Border Protection of State Border Guard Service [or the 
Intelligence Body of the State Border Guard Service] – in border and 
emigration issues, as well as other spheres that relate the issue of 
Ukrainian border protection and the state’s sovereign rights in executive 
(maritime) economic zone and continental shelf.195   
The 2005 version of the law does not include the Security Service of Ukraine in 
the list of agencies that are allowed to conduct intelligence activities.  This law transfers 
SSU activities to a set of law-enforcement agencies.  Thus, only the three above-
mentioned intelligence organizations are established in law as agencies of the Ukrainian 
Intelligence Community (UIC).  
However, because it conducts a wide spectrum of intelligence gathering regarding 
international terrorism (domestically and abroad) and its counterintelligence activities, 
the SSU could theoretically be included within the UIC.  Although the SSU is not 
                                                 
194 Translated from the Law “On the Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine.” Amended in 2005. Article 1. 
Available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=38932&cat_id=38881 (accessed 
April 14, 2007).    
195 Ibid.  
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mentioned by the law as an intelligence body of Ukraine, its activities fit within and 
relate to functions of the official Ukrainian intelligence agencies, which are underlined by 
Article 4 of this law — fighting against terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, 
illegal narcotics trafficking, illicit weapon selling and migration.196    
In fact, the SSU actively participates in fighting against international organized 
crime, including terrorism, illegal drug trade, arms trafficking and technologies for arms 
manufacturing and illicit migration.197  Performing those important tasks, the SSU 
influences the Ukrainian national intelligence cycle (intelligence gathering, analysis and 
dissemination).  Security organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the 
U.S. or the Federal Intelligence Service in Germany perform these some functions and 
are included within their national intelligence communities as independent agencies.  
Consequently, the SSU can be included within the family of intelligence organizations of 
the UIC. 
Thus, taking into consideration the law “On the Intelligence Organs of Ukraine” 
and the value of each intelligence organization in the national intelligence production and 
estimation process, it can be concluded that the UIC consists of four organizations (see 
Figure 5).  They are as follows: 
• The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU); 
• Main Directorate for Intelligence (MDI) of the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine; 
• Intelligence Body of State Border Guard Service (IBSBGS) of Ukrainian; 
• Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). 
                                                 
196 Translated from the Law “On the Intelligence Organs of Ukraine.” Amended in 2005. Article 4. 
Available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=38932&cat_id=38881 (accessed 
April 14, 2007).   
197 The information was extracted and translated from the materials of the conference “Actual 
problems of Development of the SSU.” March 16, 2007. Available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/ 
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Figure 5.   The Structure of the Ukrainian Intelligence Community 
 
Due to the understandably secret nature of intelligence organizations in Ukraine, 
it is very difficult to find unclassified information regarding their activities or budgets.  
Such information is highly classified in Ukraine and not available for public debate; 
however, “The White Book of Ukrainian Intelligence,” expected to be published by the 
end of 2007, should provide some useful public information.198    
This chapter will focus on identifying and describing the structure of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community.  The main tasks and budgets of these agencies will be 
emphasized.  The chapter is comprised of four main sections.  First, it will discuss the 
newly created Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, its main tasks and organization.  
The next section presents the structure of the Main Directorate for Intelligence of the 
                                                 
198 Ukrainian Independent Agency “RBK.” May 17, 2007. “The White Book of the Ukrainian 
Intelligence Community will be Issued at the End of 2007.” Available at http://daily.com.ua/news/ 
page.php?id=36972, and http://www.podrobnosti.ua/power/rest/2007/05/08/421607.html (accessed May 
17, 2007). 
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Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the functional responsibilities of its departments.  
Then, the major functions and organization of the Intelligence Body of State Border 
Guard Service of Ukraine will be addressed.  Finally, the main tasks and structure of the 
Security Service of Ukraine will be considered.  Thus, it will be possible to see the 
responsibilities of the agencies and their roles in the system of Ukrainian national 
security and defense.   
B. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF UKRAINE 
1. History of the FISU 
In 1991, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, the Main 
Headquarters of Intelligence was created within the Security Service of Ukraine.  The 
organization and the staff of the headquarters were approved by the decree of the Head of 
the SSU on December 28, 1991.  Taking into consideration new challenges and threats, 
the Main Headquarters quickly elaborated new approaches to modern intelligence 
activities, determined a strategy for its further development, designed its legal 
underpinning, designated forms and methods of intelligence operations and ensured 
regular dissemination of data on the sensitive issues to the highest decision and policy-
makers of Ukraine.   
Several strategic radio interception units of the USSR Committee of State 
Security and USSR Armed Forces General Staff Central Intelligence Headquarters had 
been located on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.  In the early 90s, 
the General Directorate of the Radio-electronic Intelligence (SIGINT) and 
Counterintelligence of Ukraine (the “K” General Directorate) were established at these 
facilities.   
At the end of 2000 the Main Intelligence Headquarters of the SSU gained the 
status of national intelligence body.  This allowed for the coordination of all intelligence 




Decree, and on the basis of the Main Intelligence Headquarters and “K” General 
Directorate the Intelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (the future 
FISU) was created.199   
The FISU started its activity the same year, on October 14, 2004, the day when 
the President of Ukraine signed its decree “On the Foreign Intelligence Service of 
Ukraine” (#1239/2004).200  Since then, building on the basis of the intelligence 
components of the SSU, the FISU has been functioning as an independent state body.  On 
December 1, 2005, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) approved the law “On 
the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine,” clarifying and consolidating its legal 
structure within the UIC.   
2. The Main Tasks of the FISU  
According to the Presidential Decree #3160-IV of 2005, the FISU is an 
independent state body, which carries out its intelligence activities in political, economic, 
military and technical, scientific and technical, information and ecological spheres.201  
These laws, along with the Constitution of Ukraine and the law of 2001 “On the 
Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine” (#2331-III), are the principle legal basis for the FISU 
activities.  The original tasks and responsibilities of the FISU are assigned as follows:202 
• collecting, evaluating, analyzing and disseminating intelligence to the 
heads of the highest decision-making bodies of Ukraine in accordance 
with the applicable law;  
• implementing special measures to further state policy of Ukraine in 
political, economic, military and technical, ecological and information 
spheres, as well as to contribute to national defense, foster economic 
development, and promote science and technology; 
                                                 
199 History of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, translated from http://www.fisu.gov.ua/ 
cms/ua/index/history/5.html (accessed April 14, 2007). 
200 This information is translated from the legal base documents of the FISU, available at 
http://www.fisu.gov.ua/base.php?lang=en&item=3&page=1 (accessed April 14, 2007).  
201 Ibid. 
202 Translated from Presidential Decrees #1239/2004 “On the Foreign Intelligence Service of 
Ukraine,” #3160-IV “On the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine,” and Law #2331-III “On the 
Intelligence Organs of Ukraine”, available at http://www.fisu.gov.ua/base.php?lang=en (accessed April 14, 
2007.   
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• safeguarding Ukrainian missions abroad, providing security to the staff 
and their family members in the host country as well as attached officers 
who have access to state secrets; 
• participating in international operations addressing such high-priority 
issues as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal trade of arms 
and respective technologies, and illegal migration; and 
• providing counter measures to external threats that can affect the national 
security of Ukraine, the lives and health of its citizens, and state 
establishments abroad. 
3. Organization of the FISU    
The FISU organization was formed to meet the principle demands for intelligence 
in Ukraine, in keeping with the general practices of such organizations within democratic 
society.  The legal basis for the FISU underlines the main tasks and responsibilities and 
therefore provides the information used to display the functional structure of the FISU 
(see Figure 6).   
The Organization of the FISU
Chairman the FISU 
Deputy Head













Source:  Created from the Presidential Decree #3160-IV “On the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine.”
Available at http://www.szru.gov.ua/base.php?lang=ua&item=1&page=1 (accessed July 7, 2007). 















Figure 6.   The Organization f the FISU 
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The FISU comprises operative (HUMINT — human intelligence), analytical, 
technical (SIGINT — signal intelligence), financial, research and development 
departments, as well as elements for legal support, human resources, logistics and 
administration.  Article 5 of the presidential decree #3160 obligates the FISU to have the 
following units: (1) The Administration Department; (2) the Department of HUMINT 
(human intelligence); (3) Department of SIGINT (signal intelligence); (4) the Department 
of Operative and Technical Services; (5) the Informational-Analytical Department; (6) 
the Department of Internal Security; (7) the Department of Operational Logistics and 
Support; (8) the Financial Department; and (9) several training and research 
establishments (for example, the FISU’s Institute, which is responsible for initial research 
programs, training and refresher courses for Ukrainian foreign intelligence officers).203  
By the decree, the total strength of the FISU is 4350 serviceman, 4010 of whom 
are military personnel.  The FISU is subordinated to the President of Ukraine, who 
appoints the Chairman of the Service.  The service operates under the supervision of the 
Ukrainian Parliament.  The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine monitors budget 
expenditures of the FISU, and the Attorney General of Ukraine also provides control over 
certain FISU activities.  
The FISU is allowed to cooperate with other intelligence organizations of the 
UIC, security and law-enforcement agencies, as well as state authorities, institutions, and 
establishments.  As of 2007, the FISU has established official contacts and maintained 
partnership relations with 111 foreign intelligence and special services from 67 
countries.204  Within the framework of the EU-Ukraine integration program, the FISU 
participates in actions aimed at combating terrorism, countering organized crime,  
 
 
                                                 
203 Extracted and created from the Presidential Decree #3160-IV “On the Foreign Intelligence Service 
of Ukraine.” Available at http://www.szru.gov.ua/base.php?lang=ua&item=1&page=1 (accessed July 7, 
2007).  
204 Translated from the interview of the chairman of the FISU to the Ukrainian information agency 
“UNIAN”. December 2006. Available  at http://www.szru.gov.ua/messages.php?lang= 
ua&item=31&page=1 (accessed July 22, 2007).   
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monitoring illegal migration, eliminating drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings 
and, by law, is allowed to establish representations (liaison offices) in other international 
intelligence and security organizations.  
The FISU gained the status of an independent state body when it was detached 
from the Security Service of Ukraine (national law-enforcement agency).  It became an 
independent state budget entity as well.205  The budget of the Service has been increasing 
since its establishment (see Figure 7). 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005-1* 2005-2* 2006 2007
Budget in grivnas  
(Ukrainian currency)  28000000 N/A 109800000 123200000 170804100 248227100
Budget in U.S. 
dollars (currency 
conversion rate is 
5.05 grivnas for 1 
dollar)  5,544,555 N/A 21,742,574 24,396,040 33,822,594 49,153,882
Increase (%)  N/A N/A 292.2 12.2 38.6 45.3
 
*The budget was amended in 2005 after the “Orange Revolution” and new presidential elections. 
** The FISU became an independent budget entity in FY2005. In FY2003, its budget was included within 
the budget of the Security Service of Ukraine. There is no data for FY2004. 
Source:  Created from the analysis of the State Budget of Ukraine (FY2003-2007). Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=820241&cat_id=304, 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=812978&cat_id=69625, 
http://ru.proua.com/inform/137.html (accessed May 17, 2007) and http://ru.proua.com/inform/138.html 
(accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
Figure 7.   The Evolution of the FISU Budget  
 
In comments for the Ukrainian Information Agency “UNIAN” on December 1, 
2006, the Chairman of the FISU, Colonel-General Mykola Malomuzh, noted the 
strengthening of the role of the intelligence service in the protection of national interests.  
                                                 
205 Ukrainian Independent Informational Agency. December 28, 2005. Interview of the Chairman of 
the FISU to the Agency: “This Year Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Became an Independent State-
supported Agency.” Available at http://www.szru.gov.ua/messages.php?lang=en&item=20&page=1 
(accessed July 7, 2007). 
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He also stressed that the major impact of the service’s reorganization would be the 
creation of an effective and democratic oversight system for the FISU.  This, he stated, 
would ensure against use of the Foreign Intelligence Service for purposes not identified 
by the laws of Ukraine.206 
This view was tested during the period of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2006-
2007.  As of July 2007, the international and Ukrainian mass media have not reported any 
information regarding the FISU.  In addition, there is no evidence that the service 
compromised itself in any way or was involved in the resolution of the political issues 
during that crisis.  
C. THE MAIN DIRECTORATE FOR INTELLIGENCE OF THE MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE 
1. Legislation and the Main Tasks of the Main Directorate for 
Intelligence  
The primary organization responsible for Ukrainian military intelligence was 
established on September 7, 1992 when the President of Ukraine issued his decree to 
establish the Military Strategic Intelligence Department within the Ministry of Defense.  
On July 6, 1993, based on a presidential decree, the General Military Intelligence 
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was organized by merging the 
organizational structures of the Military Strategic Intelligence Department of the Ministry 
of Defense and the Reconnaissance Department of the General Staff of the Armed 
Service of Ukraine.  Later, according to an executive order of the President on April 14, 
1994, the General Military Intelligence Directorate was renamed as the Main Directorate 
for Intelligence (MDI) of the Ministry of Defense.207  
                                                 
206 Interview of the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine to the Ukrainian 
Information Agency (UNIAN), 1 December 2006. available at: http://www.fisu.gov.ua/article.php?lang= 
en&root=7&item=86 (accessed March 28, 2007). 
207 The information is extracted and translated from the Booklet of the Main Directorate for 
Intelligence. 2004. Issued under the responsibility of the chief of the MDI by the Ukrainian Newspaper 
Vartovi Neba. Special Edition.     
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The MDI’s activities are regulated by the laws “On the Intelligence Bodies of 
Ukraine” of March 22, 2001 (#2331-III), “On counter-intelligence activity” of December 
26, 2002 (#374-IV), and “On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine” of June 19, 
2003 (#964-IV).  Moreover, such presidential edicts as “On the Activity Enhancement of 
the MID” of October 2, 2003 (# ct1138) and “On the Activity Enhancement of 
Intelligence Services of Ukraine” of April 7, 2003 (#298/2003) play an important role in 
directing the main tasks and responsibilities of the MDI.  
According to the law “On Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine,” the MDI conducts 
reconnaissance activity with the purpose of providing for the national security, 
sovereignty protection, territorial integrity and national interests of Ukraine, and 
protecting it  from external threats in military, political-military, technical-military, 
economical-military, informational and environmental areas.  Article 4 of the law 
authorizes the MDI to fight against organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal 
trade in arms and certain technologies, and illegal migration.  It is also allowed to 
participate in international intelligence and security operations against those transnational 
threats.208 
The President of Ukraine appoints the chief of the MDI.  The President also 
conducts the general coordination of the MDI according to the Constitution of Ukraine 
and the law “On Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine.”  
The MDI is an independent state budget entity.  Its budget does not belong to the 
budget of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.  The budget of the MDI has been 





                                                 
208 Translated from the law #2331-III “On the Intelligence Organs of Ukraine.” Amended in 2005. 
Article 4. Available at http://www.fisu.gov.ua/base.php?lang=en (accessed July 7, 2007). 
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rate is 5.05 
grivnas for 1 
dollar)    14,237,624 23,821,782 25,801,980 28,277,228 31,414,159 41,226,337
Increase 
(%)  N/A 67.3 8.3 9.6 11.1 31.3
 
*The budget was amended in 2005 after the “Orange Revolution” and new presidential elections. 
Source:  Created from the analysis of the State Budget of Ukraine (FY2003-2007). Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=820241 &cat_id=304, 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=812978 &cat_id=69625, 
http://ru.proua.com/inform/137.html (accessed May 17, 2007) and http://ru.proua.com/inform/138.html 
(accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
Figure 8.   The Evolution of the MDI Budget  
 
2. Organization of the Main Directorate for Intelligence  
The MDI is comprised of five departments and five major divisions (see Figure 
9). 
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Figure 9.   The Organization of the Main Directorate for Intelligence 
 
The Strategic Intelligence Department (HUMINT) is responsible for gathering 
intelligence information and promoting the fulfillment of the state policy of Ukraine, 
strengthening defense capabilities, and economic and technical scientific developments of 
Ukraine.  Together with the intelligence and law-enforcement services of Ukraine, the 
department takes part in countering international organized crime, including terrorism, 
drug trafficking, illegal immigration, illegal arms trade and technologies.  The 
department’s structural elements arrange international intelligence cooperation and joint 
actions with the intelligence and law-enforcement agencies of other countries.209  
The Armed Forces General Staff Intelligence Support Directorate (the analog of 
the G-2 in NATO) manages the reconnaissance unit activities of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine.  It is responsible for strategic planning and intelligence support of the Armed  
 
                                                 
209 The information in this paragraph is extracted and translated from the Booklet of the Main 
Directorate for Intelligence. 2004. Issued under the responsibility of the chief of the MDI by the Ukrainian 
Newspaper Vartovi Neba. Special Edition.  
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Forces of Ukraine, as well as intelligence personnel operational and combat training.  It 
also provides intelligence support to Ukrainian peacekeeping contingents during 
multinational peacekeeping operations. 
The Department of Information Support conducts analysis of intelligence 
information on the real and potential abilities, intentions or actions of foreign countries, 
organizations and individuals threatening the national interests of Ukraine.  The 
Department evaluates the political-military situation around Ukraine, in conflict regions 
and detects threats to national security.  It also prepares intelligence reports for 
submission to the high political and military command.     
The Department of Personnel Policy conducts the tasks of selection, recruiting, 
education, training and appointment of officers and civilians to positions within the MDI.  
The Department’s competencies also include defining the intelligence specialty 
requirements and further organization of their specialized education. 
The Department of Logistics Support and Military Intelligence Housing arranges 
all-round support of the MDI and its subordinate units.  It is responsible for providing 
intelligence units with specialized equipment, its exploitation, maintenance and repair 
activities.  The director of the Department solves the issues of capital construction and 
military intelligence personnel lodging.  In addition, together with the chief of the 
Financial Department, s/he is responsible for the MDI intelligence budget formulation 
and submission. 
MDI specialists take an active part in international military-technical cooperation.  
They participate in estimation, preparation and signing of the protocols and international 
agreements of Ukraine with other countries regarding military equipment buying/selling 
activities. 
The MDI actively cooperates with the other intelligence and law-enforcement 
bodies of Ukraine.  As a result of such work, the Program of Technical Intelligence 
Equipment Development to the year 2010 was put in force.  This program was approved 
by an Executive Order of the Cabinet of Ministers (#1672-13) on October 29, 2003.  
Earlier, the MDI and Ministry of Interior adopted joint operational order #024/031 on 
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December 12, 2002, which approved the “Instruction on Interaction Activities of the MDI 
and Subsequent Units of the Ministry of Interior in the Issues of Intelligence, and 
International Organized Crime and Terrorism Prevention.”     
D. THE INTELLIGENCE BODY OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD 
SERVICE (IBSBGS) OF UKRAINE  
1. Legislation and the Main Tasks of the IBSBGS  
The Intelligence Body of the Sate Border Guard Service of Ukraine (IBSBGS) 
evolved out of the Intelligence Committee of the Border Troops of the USSR.  The role 
of this military formation has changed from military operations against Western countries 
during the Cold War toward police and law-enforcement functions and preventing 
transnational crime and terrorism.   
Today, the main task of the State Border Guard Service and its Intelligence Body, 
in particular, is to ensure that people and goods can move easily across borders but to 
prevent international terrorism and transnational crime, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, illegal conventional weapon and drug trafficking, and illicit migration.  All 
these new tasks and responsibilities require transforming the IBSBGS into a police and 
law-enforcement agency.  
The laws “On the State Border of Ukraine” of November 4, 1991 (#1777-XII), 
“On Operational Investigatory Activity” of February 18, 1992 (#2135-XII), “On 
Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine” of March 21, 2001 (#2331-III), “On Counterintelligence 
Activity” of December 26, 2002 (#374-IV), and “On the State Border Service of 
Ukraine” of April 3, 2003 (#661-IV) form the main legislation that regulates the activity 
of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and its Intelligence Body.210  Moreover, the 
Executive Decrees of the President of Ukraine “On Free Movement” of June 15, 2001 
(#435), “On Reformation of the State Committee in the Issue of Border Protection” of 
July 31, 2003 (#772),  “On Administration of State Border Guard Service” of August 4, 
2003 (#797), and “On the Conception of Development of the State Border Service of 
                                                 
210 Legislation is available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/index.php (accessed July 11, 2007).  
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Ukraine for the Period 2006-2015” on June 19, 2006 are also important in determining 
the daily duties of the IBSBGS.  In addition, the latest executive orders of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of January 22, 2001 (#35) and of December 21, 2005 (#1251) guide the 
IBSBGS to carry out its tasks and missions with regard to preventing illegal migration 
through the Ukrainian State Border.211 
Based on this legislation, the IBSBGS has the following main tasks:212 
• collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence to the heads of the 
highest decision-making bodies of Ukraine in accordance with the 
Ukrainian law;  
• implementing special measures to promote the state policy of Ukraine in 
economic, political, economic, military, military-technical, ecological and 
information spheres, as well as to contribute to national defense, foster 
economic development, and promote science and technology; 
• safeguarding Ukrainian missions abroad, providing security to the 
legislative diplomatic staff and their family members in the host country; 
• participating in fighting against organized crime, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, illegal trade of arms and respective technologies, and illegal 
migration; 
• providing countermeasures to external threats that can negatively 
influence the national security of Ukraine, the lives and health of its 
citizens, and state establishments abroad. 
The laws give the IBSBGS powers and authorities to have access and obtain 
information of any kind, including data from state informational databases, banking and 
informational systems; hire experts to conduct investigations; open accounts in national 
and international banks; establish covert institutions necessary to carry out intelligence 
functions; create and use documents that cover the intelligence activities of the IBSBGS’ 
employees, etc.  The IBSBGS can recruit and confidentially establish a working 
relationship with adults (both international and domestic) who agree to cooperate with the 
IBSBGS.  Moreover, in order to protect the state border, the IBSBGS is allowed to 
                                                 
211 Executive decrees of the President and executive orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine are 
available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/npa.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
212 Translated from the Law “On the Intelligence Organs of Ukraine.” Amended in 2005. Available at 
http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=38932&cat_id=38881 (accessed April 14, 
2007) 
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conduct counterintelligence operations along the Ukrainian border and to cooperate with 
their international counterparts within intelligence and law-enforcement agreements. 213  
These functions have become more important with regard to fighting transnational 
organized crime and international terrorism.  The results of the operational activity of the 
IBSBGS are periodically published at its official Website.214 
According to the law “On Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine,” the President appoints 
and dismisses the Chairman of the IBSBGS.215  The President controls the service 
through the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC).  The Head of the State 
Border Guard Service of Ukraine manages the Intelligence Body.216  
The Cabinet of Ministers participates in conducting executive oversight of this 
intelligence organization.  The Cabinet appoints and dismisses the members of the 
internal Collegial Commission of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, which 
oversees the policy, budget and developments of the IBSBGS.  The Head of the State 
Border Guard Service is the head of the Commission.217  According to the presidential 
executive decree of August 4, 2003 “On the Issues of the Administration of the State 
Border Guard Service,” the head of the Commission is responsible for informing the 
President, the NSDC, and the relevant parliamentary committee regarding all issues 
related to the IBSBGS.  He is also responsible to prepare and submit to those institutions 
and the Cabinet the annual report concerning the activities of the IBSBGS.       
In addition, based on the law “On Administration of State Border Guard Service,” 
the People’s Council was established under the Administration of the State Border Guard 
Service in order to provide public information regarding the State Border Guard Service 
                                                 
213 Official Website of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Main Tasks of the Intelligence 
Body of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/ 
rozv/rozv6.htm (accessed July 11, 2007). 
214 The Results of Operational and Investigative Activity of the IBSBGS. 2006-2007. Translated from 
http://www.pvu.gov.ua/osd.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
215 More detailed information regarding this issue can be found at 
http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/rozv/rozv9.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).   
216 The System of Democratic Control of the IBSBGS of Ukraine. Translated from 
http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/rozv/rozv18.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
217 Executive Decree of the President of Ukraine on September 4, 2003 (#797). Clauses 9, 10. 
Available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/zakon/pitadm.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
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and its IBSBGS activities.  The Council is comprised of representatives from different 
state executive bodies, independent mass media, scientists, etc.  The Council meets 
regularly and discusses a variety of issues related to the legislation covering the State 
Border Guard Service, recent events, budget, border-crossing issues, medical benefits of 
its employees, etc.  As of July 2007, the Council is comprised of 15 members and its 
working plan includes eleven main issues to discuss.218  However, the results of the 
Council’s meetings are not published.  
Regarding parliamentary oversight of the IBSBGS, the Committee on National 
Security and Defense plays the most important role.  Oversight of the intelligence budget 
of the IBSBGS is also conducted by a special group of the Accounting Chamber of 
Ukraine, which will be discussed in the next chapter.219 
The IBSBGS is an independent state budget entity.  Since 2005, its intelligence 
budget does not belong to the budget of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.  The 










                                                 
218 People Council of the State Border Guard Service. 2007. Personnel Composition and Plan of 
Issues to Discuss. Available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/gromada.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).    
219 The System of Democratic Control of the IBSBGS of Ukraine. Translated from 
http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/rozv/rozv18.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
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rate is 5.05 
grivnas for 1 
dollar)  91,742,575** 119,504,951** 158,495,050** 175,267,237** 2,969,446 3,955,367 
Increase 
(%)  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 33.2 
 
*The budget was amended in 2005 after the “Orange Revolution” and new presidential elections. 
** Before FY2006, the budget of the IBSBGS was a part of the budget of the State Border Guard Service 
Administration and was not officially published. 
Source:  Created from the analysis of the State Budget of Ukraine (FY2003-2007). Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=820241& cat_id=304, 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id= 812978&cat_id=69625, 
http://ru.proua.com/inform/137.html (accessed May 17, 2007) and http://ru.proua.com/inform/138.html 
(accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
Figure 10.            The Evolution of the Budget of the IBSBGS 
 
2. Organization of the IBSBGS 
The official Website of the IBSBGS does not provide information regarding its 
organization.  However, some information is available from open sources and the current 
legislature.  The organization of the IBSBGS is comprised of the Central Administration, 
the Foreign Intelligence Department, and five territorial directorates for intelligence (see 
Figure 11).   
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of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 









Source: Created from the analysis of legislation at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/npa.htm (accessed July 11, 2007) 
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Figure 11.   The Organization of the Intelligence Body of the State Border Guard Service 
of Ukraine 
 
The functional structure of the IBSBGS directorates includes units for HUMINT 
(human intelligence), technical intelligence, informational-analytical support, internal 
security, operation-technical units, and logistics support.220 
The Chief of the Division of Economy and Finance formulates the financial 
policy of the IBSBGS.  He is responsible for summarizing the intelligence budget 
proposals from the subordinated intelligence units and for submitting the finalized budget 
to the Chairman of the IBSBGS and further to the Minister of Finance.  
      
                                                 
220 The Organization and the Functional Structure of the IBSBGS of Ukraine. Official Website of the 
IBSBGS. 2007. Available at http://www.pvu.gov.ua/inf/rozv/rozv8.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).  
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E. THE SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE  
1. Legislation    
The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) was created by the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine on September 20, 1991, on the basis of the Soviet KGB.  The Ukrainian 
Committee of the KGB was the largest in the USSR at that time, because it protected the 
territory of Europe’s second largest country.  Thus, after independence and the 
emergence of a new democracy, it was historically necessary to reform the service, 
giving it new tasks and responsibilities.      
The first law “On the Security Service of Ukraine” was enacted on March 25, 
1992.  It fixed the powers and authorities of the new state security organization.  In most 
aspects, the tasks and missions of the SSU reflected the responsibilities of the former 
KGB, combining intelligence and law enforcement functions.  However, the processes of 
building a democratic society required new legislation.   
The laws “On Operational Investigatory Activity” of February 18, 1992 (#2135-
XII), “On Fighting with Corruption” of October 5, 1995 (#356/95-BP), “On 
Organizational and Judicial Issues of Fighting with Organized Crime” of June 30, 1993 
(#3341-XII), “On the State Sector” of January 21, 1994 (#3855-XII), “On 
Counterintelligence Activity” of December 26, 2002 (#374-IV), “On Intelligence Bodies 
of Ukraine” of March 21, 2001 (#2331-III), and “On Combating Terrorism” of March 20, 
2003 (#638-IV) form the main legislation regulating the activity of the Security Service 
of Ukraine.  Moreover, the presidential decree “On Fighting Corruption in Ukraine” of 
September 11, 2006 and the laws “On Organizational Structure and Total Strength of the 
Secret Service of Ukraine” of October 20, 2005 (#3014-IV) and “On the State Service of 
Special Communication” of January 1, 2007 are important in determining the mission of 
the SSU, its state protection and new tasks.221  
                                                 
221 The information regarding this legislation is available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/ 
publish/article;jsessionid=08327E4510209D2D77F904103E0E94CC?art_id=39449&cat_id=38875 
(accessed July 13, 2007).  
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The chairman of the SSU is appointed and dismissed by the Verkhovna Rada on 
the recommendation of the President of Ukraine.  The Ukrainian parliament oversees 
SSU activities, policies and budget through the Committee on National Security and 
Defense.  Moreover, the Committee for Legislative Provision of Law-enforcement 
Activity and the Committee for the Struggle Against Organized Crime and Corruption are 
responsible for oversight of SSU funds spent for fighting organized crime and 
corruption.222   
However, in reality, the President can appoint and dismiss the head of the service 
as s/he wishes.  In accordance with the law “On Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine,” the 
President appoints and dismisses the chairman, his first deputy, all deputies, and “is their 
main strategic task master and ultimate reporting officer.”223  The President conducts 
control over the SSU with the assistance of the Secretariat and the National Security and 
Defense Council.  Moreover, according to the presidential order of October 22, 1998 
(#1172/1998), the position of an Authorized Presidential Representative was created in 
the SSU.  His office conducts real-time oversight procedures of the service’s policies, 
activities and budget.224   
The Cabinet of Ministers also participates in conducting executive oversight of 
the SSU.  It performs its oversight functions through its Secretariat and special state 
committees and a commission.225  The activities of those institutions will be discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
The SSU is an independent state budget entity.  Its budget has been continually 
increasing (see Figure 12).  Compared with the budget of FY2003, the budget of the SSU  
 
                                                 
222 Official Website of the SSU. 2007. Democratic Control of the Security Service of Ukraine. 
Legislative Oversight. Translated from http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/ 
article?art_id=56851&cat_id=56802 (accessed March 28, 2007). 
223 Gordon Bennett, September 2004. The SBU – the Security Service of Ukraine. Conflict Studies 
Research Centre. Central and Eastern Europe Series. Defense Academy of the United Kingdom.  
224 Official Website of the SSU. 2007. Democratic Control of the SSU. Translated from 
http://sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=56851&cat_id=56802 (accessed March 28, 2007).   
225 The system of parliamentary and executive oversight of the Ukrainian intelligence community will 
be examined in later chapters.  
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in FY2007 more than doubled in size, even after reforms that separated the intelligence 
component of the SSU from its law-enforcement departments and the Foreign 
Intelligence Service of Ukraine was organized.  
 









rate is 5.05 
grivnas for 1 
dollar)   129,366,337 198,851,485 203,089,109 225,841,584 274,227,307 309,530,020 
Increase (%) N/A 53.7 2.1 11.2 21.5 12.9 
 
*The budget was amended in 2005 after the “Orange Revolution” and new presidential elections. 
Source:  Created from the analysis of the State Budget of Ukraine (FY2003-2007). Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=820241 &cat_id=304, 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id= 812978&cat_id=69625, 
http://ru.proua.com/inform/137.html (accessed May 17, 2007) and http://ru.proua.com/inform/138.html 
(accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
Figure 12.   The Evolution of the Budget of the SSU 
 
Information regarding SSU’s budget and expenditures is related to classified data.  
Due to the secret nature of this organization, it is expected that this information will 
remain protected in the future despite reform and the adoption of important democratic 





Website of the SSU presents information regarding the need to classify the SSU budget, 
giving the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine more authority in overseeing the service’s 
expenditures.226       
2. Organization of the SSU and Its Main Tasks  
The law “On Organizational Structure and Total Strength of the Secret Service of 
Ukraine” of October 20, 2005 (#3014-IV) and the amendments to this law of February 8, 
2007 (#656-V) completed the major (first) phase of the SSU reform, establishing a new 
organizational structure and separating its intelligence and law-enforcement functions.  
The law allows the SSU to have the following general organizational structure: the 
Central Administration with subordinated regional bodies; military counterintelligence 
organs; educational, research and other establishments, organizations and entities of the 
SSU; and the Office of Governmental Communication (see Figure 13).227   
The chairman of the SSU has a first deputy and several deputies working for 
him/her. The number of deputies has reached seven by the beginning July 2007.228       
                                                 
226 Translated from the Official Website of the SSU. 2007. Available at http://sbu.gov.ua/sbu/ 
control/uk/publish/article?art_id=56851&cat_id=56802 (accessed March 28, 2007). 
227 Translated from the law #3014-IV “On Organizational Structure and Total Strength of the Secret 
Service of Ukraine.” October 20, 2005. Available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/ 
article?showHidden=1&art_id=45071&cat_id=38875&ctime=1132829148957 (accessed July 13, 2007).  
228 Ukrainian Informational Agency “INTERFAX-UKRAINE.” April, 16 2007. Information translated 
from http://www.podrobnosti.ua/power/rest/2007/04/16/415776.html (accessed May 17, 2007). 
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The Organization of the Security Service of Ukraine
(after the first stage of reform)
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Figure 13.   The Organization of the Security Service of Ukraine 
 
The total strength of the SSU is, as of October 2005, 41,750 people, including 
34,610 military servicemen.229  The SSU’s central organs are divided into departments, 
main directorates, directorates, and divisions.  The most important of these are the 
Counterintelligence Department; The Information Support & Operations Management 
Department; the Department of Counterintelligence Protection of the National Economy; 
State Protection & Counterterrorism Department; Special Telecommunication Systems & 
Information Protection Department; Logistics & Maintenance Support Department; Main 
Analytical & Forecasting Directorate; Main Directorate for Combating Corruption & 
Organized Crime; State Secrets Protection Department; Personnel Policy Directorate; 
                                                 
229 This information is translated from the law #3014-IV “On Organizational Structure and Total 
Strength of the Secret Service of Ukraine.” October 20, 2005. Available at http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/ 
control/uk/publish/article?showHidden=1&art_id=45071&cat_id=38875&ctime=1132829148957 
(accessed July 13, 2007). 
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Internal Security Department; Treaties & Legal Department; Investigation Directorate; 
Scientific & Technical Directorate; State Archives of the SSU; Military-Medical 
Directorate and Financial Department.230  Moreover, the law authorizes the SSU to have 
an Antiterrorist Center.     
The SSU is built to support all activities of the Central Administration in the 
Ukrainian regions.  The regional bodies are very flexible in creating units to provide 
security in the region.  The law authorizes regional bodies to establish and develop the 
following functional units: counterintelligence; protection of the nation; 
counterintelligence protection of the Ukrainian economy; fighting against corruption and 
organized crime; combating terrorism; protection of witnesses before court decision;  
protection of servicemen of law-enforcement agencies; protection of state secrets; 
operational-technical activities; operational documentation; special telecommunication 
systems and information protection; informational-analytical; personnel policy; logistics 
support; and finance.   
Reform of this huge intelligence and security structure has been going on since 
2004.  It began when an independent intelligence agency — the Foreign Intelligence 
Service of Ukraine — was organized.          
F. SUMMARY 
It has been seen that the UIC is comprised of four intelligence and security 
agencies.  Each agency has independent tasks and missions, different from other 
organizations, as well as some overlapping functions.  This makes appropriate 
parliamentary and executive oversight difficult.   
The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine emerged from the Security Service of 
Ukraine.  It was the beginning of an important process of reform of the UIC, which has 
been going on since 2003.  The FISU is primarily an intelligence organization and 
performs its tasks abroad.   
                                                 
230 The information regarding the principal central organs of the SSU was also taken from Gordon 
Bennett, The SBU – the Security Service of Ukraine, 7-13.  
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HUMINT and SIGINT functions found within intelligence organization are 
different in nature and separated in most western and transitional democracies.  In 
Ukraine, however, the FISU is authorized to conduct both HUMINT and SIGINT 
operations.  It makes the service a very powerful intelligence and security “tool” 
available to current political leaders.  At the same time, it is difficult for the Parliament 
and state executive bodies to exercise effective oversight of this complex structure.   
Moreover, it is not clear whether the FISU conducts SIGINT operations only 
abroad or uses its powers and capabilities inside Ukraine as well.  If such operations are 
conducted abroad, it would be in keeping with the purpose of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service.  If those operations are conducted in Ukraine, it is not clear which state 
structures control these activities and what governmental departments are being served by 
such operations.      
In addition, the function assigned by law to the FISU of providing security to 
Ukrainian military and civilian personnel and their family members abroad, as well as 
safeguarding attached officers who have access to state secrets abroad, is in conflict with 
the original function of foreign intelligence services.  By nature, such activities are closer 
to the tasks of security agencies.  Thus, these security missions of the FISU are 
overlapped with similar functions performed by the Security Service and the Intelligence 
Body of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.  Such duplication of duties can lead 
to unnecessary competition among the agencies of the UIC and an inefficient use of 
intelligence resources and funds.     
The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense is also focused on 
conducting intelligence activities abroad.  It does not have mixed intelligence and 
security functions and operates overseas primarily through the HUMINT resources.  The 
MID does not have a powerful SIGINT capability.  Its SIGINT functions are military in 
nature, and focused on performing tasks during military operations and local conflicts, 
when intelligence units need to intercept an enemy’s means of communication. 
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The MDI has a clear organizational structure that allows for effective control by 
the Ukrainian parliament and different state executive bodies.  Moreover, the intelligence 
budget of the MDI is not big and, therefore, should not be difficult to oversee.   
The Intelligence Body of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine became an 
independent intelligence agency and state budget entity in 2005.  However, the activities 
of the IBSBGS are still unexplainably controlled and directed by the State Border Guard 
Service.  Its budget is small and should not be difficult to oversee by parliamentary and 
state executive bodies.   
Being authorized by the law “On Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine” to conduct 
intelligence functions, in practice the IBSBGS performs primarily security tasks, which 
are mixed with law-enforcement activities.  In addition, the law allows the IBSBGS to 
conduct counterintelligence missions along the state border of Ukraine and safeguard 
Ukrainian personnel and state secrets.  Given the fact that its intelligence tasks are minor, 
it is most likely that in the near future this organization will leave the UIC and join the 
family of law-enforcement agencies. 
The Secret Service of Ukraine has been experiencing reform since 2003.  These 
processes are still underway as of this writing.  It appears that the SSU will become the 
primary national law-enforcement agency with pure security and counterintelligence 
functions.   
Although the SSU is not mentioned by the amended law as an intelligence organ 
of Ukraine, its powerful capabilities are directed to perform tasks of the UIC in the sphere 
of fighting against terrorism and organized crime.  After the first phase of reform, the 
SSU remains an enormous organization and influences the national intelligence 
estimation processes more than any other organization within the UIC.  
The SSU also continues to conduct some intelligence operations abroad.  Despite 
the reduction of the size of the agency (after the separation of the Main Intelligence and 
SIGINT directorates), the SSU has an extremely large budget which has been growing 
since the 2004 reforms.  It is also unclear why the budget of the SSU has been increasing 
when the most costly directorates left the SSU and become part of a state independent 
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budget entity (the Foreign Intelligence Service).  Such manipulations of functions and 
organizations within the UIC make budget oversight of the SSU problematic.   
It is also worth mentioning that the UIC does not have an all-source analysis 
intelligence agency that provides a single national intelligence estimate based on 
information from other national intelligence and security organizations.  The practice of 
agencies reporting independently, as well as performing similar functions, creates certain 
difficulties and inefficiency in the intelligence decision-making process, nor does it 
benefit the Ukrainian foreign policy decision-making process.  Moreover, national budget 
constraints obligate Ukraine to create such an independent all-source analytical agency 
and clarify in detail the intelligence and security tasks among agencies of the UIC.   
To oversee such complex intelligence and security organizations requires a 
change in the system of parliamentary and executive oversight.  The next chapter will 
examine how intelligence oversight is conducted by the Ukrainian parliament.  The 
intelligence budget process and the intelligence budget oversight mechanisms will be 
introduced and discussed. 
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V.  PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE UKRAINIAN 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Robert A. Dahl, an American scholar, said “the most fundamental and persistent 
problem in politics is to avoid autocratic rule.”231  As the Ukrainian Intelligence 
Community (UIC) deals with one of the state’s core tasks — national security — a 
system of oversight and control is needed to counterbalance the executive’s power.  
Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community is an essential element of power-
sharing at the state level and can set certain restrictions on the power of the executive or 
president.232   
One of parliament’s most important mechanisms for controlling intelligence 
executives is the budget. Ukrainian intelligence organizations use a considerable portion 
of the state budget.  Thus, it remains vital that the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
Parliament) monitor the intelligence budget process and ensure that use of the state’s 
scarce resources is both effective and efficient.   
The Verkhovna Rada is the highest legislative body of Ukraine. It consists of one 
chamber of four hundred and fifty parliamentarians.  One half of the Verkhovna Rada is 
elected by local constituents and one half through the elective lists of the political parties 
that won in the previous election.   
Article 85 of the Ukrainian constitution gives important powers and rights to the 
Verkhovna Rada to perform oversight of the Ukrainian Intelligence Community (UIC).  
The key powers and authority of the parliament are underlined in paragraphs 4 and 22 of 
the article: “(4) – approve the State Budget of Ukraine and introduce amendments to it; 
                                                 
231 A program of the Institute of Politics and the Phillips Brooks House. 2007. Harvard CIVICS, 5 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/unruh/private/docs/Harvard_CIVICS_Curriculum_Spring_20051.doc 
(accessed June 6, 2007). 
232 Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices. 2003. 
Handbook for Parliamentarians, No. 5, 18. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF). 
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control the implementation of the State Budget of Ukraine and adopt decisions in regard 
to the report on its implementation; and (22) – confirm the general structure and 
numerical strength, and defining the functions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 
Security Service of Ukraine and other military structures created in accordance with the 
laws of Ukraine.”233 
Based on this constitutional power, the Ukrainian parliament has adopted special 
legislation to oversee activities and budgets of the UIC and law-enforcement agencies.  
Ukrainian legislation dealing with intelligence and intelligence budget oversight is 
presented primarily in a specific law passed in March 2001, “On the Intelligence Bodies 
of Ukraine” (amended in 2005), and two basic laws passed on June 19, 2003 “On 
Democratic Civil Oversight of the Military Organization and Law-enforcement Agencies 
of Ukraine” and “On the Fundamentals of the National Security of Ukraine.”  The 
fundamental provisions of these laws are elaborated in special legislative acts dealing 
with intelligence oversight issues, such as “On the Verkhovna Rada’s Committees,” “On 
the Procedures of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,” and “On the Accounting Chamber of 
Ukraine.”  In addition, the major intelligence budget procedures are explained in the 
national law of 2001, “On the Budget Code of Ukraine.” 
The Verkhovna Rada carries out the functions of intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight through its permanent parliamentary committees.  According to Article 
89 of the constitution, the Verkhovna Rada confirms the list of all parliamentary 
committees, and elects chairmen to the respective committees.  This list is usually drawn 
up during the first plenary session of the new parliament based on the proposition of the 
people’s deputies.      
The Committee for National Security and Defense (CNSD) is the major 
parliamentary body that deals with intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.  By 
law, the CNSD prepares legislation on intelligence issues, oversees the UIC structure and 
the policies and activities of its intelligence agencies, authorizes and controls intelligence 
appropriations and conducts the preliminary consideration of intelligence issues under the 
                                                 
233 Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. Chapter IV: The Supreme Rada of Ukraine. Article 85. Available at 
http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm#r4 (accessed May 29, 2007). 
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authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.234  During the State Budget appropriations 
process the Budget Committee (BC) plays an important role in intelligence budget 
oversight as it has the power to review proposed intelligence expenditures and to 
influence decisions regarding final intelligence appropriations.  These committees 
prepare legislative drafts on issues of intelligence funding and authorize the UIC agencies 
to use appropriated funds.  Both committees are also allowed to oversee intelligence 
expenditures during the various stages of the intelligence budget cycle.   
To enhance intelligence budget oversight, the Ukrainian parliament exercises its 
control powers over the UIC via the Accounting Chamber (AC).  According to the law 
“On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine,” it supervises the usage of the national budget 
funds of governmental and non-governmental organizations, and expenditures of 
independent state bodies, like agencies of the UIC (the key spending units).   
Thus, the Ukrainian legislature empowers parliamentarians to oversee operational 
activities and financial aspects of the UIC.  They can make necessary decisions regarding 
intelligence budget authorization and appropriations, as well as monitor the financial 
activities of intelligence organizations.  
This chapter consists of three main sections. First, it will describe the typical 
intelligence budget process in Ukraine, with emphasis on intelligence budget 
development inside intelligence agencies and subsequent processes within the Ukrainian 
parliament.  The next section discusses the oversight mechanisms and jurisdiction of the 
parliamentary Committee for National Security and Defense and the Budget Committee.  
Finally, the role of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine on the issue of intelligence 
budget oversight will be considered.            
B. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET PROCESS 
The introduction of the Budget Code of Ukraine in June 2001 affected the 
Ukrainian budget system and budgeting for the Ukrainian intelligence community in 
                                                 
234 Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. Chapter IV: The Supreme Rada of Ukraine. Article 89. Available at 
http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm#r4 (accessed May 29, 2007).. 
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particular.  According to the law “On the Budget Code of Ukraine,” the list of key budget 
entities (national spending units) of the State Budget of Ukraine is established each fiscal 
year and should be approved by the State Budget Law by establishing budget 
appropriations.235  Today, all four agencies of the UIC have the status of budget entities.  
Each has an independent budget line in the State Budget of Ukraine and, therefore, is 
obligated to conduct budget development and execution procedures independently from 
the rest of the state budget entities, as well as defense, security and law-enforcement 
agencies.    
The Budget Code of Ukraine provides the time frame and other requirements for 
all participants of the budget process.  Its Article 19 identifies four stages in the national 
budget process.  These stages include: formulating draft budgets; considering and passing 
the State Budget Law of Ukraine; executing the budget; and preparing and considering 
reports on budget execution and making decisions on these reports.  Moreover, the law 
requires that each key budget entity be controlled at each stage of the budget process by 
conducting financial control and audits.236   
The intelligence budget process is designed to meet the requirements of the 
Budget Code.  To achieve these objectives, the following procedures are employed.    
1. Development of the Intelligence Budget within Intelligence 
Organizations 
Among intelligence organizations of the UIC, the internal processes of financial 
planning and budgeting are approximately the same.  In each intelligence agency these 
processes are performed under the coordination and supervision of a Chief of the 
Financial Department (CFD).  As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Financial Department is 
part of the organizational structure of every intelligence agency of the UIC. It usually 
carries out its functions within an administrative directorate.  The CFD is subordinated  
 
                                                 
235 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007. Chapter 1. Paragraph 4: Budget 
Process and Participants. Article 22: Key Spending Units and Main Functions Thereof. Available at 
http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 (accessed May 29, 2007).   
236 Ibid., Article 26: Audit and Financial Control. 
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directly to the director of an intelligence agency.  The CFD is the executive body through 
which an intelligence director exercises his authority over the spending of intelligence 
funds.         
The Budget Code of Ukraine requires an intelligence agency to provide the 
Cabinet of Ministers with an intelligence budget proposal on a timely basis through the 
Ministry of Finance.  The Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for development of the 
State Budget of Ukraine, which, after approval of the parliament, becomes a national law.   
Each year (see Figure 14), the Cabinet of Ministers, together with the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Economy and European Integration, issues a report “On the 
Guidelines of Budget Policy for the Next Budget Period.”  These propositions and 
recommendations are designed to help state budget entities to develop their budgets for 
the next fiscal year and provide targets, ceilings, and necessary guidelines.   
The Intelligence Budget Process in Ukraine
Source: The Budget Code of Ukraine, http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 (accessed May 30, 2007).
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According to the Code, this document should be submitted to the Verkhovna 
Rada Budget Committee by the end of May and no later than four working days prior to 
the parliamentary plenary session of June 1.  In order to expedite the budget process in 
2007, the Guidelines were submitted to the Parliament by May.237   
No later than June 1, or the first day of a plenary session of the Verkhovna Rada 
after this date, hearings on budget policy for the next budget period take place in the 
Ukrainian parliament.  A report “On the Guidelines of Budget Policy for the Next Budget 
Period” is presented by the Prime Minister of Ukraine or by the Minister of Finance.238  
Based on this report and results of the parliamentary hearings, a Budget Resolution on 
approving or taking into consideration the Guidelines of the Budget Policy for the next 
budget period is passed by the Verkhovna Rada no later than July 1.  This Resolution is a 
major guideline for the national budget entities to develop budgets for the next fiscal 
year.  However, for the agencies of the UIC it is not the main document to develop 
intelligence budgets.    
The Resolution serves for them as additional information to develop their budgets 
because each intelligence agency has its special guidelines and requirements for 
intelligence budget planning and development.  Those special guidelines come from the 
Head of the Secretariat of the President (office of his Deputy for Intelligence and Law-
enforcement Issues, in particular).  Earlier — usually by May of a current fiscal year  
(FY) — some recommendations also come from the CNSD to intelligence agencies in 
order to avoid big differences in intelligence budget estimations.  For example, the 
recommendations regarding the FY2005 intelligence budget of the Secret Service of 
Ukraine were done by the CNSD on April 8, 2004.239  Taking under consideration the 
reform processes that took place in the Ukrainian Secret Service in 2005 (separation of 
                                                 
237 The Interview of the First Vice-Prime Minister, Finance Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov to 
the Radio Station “Ukraine” on March 22, 2007. Available at http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php/ 
index.php?id=148&listid=43009 (accessed May 31, 2007).  
238 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007. Article 33: Definition of the 
Guidelines of Budget Policy for the Next Budget Period. Available at http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 
(accessed May 29, 2007). 
239 News of the CNSD. Archive. 2004. Propositions Regarding the Budget of the Secret Service of 
Ukraine for 2005. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/news/news/20040408news0036.htm 
(accessed June 13, 2007).  
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foreign intelligence from law-enforcement functions), the CNSD provided its 
recommendations to the just created Foreign Intelligence Service regarding the budget 
developments for FY2007 on December 13, 2006, while conducting the working meeting 
with the intelligence service’s executives.240   
During this time, as a rule, informal and formal meetings and consultations take 
place between intelligence officials and the Office of the Deputy for Intelligence and 
Law-enforcement Issues to update intelligence requirements and discuss agencies’ 
appropriations for the next fiscal year.  Therefore, the legislative and executive branches, 
by law, may start conducting their intelligence budget oversight functions during the first 
stage of the intelligence budget process (budget preparation).   
Based on these special recommendations, the director of an intelligence 
organization releases internal documents (instructions) that regulate the agency’s 
intelligence budget processes, as well as timeframes for budgeting in subordinate 
intelligence spending units.  These spending units submit their budget estimates to the 
CFD.  The CFD revises these estimates, determines the intelligence financial 
requirements for the upcoming year, and prepares consolidated budget estimates of the 
agency’s income and expenditures.  The intelligence organization’s budget request is then 
reported to the director of the given intelligence agency. 
Once it is approved by the agency’s director, the intelligence budget request goes 
for submission to the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine for revision and standardization.  
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for coordination of budget request preparation 
activities among national budget entities.  It is also in charge of combining those requests 
into one single document — the State Budget Proposal (the draft State Budget Law of 
Ukraine).241  The Ministry is allowed to analyze and control the budget requests of the 
national budget entities at a stage of the budget preparation process.  Based on the results 
                                                 
240 Materials of the Visiting Meeting of the CNSD to the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. 
2006. Available at http://www.szru.gov.ua/messages.php?lang=ua&item=37&page=1 (accessed June 13, 
2007). 
241 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007. Article 32: Organizational 
Principles on Formulation of the State Budget of Ukraine. Available at http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 
(accessed May 29, 2007).  
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of the analysis of each budget entity, the Ministry of Finance may make a decision to 
include or exclude a certain portion of the budget request in the final request that is later 
submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers.242     
After its submission to the Ministry of Finance, the intelligence budget request 
becomes a part of the Cabinet’s Budget Proposal, which is presented to the Secretariat of 
the President.  Following revisions made by the Secretariat of the President, the proposed 
intelligence budget returns to the Cabinet of Ministers and to the Ministry of Finance, in 
particular, for final revision.  Later it becomes a classified appendix to the draft State 
Budget Law of Ukraine that should be submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to the 
Parliament for reading and approval (authorization) no later than September 15.243  
Afterward, the classified appendix should be reported to the CNSD and the BC for final 
scrutiny.  
2. Budgeting for Intelligence within the Parliament  
The CNSD and the BC start analyzing and reviewing the intelligence budgets of 
the UIC after they are submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to the Verkhovna Rada (by 
September 15).  Expenditures for intelligence budget programs are presented to the 
relevant committees as classified appendices of the draft State Budget Law.     
The State Budget does not show the detailed amount of expenditures proposed for 
intelligence programs.  Article 31 of “The Budget Code of Ukraine” emphasizes that the 
State Budget of Ukraine should contain explanations for all expenditures, except for 
expenditures involving State secrets (funding of classified programs).  Therefore, secret 
intelligence expenditures planned for the activities of bodies of State power for purposes 
of national security are included in the State Budget of Ukraine without details. 
                                                 
242 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007, Article 36: Analysis of Budget 
Requests and Development of Proposals to the draft State Budget of Ukraine. Available at 
http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 (accessed May 29, 2007). 
243 Ibid. 
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According to “The Budget Code of Ukraine,” four parliamentary committees, the 
Accounting Chamber and the Ministry of Finance are authorized to overview secret 
budget expenditures.       
The Accounting Chamber and the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine shall 
supervise secret expenditures in keeping with procedures established by 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.  Reports on secret expenditures shall be 
reviewed by the Verkhovna Rada Budget Committee, the Verkhovna 
Rada Committee for Legislative Provision of Law-enforcement Activity, 
the Verkhovna Rada Committee for the Struggle Against Organized Crime 
and Corruption, and the Verkhovna Rada Committee for National 
Security and Defense.  Some reports on the use of funds for secret 
expenditures shall be reviewed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at a 
secret sitting.244 
However, classified intelligence budgets and expenditures are reviewed only by 
the CNSD, the BC, and the AC.  They are also allowed to oversee expenditures of 
classified intelligence budget items.  
The Ministry of Finance also reviews this budget information before including it 
within the draft State Budget of Ukraine.  The Committee for Legislative Provision of 
Law-enforcement Activity and the Committee for the Struggle Against Organized Crime 
and Corruption are responsible for reviewing the classified budgets of the Ministry of 
Interior and other law-enforcement agencies.  The latter committee has statutory power to 
request information from the Secret Service of Ukraine and oversee the use of its funds 
for fighting organized crime and corruption.245 
Within 5 days after the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine submits the draft State 
Budget Law to the Parliament (September 15), the Minister of Finance of Ukraine should 
present it to a plenary meeting and submit it to the BC.     
After accepting the draft State Budget Law of Ukraine submitted by the Cabinet 
(but no later than October 1), the draft State Budget Law of Ukraine is reviewed by 
                                                 
244 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007. Article 31. Available at 
http://meget.kiev.ua/pg.php?i=29 (accessed May 30, 2007). 
245 Democratic Control of Secret Service of Ukraine. 2007. Legislative Oversight. Available at 
http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=56851&cat_id=56802 (accessed March 28, 
2007). 
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people’s deputies, relevant committees, and political factions of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine. “The Verkhovna Rada’s committees formulate their proposals regarding the 
draft State Budget of Ukraine, submit them to the Budget Committee, and appoint 
representatives to take part in the Budget Committee’s work. The deadline for submission 
of proposals by Verkhovna Rada members is October 1.”246  
Thus, the CNSD reviews and analyzes the intelligence budget during the period 
from September 15 to October 1.  During this timeframe, closed-door hearings take place 
at the CNSD on intelligence budget issues.  Usually, intelligence executives personally 
report budget requests of intelligence agencies.  Intelligence officials may also be 
required to explain in detail the financial aspects of certain intelligence programs and 
provide justification for including those expenditures for the upcoming year.  Later, the 
CNSD submits its estimation regarding the budget for intelligence to the BC for further 
review.   
While analyzing the intelligence budget request from the CNSD, the BC may also 
hold hearings to ask the agencies’ directors to explain financial details of selected 
intelligence programs.  According to Article 39 of the law “On the Budget Code of 
Ukraine,” the representatives of the CNSD should be delegated to the BC to work 
together to summarize the intelligence budget proposals.  This is a mandatory procedure 
that happens every year.   
The goal of this liaison activity is to reach agreement between the CNSD and the 
BC regarding the main features of intelligence budgets.  The agreement between the two 
committees is worked out during the special meeting or conference behind closed doors.  
The materials of that meeting are not published.  No information is available indicating 
that the agreement regarding intelligence budgets between these committees was not 
reached or was postponed for an uncertain period.      
Having reached an agreement in both committees, the proposed intelligence 
budget becomes a part of the final report of the BC to the Parliament regarding the 
                                                 
246 Translated from the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine.” 2007. Article 39: Presentation of the draft 
State Budget Law of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Available at http://meget.kiev.ua/ 
pg.php?i=29 (accessed May 29, 2007). 
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proposed draft State Budget Law of Ukraine.  Based on the requirements of Article 31 of 
the Code, budgets for intelligence are included in this proposed draft without details.  The 
final report of the BC to the Parliament opens the first reading of the proposed draft State 
Budget Law of Ukraine.       
After parliamentary approval of the Budget Committee’s report, the Cabinet of 
Ministers has two weeks to implement the amendments and recommendations of the 
Rada and submit it to the Parliament for the second reading.  The second reading once 
again begins with the report of the Ministry of Finance.  The Verkhovna Rada can 
approve the proposed second draft state Budget Law by voting.  If this vote fails, the 
proposed Law goes to the BC for further revision.  Standing committees and people’s 
deputies have three days to submit their amendments to the BC, which then has five days 
to make amendments and provide deputies with its conclusions (no later than three days 
before the third reading starts).  The third reading repeats the general procedures of the 
second one. 
Theoretically, the UIC can amend its budget during the first or the second 
reading.  However, the conference agreement between the CNSD and the BC almost 
“fixes” the intelligence budgets.  The current Ukrainian legislature allows any budget 
entity (as well as intelligence agencies) to initiate an amendment to the law “State Budget 
of Ukraine” any time it considers it necessary.  If an agency of the UIC needs to increase 
appropriations, it gets approval from the Secretariat of the President, the National 
Security and Defense Council and the Cabinet of Ministries.  The agency then writes its 
proposals to the CNSD.  After conducting an analysis of the proposed issue (and audits if 
necessary), the committee makes its decision to refuse or support the proposed 
amendment.  If they support it, the CNSD organizes statutory procedures to prepare an 
amendment for reviewing and voting in the Verkhovna Rada.  This procedure is very 
complicated and, due to continuous budget constraints in Ukraine, is not likely to be 
successful.   
An agency of the UIC has only succeeded once in changing its budget.  In 2004, 
the CNSD introduced to the people’s deputies its proposals to increase the FY2004 
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intelligence budget of the Security Service of Ukraine.  The amendment to the law “State 
Budget of Ukraine” was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in April 2004.247   
On November 21, 2005, the CNSD announced that during the first reading of the 
proposed law “State Budget of Ukraine for 2006,” the propositions of the intelligence 
agencies and the CNDS regarding the FY2006 intelligence funds were simply ignored by 
the Parliament.  The letter was sent to the President of Ukraine, the National Security and 
Defense Council, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Budget Committee.248  However, the 
attempt to increase intelligence funding was unsuccessful.  The CNSD official Website 
does not contain information that the proposed additional funds were approved and 
included into the proposed FY2006 budget for intelligence.    
On September 22, 2006, based on the additional requests of intelligence agencies, 
the CNSD issued propositions regarding the budget amendments of intelligence agencies 
in 2007.249  However, the published intelligence budget for FY2007 does not indicate 
whether the proposed amendments were approved by the Parliament.   
The State Budget Law of Ukraine should be passed by December 2.  This law 
officially appropriates expenditures for state budget entities, including intelligence 
agencies.  If the Parliament fails to complete the budget on time, a special resolution on 
the financing of vital expenditures should be passed by the Parliament until final approval 
of the law.  The Ukrainian Parliament has not failed to provide funds for the intelligence 
organizations on time since this process began in 1992.   
C. THE PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES: JURISDICTION 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
According to the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada holds significant authority 
and has access to any state information and classified data as well.  Article 86 of the 
                                                 
247 The CNSD. Archive. Regarding the Proposed Law “On Changes of the Law On State Budget of 
Ukraine.” 2004. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/news/archive.htm (accessed June 14, 2007).  
248 The CNSD. Archive. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/news/20060922news0007.htm 
(accessed June 14, 2007).  
249 The CNSD. 2006. Propositions of the CNSD to Increase Budgets of Agencies Dealing with the 
National Security and Defense Issues. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/news/ 
20060922news0007.htm (accessed June 14, 2007).   
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Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that the people’s deputies can call on the executive 
branch to conduct investigations and obtain any kind of information.  The results of these 
inquiries should be reported to and discussed at sessions of parliament.   
The law “On the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committees” specifies the power of 
committees to call for investigations.  It says that all executive bodies, entities and 
organizations, as well as their officials, must provide committees with all information, 
original documents and copies upon their request.  In addition, the law gives the 
parliamentary committees and its people’s deputies the power to question executives in 
the parliament committees, organize hearings for them and request cabinet officers, 
civilian and military to testify in parliament.   
There is no special parliamentary committee in the Verkhovna Rada that deals 
exclusively with intelligence issues.  The CNSD includes for these purposes a 
subcommittee “On Legislative Support of National Security and Intelligence Bodies of 
Ukraine,” which is the key substructure of the Verkhovna Rada in the system of 
intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.   
The Verkhovna Rada Budget Committee (BC) also deals with the issues of 
intelligence budget oversight.  However, its intelligence budget oversight functions are 
operational mostly during the short period of intelligence budget appropriation.  It does 
not have the power to influence intelligence expenditures after they are appropriated.      
1. The Committee on National Security and Defense   
a. The Organizational Structure of the Committee, Main Functions 
and Tasks of Its Subcommittee on Intelligence Issues   
The CNSD was created by the Ukrainian Parliament on October 10, 1990.  
At this time it was a permanent parliamentary commission “On the Issues of Internal and 
External Security.” According to the parliamentary decision of May 13, 1998 “On the 
Verkhovna Rada Committees,” the commission was renamed as the Committee on 
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National Security and Defense.250  Based on a decision of the Ukrainian Parliament on 
February 20, 2003, fourteen people’s deputies are delegated to the CNSD to carry out 
oversight duties and support the committee’s functions.  On June 4, 2007, this statutory 
number was increased to sixteen.   
All political parties of the Verkhovna Rada are represented on this 
committee (six positions for the “Blok of Ulii Timoshenko,” five for the “Party of 
Regions,” three for “Our Ukraine,” one for the “Socialistic Party,” and one for the 
“Communist Party”).251  It is worth mentioning that only five members of the CNSD had 
experience serving in intelligence and security organizations: one served in military 
intelligence; two were high ranking officers in the Armed Service of Ukraine; and two 
members of the CNSD had long experience serving in the KGB and later in the Security 
Service of Ukraine.252            
The committee considers draft legislation and overview issues of 
intelligence and national security and defense.  The law “On the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine Committees” stipulates that the committee can establish subcommittees to 
organize work within specific areas.   
Sub-committees should include at least three members of the committee; 
members of the committee may have membership in more than one sub-
committee.  Sub-committees are supported by the respective divisions in 
the committee Secretariat and its staff members…The secretariat of the 
committee organizes the work of the committee providing information, 
consultation, and documentation.  The staff of the secretariat comprises 
about thirty experts.253 
                                                 
250 History of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense. 2007.  
Translated from the official Committee’s Website. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/about.htm 
(accessed June 3, 2007). 
251 The CNSD. 2007. Composition of the Committee. Available at http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/ 
site/p_komity_list?pidid=1808 (accessed June 14, 2007). 
252 The CNSD. 2007. Biographies of the CNSD’s members are available at 
http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/vip.htm (accessed June 14, 2007).  
253 Leonid Polyakov, January 2005. An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and 
Governance of the Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine, 29. DCAF. Geneva. Available 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf (accessed June 3, 2007). 
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The CNSD contains six subcommittees (see Figure 15).  The 
subcommittee on Legislative Support of National Security and Intelligence Bodies of 
Ukraine is the main structure of the CNSD that oversees the activities of intelligence 
agencies and conducts intelligence budget oversight.   
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Figure 15.   The Organization of the Committee on National Security and Defense 
 
The subcommittee’s main functions and tasks regarding intelligence 
oversight are the following:254 
• Lawmaking activity related to the issue of intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight, including the examination upon its own initiative or 
instruction from the Parliament;  preliminary review of draft laws 
submitted by other parliamentary committees and people’s deputies on 
intelligence issues;  preparation of the conclusions and recommendations 
with regards to draft laws on intelligence matters; 
                                                 
254 Translated from: Main Functions and Tasks of the Committee on National Security and Defense. 
Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/about.htm (accessed June 3, 2007). 
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• Collecting, studying and researching information related to the activity of 
the CNSD;  organizing hearings for intelligence executives, as well as 
during the parliamentary sessions; 
• Participating in the formulation of intelligence budgets and in the control 
over them; preliminary review of international treaties and agreements on 
intelligence cooperation issues; preparation of conclusions concerning 
their ratification or abrogation. 
The subcommittee also has a legal right to call for investigations in the 
intelligence sector.  A new law “On Temporary and Special Inquiry Commissions of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” may update current procedures to conduct such 
investigations.255  The proposed law was provided to the parliament on March 5, 2007 
for registration, review and vote.      
The subcommittee “On Legislative Support of National Security and 
Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine” continually overviews the most important intelligence 
issues and reports them to the CNSD.  The subcommittee conducts regular meetings with 
intelligence executives, testifies at hearings, and organizes inspections.   
Given that the sub-committee deals with classified intelligence issues, its 
decisions are not widely published in the mass media.  The official Website of the CNSD 
does not provide detailed information concerning the functional successes of the 
committee and its subcommittees in reviewing the intelligence agencies.  Materials on 
hearings and other events of the CNSD and its relevant subcommittee regarding 
intelligence oversight functions are also not published at the official Website of the 
Verhovna Rada.  In addition, no information is available concerning thematic subjects of 
those hearings.     
The most recent report of Ukrainian mass media regarding the attempt of 
the CNSD to summon the Chairman of the Ukrainian Secret Service and the Secretary 
Deputy on Intelligence and Law-enforcement Issues of the Presidential Secretariat to 
testify before the Parliament was published on May 16, 2007.  On that day, the 
                                                 
255 Translated from: People’s Deputy Olexandr Feldman Proposes to Fix the Statutory Right of the 
Parliamentary Temporary and Special Commissions. 2007. Available at: http://delo.ua/news/ 
econimic/ukraine/info-23454.html (accessed June 3, 2007).  
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Informational Agency “RBK-Ukraine” reported that the CNSD was going to invite those 
officials to question them concerning some national security related issues.256  However, 
the fact that meetings took place and the actual results of any possible meetings still 
remain unknown.   
Thus, the Ukrainian Parliament and the CNSD, in particular, do not inform 
the public regarding the results of parliamentary hearings related to the security sector.  It 
is still unknown whether the hearings concerning intelligence budget issues were 
organized in the CNSD and the BC or if they even took place in Ukraine in 2007.257  
b. International Cooperation of the CNSD 
The parliamentary intelligence oversight system in Ukrainian is in the 
process of development.  The members of the CNSD continuously conduct research and 
gain international experience in order to enhance this type of control in Ukraine.   
The CNSD and sub-committee members take part in international 
conferences and seminars on intelligence-related issues.258  The CNSD regularly extends 
invitations to visit Ukraine to members of various international parliamentary committees 
dealing with intelligence oversight issues.  During their meetings, the participants 
exchange information concerning the best techniques and practices of intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight.259  Some recent events with regards to the issue of 
intelligence oversight are discussed in the Ukrainian mass media and on the official 
Website of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). 
 
                                                 
256 Translated from: The Committee on the National Security and Defense is Going to Invite Security 
Officials. May 16, 2007. Informational Agency “RBK-Ukraine.” Article Available at 
http://www.rbc.ua/rus/newsline/2007/05/16/203998.shtml (accessed June 6, 2007).   
257 Materials of the Parliamentary Hearings in 2007. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/ 
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258 Translated from: Information about the Activities of the Committee on National Security and 
Defense. 2007. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/~k_obor/about.htm (accessed June 3, 2007). 
259 Ibid. 
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In this regard, the first important event occurred in June 2004, when the 
international conference “On the Defense and Security Sector Oversight” was organized 
in Ukraine and hosted by the CNSD.260  This event was a key turning point for further 
international cooperation of the CNSD.  
During this conference, representatives of the DCAF and the CNSD 
discussed the most significant problems of intelligence and intelligence budget oversight 
in western countries.  The major challenges to enhancing such control in Ukraine were 
also reviewed.  
The conference accelerated transformational processes in security sector 
reforms.  As a result, certain structural changes were adopted in the Ukrainian 
Intelligence Community.  At the beginning of 2005, the CNSD was actively involved in 
reforming the Secret Service of Ukraine and its budget oversight system.  The Security 
Service was separated from the foreign intelligence activity and the new agency — the 
Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine — was organized.261  After this reorganization, 
an audit of the intelligence budget of the Security Service was conducted by the CNSD 
and the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.  This procedure was organized in order to 
check previous expenditures of the Security Service and make estimates of new budget 
requirements for these two intelligence services. 
Perhaps the most important events regarding intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight occurred in Ukraine in May and December of 2005.  On May 11, 2005, 
the international conference “Current Problems of Defense and Security Sector Reform in 
Ukraine” was organized by the Ukrainian Parliament.262  The most significant problems 
of transparency and accountability in the Ukrainian security sector were discussed.      
                                                 
260 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 2004. International Conference. Materials of the Conference are 
Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/_diarydetailskms.cfm?lng=en&id=15797&nav1=2 (accessed June 3, 
2007). 
261 Smeshko, Igor. September 2005. Reformation of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Whole 
Law-enforcement System Will Happen. Translated from the Interview to the Defense Express Magazine. 
Available at http://www.cripo.com.ua/?sect_id=3&aid=8140 (accessed May 17, 2007).  
262 The materials of the conference are available at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/ 
_diarydetailskms.cfm?lng=en&id=15666&nav1=2 (accessed June 4, 2007). 
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On December 18, 2005, the international conference “NATO-Ukraine 
Roundtable on Civil and Democratic Oversight of the Intelligence Sector” was organized 
in Ukraine and hosted by the CNSD.263  This time, the purpose of the conference was to 
raise issues concerning the transparency and accountability of Ukrainian intelligence.          
High-level representatives from the DCAF, NATO, and the Ukrainian 
Parliament and Presidential Administration gathered together to discuss perspectives of 
intelligence oversight in Ukraine and its legislative and executive procedures, in 
particular.  Moreover, representatives of parliamentary oversight bodies and intelligence 
executives from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania took part in this conference.264   
During these conferences, international officials shared their experience 
and knowledge in organizing and conducting intelligence and intelligence budget 
oversight.  These conferences were considered by some members of the international 
community as distinguished and unprecedented events in the security sector reforms 
occurring in Ukraine. 
In 2006, such conferences became common practices.  On May 18, the 
international conference “The Security Sector Reform: Lessons Learned” took place in 
Ukraine.  Then, on June 22, the parliamentary roundtable was conducted “On Oversight 
of the Security Sector”; on October 19, the regional meeting of the DCAF Foundation 
Council was held, focusing on the issue of “Defense and Security Sector Review in 
Ukraine”; and on October 7, the workshop “Defense Institution Building: Tools for 
Policy Development, Coordination, Advocacy, and Implementation” took place in the 
Verkhovna Rada.  Finally, on December 11, a Seminar “On Cooperation between Civil 
Servants and Professional Military in Defense and Security Sector Governance” hosted 
by the CNSD was organized. 
                                                 
263 The Information regarding the program of the conference is available at   http://se2.dcaf.ch/ 
serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=375C8628-F945-52AF-6A6F-
B623B56284E3&lng=en (accessed June 4, 2007). 
264 The Information regarding the participants of the conference is available at 
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=47381FE0-FA89-945A-1580-
DFB4DA7BFD93&lng=en (accessed June 4, 2007).  
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In 2007, only two international workshops took place in the CNSD.  On 
February 7, 2007, a workshop “On Practical Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the 
Intelligence Sector” took place, and in March 26, the senior-level NATO-Ukraine 
roundtable “On Parliament’s Role in National Security and Defense” was held.  These 
workshops were aimed “to share experience regarding practical aspects of the functioning 
of parliamentary committees or sub-committees responsible for intelligence oversight and 
provide practical support for the development or improvement of the relevant legal and 
procedural bases.”265   
In 2007, the international activity of the CNSD and practical 
implementation of the intelligence and intelligence budget oversight mechanisms were 
decreased due to a political crisis that occurred in Ukraine.  In April 2007, the President 
of Ukraine made a decision to dissolve the Parliament in order to call for new elections.  
According to an agreement between the Ukrainian Parliament and the President, these 
elections were to be held on September 30, 2007.  No further international meetings 
between the CNSD and the DCAF were scheduled in 2007.  These meetings are not on 
the list of planned DCAF events for 2008, pending resolution of the current political 
crisis in Ukraine.266    
2. The Budget Committee   
The Budget Committee is the main parliamentary body that is responsible for the 
State Budget of Ukraine (see Figure 16). As of June 15, 2007, it consists of twenty-six 




                                                 
265 The materials of the workshops are available at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/_diarypastkms.cfm?lng= 
en&id=28466&param0_219=2007&nav1=2&nav2=2 (accessed June 4, 2007). 
266 Future Events of the DCAF. 2007. Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/ 
_diarykms.cfm?nav1=2&nav2=1 (accessed June 4, 2007). 
267 The Total Strength of the BC. 2007. Available at http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/ 
pls/site/p_komity?pidid=1813 (accessed June 14, 2007).   
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committee (fourteen positions for the “Party of Regions,” four for “Our Ukraine,” four 
for the “Socialistic Party,” three for the “Blok of Ulii Timoshenko,” and one for the 
“Communist Party”).268       
The Organization of the Budget Committee 
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Figure 16.   The Organization of the Budget Committee 
 
The organizational structure of the BC is made up of the head, two first deputy 
heads, a secretary and three deputy heads who run three sub-committees: “On the State 
Revenue,” “On the Social Programs,” and “On the State Budget Control on Budget 
Implementation and Execution.”269        
Theoretically, this committee initiates and coordinates all parliamentary budget 
cycles, including the intelligence budget cycle.  It controls the process of preparation and 
                                                 
268 The Budget Committee. 2007. Composition of the Committee. Available at 
http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/site/p_komity_list?pidid=1808 (accessed June 14, 2007). 
269 The organizational Structure of the Budget Committee. 2007. Available at 
http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/site/p_komity?pidid=1813 (accessed June 5, 2007). 
 114
adoption of budgets of intelligence agencies and reviews the report of the Accounting 
Chamber of Ukraine on intelligence budget execution at the end of the fiscal year.270   
The BC does not have a separate subcommittee to deal with intelligence issues or 
a subcommittee on the budgets of security structures.  A few people’s deputies of the 
committee have special education in formulating the state budget policy and budgeting 
for the security sector.271  However, as a rule, parliamentarians of the BC critically 
discuss the intelligence budget at the budget adoption stage.  They also pay much 
attention while reviewing the execution of the intelligence budget.  
The BC does not have a sufficient number of qualified specialists to deal 
effectively with intelligence budgeting and oversight issues.  During the stage of 
intelligence appropriations, the CNSD delegates its members to take part in meetings of 
the State Budget Working Group, which operates within the BC during the appropriation 
stage.  This delegation helps the BC to figure out future intelligence appropriations and 
understand the picture of future intelligence budget expenditures.   
The role of the BC in budgeting for intelligence is limited to the general 
coordination and oversight of the appropriateness of budgeting for intelligence to the 
national budget process.  Dealing with other budgets at the same time, the BC does not 
have sufficient staff resources to understand all the specifics and practices of intelligence 
budgets.  Moreover, time constraints do not allow the Budget Committee to be fully 
effective in checking and tracking all appropriations of intelligence agencies.  Thus, most 
real power in the development of intelligence budgets belongs to the Ministry of Finance, 
the Secretariat of the President and the Committee on National Security and Defense.   
                                                 
270 Polyakov, An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the Defense and 
Security Sector in Ukraine, 30. 
271 Biographies of the BC’s members are available at http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/site/ 
p_komity_list?pidid=1813 (accessed June 14, 2007).  
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D. THE ACCOUNTING CHAMBER OF UKRAINE AND ITS ROLE IN 
INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
1. The Organizational Structure of the Accounting Chamber 
The Constitution of Ukraine adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
Parliament) on June 28, 1996 established the constitutional status of the Accounting 
Chamber (AC) as the body acting on behalf of the Parliament to execute control over the 
use of Ukrainian state budget funds.  On July 11, 1996, the Parliament adopted the law of 
Ukraine “On the Accounting Chamber” that recognized the AC as a permanent body of 
external state financial control that is subordinated to the Verkhovna Rada.  This control 
has been functioning in Ukraine since 1997.272 
On December 8, 2004, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the law of Ukraine No 2222-
IV “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine” that amends Article 98 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine as follows: “Control over revenues of the State Budget of 
Ukraine and their use on behalf of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be exercised by the 
Accounting Chamber.”273  This amendment went into effect on January 1, 2006.  Since 
that time, the article has extended the authority of the AC regarding control of the use of 
each governmental organization’s funds.  Therefore, it also includes agencies of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community.  
By law, the AC shall consist of a Chairman, a First Deputy and Deputy Head, the 
Secretary of the AC, and comptrollers working in audit departments (see Figure 17). 
                                                 
272 Information is taken and translated from the official Website of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
Parliament). Available at http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/index (accessed May 21, 2007). 
273 Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. Article 98. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm 
(accessed March 28, 2007).  
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The Organization of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine           Figure 7
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Source: The law “On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine ”. Amended in 2004. Chapter III:  Composition
and Structure of the Accounting Chamber. Article 10.  
 
Figure 17.   The Organization of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine 
 
The AC activities are supported by a staff.  The structure and the total strength of 
the staff are regulated by the Chairman of the AC and are usually limited by funding 
allocated for such needs.274  The Board of the AC is comprised of the Chairman, the First 
Deputy and Deputy Chairman, the Secretary of the AC, and Chief Comptrollers — heads 
of the AC operational departments.  
The Chairman of the AC shall be appointed to the office by the Verkhovna Rada 
after nomination by the Chairman of the Parliament for a term of 7 years, with the right to 
be appointed for a second term.  The appointment must be approved by a majority of the 
parliament, by a secret ballot.  The Chairman also must be a citizen of Ukraine and have 
a terminal degree in economics or law, as well as professional experience in public 
administration, audit and finance.  In addition, s/he should demonstrate professional 
knowledge during the process of selection according to special procedures, set up by the 
relevant parliamentary committee [the Budget Committee].  
The Head of the Accounting Chamber shall have a right to participate in 
sessions of the Parliament, its committees and ad hoc, special and other 
commissions when issues concerning the Accounting Chamber are under 
consideration.  The Head of the Accounting Chamber, as well as the Board 
                                                 
274 Translated from the Statute of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.  
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members, can not be a Member of the Parliament of Ukraine, a member of 
the Government of Ukraine, get involved in entrepreneurial activities, 
have a part time job (except for teaching, research and other creative 
activities conducted outside of working hours).275 
The AC performs its executive control over intelligence expenditures based on the 
authorization of parliamentary committees.  According to an amendment to the law “On 
Accounting Chamber” of 2004 (Article 6), the AC “if authorized by parliamentary 
committees, shall verify the appropriateness of spending targeted national funds and 
over-the-budget funds by executive bodies.”276 Thus, with the purpose of overseeing 
intelligence budgets, the CNSD and the BC are authorized to task the AC with control of 
intelligence expenditures.   
In addition to the constitutional power of the Accounting Chamber, the law “On 
Intelligence Organs of Ukraine” of 2001 specifies that the AC is responsible for 
overseeing intelligence budgets and expenditures exercised on intelligence-related 
activities.  The AC conducts its oversight through a specially authorized department — 
the Defense and Law Enforcement Audit Department (see Figure 18). 
The Head of this department is a governmental official who is subordinated to the 
Board of the AC.  S/he manages direction of the AC operations within defense, law 
enforcement, and intelligence agencies.  Having the highest state clearance, the head of 
the department has the right to be present at all meetings of committees of the Parliament, 
state bodies, and local governments. S/he also has the exclusive right to attend special 
meetings of the boards of central executive bodies, to which the Ukrainian intelligence 
agencies belong.   
The department head may be discharged from his position ahead of time, except 
for retirement or resignation, by the recommendation of the AC Board in cases of  
 
 
                                                 
275 The Law “On Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.” Amended in 2004. Chapter III: Composition and 
Structure of the Accounting Chamber. Article 10. Available at http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/ 
control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=88465&cat_id=32815 (accessed May 21, 2007).    
276 Ibid, Article 6. Amended in 2004.   
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unsatisfactory performance of duties, violation of laws or abuse of office.  S/he can not 
get involved in entrepreneurial activities, nor have a part time job (except for teaching, 
research and other creative activities).277 
 
 
Source:  The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. 2007. Translated from http://www.ac-
rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article?showHidden=1&art_id=88278&cat_id=32784&cti
me=1091630232224 (accessed May 28, 2007).      
 
Figure 18.   Functional Structure of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine [From: The 
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. 2007] 
 
                                                 
277 The law “On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.” Amended in 2004. Article 11. Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=88465&cat_id=32815 
(accessed May 21, 2007). 
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The AC regularly monitors the expenditures of intelligence agencies.  For 
example, in May 2007 the AC was involved in auditing the Security Service of Ukraine.  
On May 16, 2007, the Verkhovna Rada and its CNSD authorized the AC to conduct 
audits of this service and control the expenditures for intelligence-related activities.  
About 250 people’s deputies voted for this decision.278  However, the results of this 
inquiry were not published or even commented on by the AC or the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine. 
2. The Special Group of the Defense and Law-enforcement Audit 
Department  
In order to control the expenditures of funds from the State Budget of Ukraine to 
support intelligence agencies and finance their activities, a special group was established 
within the Defense and Law Enforcement Audit Department.  According to Article 15 of 
Chapter IV of the law “On the Accounting Chamber” the group should exercise control 
of targeted national intelligence funds on the basis of annual and operational plans, which 
are to be formed specified by the Parliament and relevant committees (CNSD and BC).  
The group’s experts actively participate in conducting audits of intelligence expenditures 
and are responsible for overseeing intelligence funds at each stage of the intelligence 
budget process: preparation, appropriation and execution.    
This group is also authorized to gather expert and analytical information and 
perform other activities aimed at controlling intelligence spending.  Proposals of this 
group of experts are oriented primarily toward the elimination of the ineffective usage of 
intelligence budget funds.  By examining draft intelligence budgets and developing 
proposals for the CNSD on the effectiveness of intelligence funds, the AC’s group is 
directly involved in the improvement of the intelligence budget process.279   
                                                 
278 Ukrainian News Agency “UNIAN”. May 16, 2007.  An Announcement of the Chairman of the 
Ukrainian Parliament. Available at http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-195726.html (accessed June 10, 
2007). 
279 History of Establishment and Development of the Accounting Chamber. 2007. Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=520279&cat_id=32785 
(accessed May 22, 2007).    
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Moreover, by the laws “On the Intelligence Organs of Ukraine” and “On the 
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine,” the special group of the Defense and Law 
Enforcement Audit Department is authorized to receive all documents from intelligence 
agencies that certify expenditures.  In addition, it can call on heads of intelligence 
organizations to report on these issues.  These laws allow them also to make a 
preliminary analysis regarding the financial activities of intelligence agencies, prior to 
hearings at the parliamentary oversight committees.    
In order to protect information that contains national secrets from disclosure, the 
group follows certain mandatory rules provided by the Ukrainian legislature.   According 
to the law, “materials, which executive bodies or other institutions, enterprises, and 
organizations provided for analysis, check or audit [as well as information and 
documents, which the AC receives about financial activity of an intelligence organization 
or natural persons], are subject to professional secrecy and may be used only for 
controlling purposes.”280  Therefore, the AC controls intelligence expenditures and 
conducts intelligence budget oversight using the principles of professional secrecy.     
The law “On State Secrets” of 1992 and the law “On Accounting Chamber” 
interpret professional secrecy as the “process of safekeeping materials, documents, other 
information, which are used by the Accounting Chamber officials and persons involved 
in activities of the AC during checks, audits and examinations.”281  It is prohibited for the 
AC’s auditor generals (inspectors) to disclose this information in any form before the AC 
makes a decision, which should be based on the decision of the Parliament and its 
committee responsible for intelligence oversight issues, in particular.  Thus, members of 
this special group carry out functions spelled out in the law “On the Accounting 
Chamber” only provided that they have been granted access to the documents 
constituting state secrets in the order established by the law of Ukraine “On State 
Secrets”.   
                                                 
280 The law “On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.” Amended in 2004. Article 19. Available at 
http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=88465&cat_id=32815 
(accessed May 21, 2007). 
281 Ibid., Article 20.  
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According to the statutory act “On Adoption of the Standard of the Accounting 
Chamber of Ukraine” and its special instruction “Procedure of Preparation and Holding 
of Audits and Execution of Their Results” (adopted by the Resolution of the Board of the 
AC on December 27, 2004 under #28-6 and registered in the Ministry of Justice of 
Ukraine on January 28, 2005 under #115/10395), the officials of the Defense and Law 
Enforcement Audit Department and members of a special group, which are engaged in 
the audit of intelligence funds, shall have the following rights:282   
• to obtain all necessary information on the audited objects from the 
intelligence agencies, and other organizations connected with the activity 
of the audited object;  
• to have unlimited access to any premises and storage places of the audited 
objects unless otherwise stipulated by the laws of Ukraine;  
• to obtain original documents or copies, other materials, electronic media 
data, extracts from these documents from the officials of the audited 
object;  
• to obtain secret documents and other documents restricted to limited 
access;  
• to demand that audited object officials immediately eliminate detected 
violations;  
• to get explanations from the audited object officials, other institutions, 
organizations, enterprises connected with the activity of the audited object; 
and 
• to draft protocols of administrative violations when necessary.   
The statutory act also emphasizes that if the control team [a special group that 
controls intelligence expenditures] “meets barriers” to the conduct of an audit, the leader 
of the group shall create a special memo and promptly send it to the AC.  The memo on 
administrative violation shall be signed by the AC Chairman or one of his deputies and 
filed in court for immediate action.   
While carrying out their duties, the group members are also forbidden from 
revealing methods and means of intelligence activities, uncovering the identity of their  
                                                 
282 Standard of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. Amended in 2004. Chapter 1: General 
Provisions. Article 1.7 http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/ 
main?art_id=283173&cat_id=121 (accessed May 22, 2007). 
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operatives, and illegally disseminating information received.283  In other words, their 
oversight and controlling functions should not place intelligence’s sources and methods 
of operational activity at risk.        
With the purpose of organizing a better means of oversight of intelligence funds, 
the AC consults intelligence executives on issues of the state budget, its targeted usages, 
processes, requirements, as well as execution of intelligence expenditures.  These 
functions and powers of the AC are underscored in Article 6 of Chapter II of the amended 
2004 law “On Accounting Chamber.” 
The AC makes annual reports to the Verkhovna Rada on its performance results.  
By order of the Verkhovna Rada, its relevant committees (CNSD and BC) may hear 
reports and information (statements) of the AC on the results of audits of intelligence 
agencies. However, hearings and discussions regarding intelligence expenditures and the 
results of audits are held behind closed doors either at the office of the oversight 
committees or the Defense and Law Enforcement Audit Department. 
The AC’s special group is allowed to conduct operational (unexpected) audits of 
intelligence expenditures.  Moreover, sometimes the external control and audit of the 
financial and business activities of intelligence agencies can be exercised by the Central 
Control and Auditing Administration of Ukraine in accordance with its authority 
established by Ukrainian legislation.284 
3. The International Cooperation of the Accounting Chamber 
The AC is deeply involved in international financial cooperation and foreign audit 
activities in order to protect the Ukrainian State Budget System from participating in 
illegal financial transactions.  By monitoring the UIC budget and expenditures, the AC 
minimizes the possibility of using intelligence agencies in international money laundering 
activities and illegal financial transactions. 
                                                 
283 Leonid Polyakov, “Rationalisation and Regulation of Non-Military Security-Sector Organisations” 
(Materials of the Joint Workshop of Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Ukraine) and 
the Centre for European Security Studies (the Netherlands), Kiev, Ukraine, April 23, 2004). Available at 
http://www.uceps.org/ua/show/649/ (accessed May 23, 2007). 
284 The Budget Code of Ukraine. Article 26: Audit and Financial Control.   
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In 2006, during a working meeting of the Euro-Asian Financial Group (Russia, 
Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China) a decision was 
made to increase regional international cooperation regarding the issue of fighting 
terrorism financing and money laundering.285  This decision was based on international 
requests to stop the illegal financial transactions sourced by illicit drug trafficking from 
Afghanistan to those countries.  The flood of illegal money obtained from narcotics has 
recently increased from the Afghanistan region and has served as a valuable source of 
funds for international and regional terrorist groups, as well as organized crime cartels.   
Within the framework of this international organization, the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Georgia, and Turkey were given the status of observers.  Ukraine 
was given the status of special observer.  This implied that Ukraine was encouraged by 
the financial security institutions of those countries to establish a Ukrainian Financial 
Intelligence Task Force (UFITF) to fight threats effectively.286   
One of the UFITF tasks is to prevent the possibility of using the State Financial 
System of Ukraine and its budgetary entities to conduct illegal financial transactions.  
This vital task will effectively be carried out by the UFITF with the cooperation of the 
AC.  Thus, by conducting its oversight functions, the AC protects national budget 
entities, as well as intelligence organizations, from being used in illegal financial 
activities.  Understanding the importance of these duties, the Accounting Chamber of 
Ukraine has already expanded its international financial cooperation with most western 
democracies and started working closely “as a full-fledged member of international 
organizations of the supreme audit bodies INTOSAI and EUROSAI.”287 
                                                 
285 Ukrainian Informational Agency. Creation of the Intelligence Financial Task Forces in Euro-Asian 
Group. International Cooperation. Available at http://unian.net/rus/news/news-177191.html (accessed 
December 15, 2006). 
286 Ibid. 
287 The History of Establishment and Development of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. Available 
at http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=520279&cat_id=32785 
(accessed May 25, 2007). 
 124
E. CONCLUSION 
A parliamentary system of intelligence budget and oversight has been established 
and currently functions in Ukraine.  The Verkhovna Rada has adopted special legislation 
to oversee activities and budgets of intelligence agencies.  The statutory rules also allow 
the Ukrainian parliament to monitor intelligence budgets at each stage of the intelligence 
budget cycle.   
The CNSD is the main parliamentary body that oversees tasks, policies and 
appropriations of intelligence agencies.  During the intelligence budget process, the 
CNSD coordinates its budget oversight functions with the BC, which is empowered to 
control intelligence expenditures within the system of national budget planning and 
development.  In order to enhance the system of intelligence oversight, this committee 
actively participates in international conferences, taking under consideration the best 
practices of western and transitional democracies.   
Moreover, intelligence expenditures can be reviewed by the AC and its special 
group that has the constitutional authority to conduct this type of control.  The AC is also 
charged with the task of protecting intelligence agencies’ financial systems from being 
used by illegal financial institutions.  This task creates an additional oversight function, 
which is conducted by the AC of Ukraine.  This function is vital for such a transitional 
democracy as Ukraine.       
However, the system of intelligence and intelligence budget oversight of the UIC 
is not completely efficient or fully operational.  The powers for conducting oversight are 
written into Ukrainian laws but, in practice, there are problems that affect the whole 
system of intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.  Those problems can be 
summarized as follows.   
The Ukrainian parliamentary oversight system does not have an independent 
intelligence oversight committee dealing only with issues related to intelligence.  The 
effectiveness of the Sub-committee on Legislative Support of National Security and 
Intelligence Bodies of Ukraine is doubtful because it also deals with oversight functions 
of various secondary issues that are not related to intelligence.  The CNSD and its 
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relevant subcommittee have a small number of people’s deputies involved in oversight 
functions. The number of experienced staff to perform those duties is not appropriate for 
such an important activity.    
The Parliament does not have an absolute ability to control the intelligence budget 
process.  The CNSD sends its recommendations to intelligence agencies regarding future 
intelligence appropriations at the beginning of the intelligence budget cycle.  However, 
the CNSD does not control the development of budgets.  There is no information 
available that the committee or its relevant sub-committee controls intelligence budget 
development before the Cabinet of Ministers submits the proposed law on State Budget 
of Ukraine (by September 15).  Before this deadline the Parliament has limited 
information about proposed intelligence budgets with which to conduct efficient analysis 
and control.   
When the budgets are submitted to the Parliament, the CNSD has just two weeks 
(until October 1) for the review and scrutiny of intelligence budgets.  The efficiency to 
control future intelligence appropriations is also decreased because, within a two-week 
period, the CNSD needs to analyze the intelligence budgets of four intelligence agencies.  
The committee is not able to check every single intelligence budget item and is forced by 
time constraints to follow the general rules of the budget cycle.  When the proposed Law 
on State Budget is ready to be handed over to the BC (October 1), it is too late for the 
CNSD to make any changes because after this period the BC is responsible for 
intelligence budget analysis in accordance with the overall state budget framework.  
The BC influences the intelligence budget appropriations, but its role in 
intelligence budgeting and oversight is limited.  The BC conducts mostly general 
coordination of the appropriateness of budgeting for intelligence within the general 
budget process.  Furthermore, the BC has a small number of specialists who can deal 
with intelligence budget issues.  Due to a lack of professional experience in intelligence-
related issues, the control of intelligence budget items by the BC is doubtful.  Moreover, 




the same time with budget groups from different parliamentary committees, it is difficult 
for the BC’s specialists to oversee all the specifics of intelligence budgets.  Important 
items may be overlooked.  
The CNSD and the AC do not inform the public regarding the results of 
parliamentary hearings related to intelligence and audits conducted in the UIC.  It is still 
unknown whether those hearings and audits make any differences in the behavior of 
intelligence agencies and their budget issues.  The lack of public information concerning 
the results of hearings organized by the CNSD and the BC and audits conducted by the 
AC raises questions regarding the effect of those activities on the system of intelligence 
oversight or whether they even took place in Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian parliamentary system of intelligence and intelligence budget 
oversight has some problems with efficiency.  However, recent events in the sphere of 
intelligence oversight have demonstrated that it is operational and workable.  
Parliamentarians have some ability to keep abreast of events taking place inside agencies 
of the UIC and stay informed regarding the usage of intelligence expenditures. That 
awareness can be enhanced if the parliamentary intelligence oversight system works 
closely with the executive branch of Ukrainian government.   
The next chapter will discuss the system of executive oversight of the UIC.  The 
oversight functions of the Secretariat of the President, National Security and Defense 
Council, as well as the newly created Office of the Vice Prime-Minister on the Issue of 
National Security and Defense will be stressed.                                
 
 




VI.  EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE UKRAINIAN 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Executive oversight is needed in order to keep intelligence agencies effective and 
manageable like any other governmental entity.  In Ukraine, executive oversight of the 
Ukrainian Intelligence Community (UIC) is conducted by the President through 
specialized institutions and the Cabinet of Ministers — the highest body in the system of 
executive power.288   
According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President, as the guarantor of state 
sovereignty, human rights and freedoms, has the dominant role in the control of the UIC.  
Article 106 of the Constitution stipulates that, as the Head of National Security and 
Defense Council and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services of Ukraine, the 
President appoints and dismisses the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, the high 
command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military institutions, and the heads 
of intelligence agencies.289   
The President administers all issues in the sphere of intelligence and the state’s 
national security and defense.  To exercise his power and authority, the President 
“creates, within the limits of the funds envisaged in the State Budget of Ukraine, 
consultative, advisory and other subsidiary bodies and services.”290  The most influential 
among these are the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine and the National Security and 
Defense Council.  Among different executive tasks, these presidential auxiliary 
institutions are also designed to provide effective intelligence and intelligence budget 
oversight functions of the UIC.  
                                                 
288 The Constitution of Ukraine. June 28, 1996. Article 113. Available at 
http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm (accessed June 26, 2007). 
289 Ibid., Article 106. 
290 Ibid., Paragraph 28.   
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Pursuant to the Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine conducts 
oversight over each governmental entity.  The Cabinet delegates and coordinates the 
work of ministers and other executive branches, including intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies.  It should also take measures to ensure proper defense capabilities 
for the national security of Ukraine, and determine the need for defense funding.291   
Within this constitutional and legislative framework, the system of executive 
oversight of intelligence in Ukraine is enduring.  Adopted in 2005, the law “On 
Democratic Civil Control of the Military Organization and Law-enforcement Agencies of 
Ukraine” fixes the distribution of authority and powers of the state branches to exercise 
oversight of intelligence agencies.  This law balances the authorities of state branches in 
order to avoid concentration of excessive power over the intelligence organizations and 
law-enforcement agencies in any one of them.292 
This chapter consists of three main sections. First, it will describe the organization 
of the Secretariat of the President and how it conducts executive oversight of the UIC 
through its specialized services (offices).  The next section discusses the executive 
oversight of the UIC provided by the National Security and Defense Council.  Finally, the 
oversight role of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will be considered.   
B. THE SECRETARIAT OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE 
1. The Organization the Secretariat and Its Main Intelligence Oversight 
Functions  
In accordance with Clause 28 of Article 106 of the Ukrainian Constitution the 
President of Ukraine, Mr. Victor Yushchenko, ordered a change to the Presidential 
Administration to the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine (Secretariat) after his 
inauguration in 2005.  An organizational order regarding this change was signed by the 
President on October 14, 2005 (#1548/2005).   
                                                 
291 The Constitution of Ukraine. June 28, 1996. Article 116. Available at 
http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm (accessed June 26, 2007). 
292 Polyakov, An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the Defense and 
Security Sector in Ukraine, 12. 
 129
The Secretariat of the President is an administrative unit set up by the President 
for maintaining his duties.  The Secretariat Head, who is appointed and dismissed by the 
Ukrainian President, manages the Secretariat (see Figure 19).   
 
The Current Organization of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine
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Figure 19.   The Current Organization of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine 
 
As of June 2007, the Secretariat consists of two First Deputy Heads, six Deputy 
Heads, the President’s Spokesperson, twenty experts and advisors to the President, the 
representatives of the President in the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the 
Constitutional Court, other representatives of the President, a chief of services and other 
services and departments.     
The Secretariat of the President is a huge bureaucratic apparatus.  According to 
presidential order #1548/2005, the total strength of the Secretariat is 605, all of whom 
have the status of state servicemen.  Only the President and the Head of the Secretariat 
can make amendments to the personnel policy requirements of the Secretariat and its 
number of servicemen.    
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The main task of the Secretariat is to provide administrative, legal, advisory, 
information, analytical and other assistance to the President of Ukraine, as well as 
conduct various oversight and controlling functions.  The Secretariat can engage 
scientists, experts (on a fee or contract basis) and representatives of central and local 
government bodies in carrying out certain tasks.  It is empowered by the President to 
commission officials from all ranks to eliminate obvious defects and drawbacks and to 
inform intelligence and law-enforcement agencies about the instances of violation of the 
Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, and decrees and orders by the President of 
Ukraine.293   
The Secretariat is entitled to request and receive information from government 
and local self-governing bodies, state enterprises, institutions, organizations and officials.  
Intelligence and law-enforcement agencies are responsible to provide information to the 
Secretariat of the President continually to help formulate national and foreign policy.  It 
also coordinates communication and official statements between the Ukrainian President 
and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, government 
and local self-governing bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations.294    
To support presidential functions in achieving strict oversight of the UIC, the 
Secretariat is authorized by the President to set requirements of intelligence agencies, 
analyze its expenditures and activities, as well as testify at hearings of its executive 
directors and prepare submissions for their appointment and dismissal.295  It also 
participates in the preparation of intelligence budgets and provides recommendations for 
the President of Ukraine with regard to state honors and the highest military ranks, 
special ranks and grade levels for military and civilian servicemen and employees of 
intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.   
                                                 
293 Translated from the Official Website of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine. 2007. 
Available at http://www.president.gov.ua/content/300.html (accessed June 26, 2007). 
294 Ibid. 
295 The Presidential Order “On the Issue of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine.”  November 4, 
2005. Statutory Rights of the Secretariat. Clauses 8, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23. Available at 
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3462.html (accessed June 26, 2007).   
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The Secretariat conducts intelligence and intelligence budget oversight through 
the special services, called the Main Service of Security and Defense Policy and the Main 
Service on the Issues of Law-enforcement Activities, which are subordinated to the 
Deputy Head of the Secretariat on Intelligence and Law-Enforcement Issues, and General 
Defensive Inspection under the President of Ukraine.  Moreover, taking into 
consideration the complexity and multifunctional tasks of the Security Service of 
Ukraine, as well as its importance in the sphere of national security and defense, an 
independent Office of the Representative of the President on the Issue of Oversight of the 
Security Service of Ukraine was established under the Head of the Secretariat in 
November 2005.   
According to presidential order #1548/2005, those intelligence and law-
enforcement oversight structures have absolute power to obtain information from the UIC 
and conduct planned and operational control over its agencies.  Clauses 5.1 and 5.2 of 
this order empower them to “have access to any governmental information and use any 
databases, documents and archives” to carry out its oversight functions.”296  The services 
identified in this order can also establish their liaison components at the intelligence 
agencies’ headquarters and request the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine or other 
specialized governmental institutions to conduct audits in order to ensure the propriety of 
intelligence expenditures.  In addition, they may request intelligence executives to report 
in person information regarding the service’s activities or other data they are interested 
in. 
Finally, the National Institute for Strategic Studies serves as a think tank, helping 
the Secretariat to analyze intelligence requirements, current policies and budgets of the 
UIC’s agencies.297  The institute has several regional branches and is primarily 
comprised of retired military and law-enforcement officers and civilians.  Due to the 
closed nature of its research, there is no information available regarding the results of the 
institute’s work, as well as the quality of its advice to the Secretariat. 
                                                 
296 Translated form Executive Order of November 4, 2005 #1548/2005. Clauses 5.1, 5.2. Available at 
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3462.html (accessed June 28, 2007).   
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2. Current Oversight Activities of the Secretariat of the President 
The official Website of the Secretariat does not provide information regarding the 
intelligence oversight activities of its specialized units and results of their oversight 
functions.  However, due to the political crisis that has been taking place in Ukraine since 
2004 and the confrontation between legislative and executive powers in Ukraine that 
occurred in March 2007 (disagreement between the President from the one side and the 
Parliament and the Prime Minister on the other side), some information is available from 
the Ukrainian informational agencies.  This information indicates that the President of 
Ukraine with his Secretariat is the most influential oversight body and has dominant 
powers in controlling the UIC.   
During the political crisis, the President enhanced his power over intelligence 
organizations and provided more authority toward law-enforcement agencies.  He 
enhanced his authority to prevent a violent resolution of the political disagreement; 
however, a political polarization of intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies 
resulted.298  To defuse that situation and improve oversight of the UIC, the President 
appointed a new chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine in 2005.  When 
the confrontation continued in 2006, and politicization of the Security Service of Ukraine 
became more visible, the President dismissed the chairman of the Security Service and 
appointed a new one.  Closer control of the Security Service was initiated by the 
Secretariat of the President and its First Deputy Arsenii Yatsenyk, in particular.299  He 
discovered corrupt connections inside and outside the Security Service of Ukraine and 
organized appropriate oversight countermeasures conducted by the specialized services 
of the Secretariat.300 
                                                                                                                                                 
297 Information regarding the National Institute for Strategic Studies is available at 
http://www.niss.gov.ua/en/ (accessed July 3, 2003).  
298 Marchuk Evgen. Interview to the Ukrainian Informational Portal “No Censor”. May 31, 2007. 
Available at http://www.proua.com/archive/2007/05/31/ (accessed June 27, 2007).  
299 Translated from Ukrainian Website “Censor Net”. 2006. “Arsenii Yatsenyk Has Promised to 
Reform Half-Pregnant Security Service of Ukraine.” Available at http://censor.net.ua/go/ 
offer/ResourceID/39758.html (accessed June 27, 2007).   
300 Ibid. 
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The leaders of the political parties of Ukraine noticed that during the political 
crisis the President wanted to increase his authority and accumulate intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies around the Secretariat.  On April 27, 2007, the Head of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine, Mr. Petro Symonenko, offered to collect signatures in 
Ukraine on the issue of President Yushchenko’s usurpation of power.  According to Mr. 
Symonenko “the President is going to resort to force to solve the political crisis in the 
country and has already enhanced oversight and control of the UIC to organize future 
actions.”301 
Based on the propositions of the Head of the Secretariat, the President signed an 
executive order that allows the Secretariat to appoint one officer from each intelligence 
agency to the position of an Assistant Deputy Head of the Secretariat on Intelligence and 
Law-enforcement Issues.  This order came into action on June 27, 2007.302  It should be 
noted that this order requires that an officer shall be selected from the intelligence and 
law-enforcement services based on the decision of the liaison component of the 
Secretariat at a particular service.  Such a decision suggests that the Secretariat began 
using the personnel files of the services’ employees in order to fill the assistant positions 
with intelligence officers who are not corrupted and politically engaged.   
Thus, recent political events in Ukraine forced the President and its Secretariat to 
enhance the system of executive oversight of the UIC and law-enforcement agencies.  
However, stringent controls were put in place, mostly toward agencies that have law-
enforcement functions, such as the Security Service of Ukraine.  The organizational 
changes that have taken place in the Secretariat since the Orange Revolution have not yet 
produced an independent service or department that would deal primarily with 
intelligence oversight issues.   
                                                 
301 Petro Simonenko, April 27, 2007. Ukrainian Information Agency “FORUM”. “The President 
Prepares the Armed Variant to Solve Crisis” http://ua.for-ua.com/ukraine/2007/04/27/110054.html 
(accessed June 27, 2007). 
302 Ukrainian Informational Agency “FORUM”. June 27, 2007. Available at http://ua.for-
ua.com/ukraine/2007/06/27/194616.html (accessed June 27, 2007). 
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3. The General Inspectorate under the President of Ukraine 
The “General Inspectorate (GI) Under the President of Ukraine” is the 
presidential institution that serves as an additional “tool” for the Secretariat of the 
President to conduct executive control and oversee policies and budgets of intelligence 
and law-enforcement agencies.  The GI operates as a presidential office.   
The means of the GI in Ukraine are executed according to requirements of the 
Decree of the President of Ukraine dated July 4, 2003 (#565/2003) “About Holding of 
General Inspection.”  They are determined by the “List of Main Measures of Holding 
General Inspection in Ukraine,” developed by the state committees that are established 
under the Prime Minister of Ukraine.   
The GI has the authority to check reform and development issues within the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military organizations.  It also pays significant 
attention to the armament and military equipment of military and non-military 
organizations, as well as their budgets and expenditures.     
The GI exercises some control at all levels of government in Ukraine.  
Mechanisms for collaboration among different levels of state management include 
regular meetings of state executives under the leadership of the Prime Minister of 
Ukraine.  During its working meetings, the GI discusses issues in the sphere of reform, 
development of intelligence and security organizations, other military organizations, as 
well as armament and military equipment.  The results of activities conducted among 
experts engaged in military, intelligence and security oversight are reported.303 
The membership of the GI consists of high representatives of the Ministries of 
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Emergency Situations, Interior, Economy, Finance, Justice, 
Labor and Social Politics, as well as the Security Service of Ukraine and Academy of 
                                                 
303 Informational-reference materials about state of executing measures of defensive inspection in 
Ukraine. 2007. Available at http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=def_insp&sub=irm (accessed 
June 30, 2007).  
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Science.304  As of 2007, intelligence agencies do not have representation at this 
institution, though they can provide analytical information in order to support the 
inspection in conducting a strict control in the sphere of national security and defense.   
Before 2003, the GI did not have authority to control intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies.305  After 2003, it started carrying out executive oversight 
functions of the UIC, controlling its organizational structure, reform processes and 
budget policies.   
The GI regularly published its annual prospective executive plan of work (list of 
main actions).306  However, since 2004, no information is available regarding the results 
of its oversight work.  
C. THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COUNCIL   
1. Organization of the National Security and Defense Council and Its 
Main Intelligence Oversight Functions 
According to the Ukrainian Constitution (Article 107), “the National Security and 
Defense Council (NSDC) of Ukraine is the coordinating body in matters pertaining to 
national security and defense under the President of Ukraine.  The NSDC shall coordinate 
and supervise the activities of organs of executive authority in the sphere of national 
security and defense.”  The President of Ukraine is the Chairman of the NSDC and 
authorized to appoint its members.   
The Constitution of Ukraine demands that the competence and functions of the 
NSDC should be provided by a separate law.  On January 16, 1997 the Ukrainian  
 
                                                 
304 List of permanent coordination group of the Defensive Inspection of Ukraine. 2007. Available at 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=def_insp&sub=coordination_group (accessed June 30, 
2007).  
305 Nikolay Sungurovskiy, Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy Gritsenko, November 10, 2000. Civilian 
Control of Security Sector is the Requirement of the Time. Ukrainian Newspaper Zerkalo Tyzhnya, 
#43(316) 4. Available at http://www.zn.ua/1000/1030/28899/ (accessed June 30, 2007). 
306 List of Main Actions During Defensive Inspection in Ukraine. 2003. Available at 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=def_insp&sub=list_of_action (accessed June 30, 2007).   
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Parliament adopted the “Conception of National Security.”  This document became the 
basis for the law “Regarding the National Security and Defense Council,” which was 
signed by the President in 1998.   
According to Article 4 of the law, this institution has the “authority and powers to 
carry out day-to-day control of executive structures [including intelligence agencies]; 
uses state officials and analysts of all governmental departments, research organizations 
of both private and public form of property to analyze necessary information; initiates the 
legislation related to the issue of national security and defense and controls its 
implementation; coordinates and controls the activity of state local institutions [including 
agencies of the UIC] during the time of emergency or threat of a crisis situation.”307  In 
terms of rank and position, membership in the NSDC must include the Prime Minister of 
Ukraine, the Minister of Defense, the Head of the Security Service, the Minister of the 
Interior, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The Chairman of the Supreme Council of 
Ukraine may take part in meetings of the NSDC.  Decisions of the NSDC are put into 
effect by decrees of the President of Ukraine.308  However, due to the current political 
crisis in Ukraine, the President has made changes in the membership of the NSDC.   
According to his executive order of November 29, 2006 (#1008) “On the 
Administration of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine,” the President 
has increased the number of members of the NSDC to 42.  Added to the Council are the 
First Prime Minister — Minister of Finance, the Head of the Secretariat of the President, 
the Secretary of the NSDC, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Interior Troops, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Director of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, 
the Head of the National Bank, and 27 heads of the regional state administration.  The 
order expands the total strength of the NSDC’s staff from 254 to 260 servicemen. 
This order also made some structural changes to the system of the NSDC 
executive oversight of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies (see Figure 20).  The 
                                                 
307 The Law of Ukraine “Regarding the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.” 1998. 
Available at http://www.rainbow.gov.ua/about/ (accessed June 28, 2007).   
308 Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. #254/96-BP. Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, #30. 
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Secretary of the NSDC was given new authority over the Departments of Strategic 
Developments, On the Issues of Energetic and Nuclear Security, Informational Security, 
On the Issues of Law-enforcement Activities, and Finance and Economy.  In addition, the 
Personnel Section and the Section of State Secret Protection were subordinated to the 
Secretary of the NSDC.309      
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Figure 20.   The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council 
 
The NSDC conducts executive oversight of agencies of the UIC through its 
specialized departments, such as the Department of Informational Security, the 
Department of Law-enforcement Activity, and the Department of Finance and Economy.  
It is worth mentioning that clause 3.8 of this statutory order gives those specialized units 
the authority and powers to analyze and control the financial, personnel and 
                                                 
309 Ukrainian Informational Agency “UNIAN”. 2007. “The President Made Some Changes to the 
Organization of the NSDC”. Translated from http://www.unian.net/rus/news/news-178672.html (accessed 
June 25, 2007). 
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organizational aspects of national security and defense.310  Those departments participate 
in estimations of the intelligence and security requirements of agencies, their budgets and 
needs and, therefore, can influence the UIC.  In this regard, the NSDC conducts executive 
oversight of the UIC, making propositions to the President of Ukraine to strengthen the 
field of national security and defense or make changes in budgets or organizational 
structures of those governmental institutions dealing with intelligence, security, and law-
enforcement issues.  Moreover, clause 4.1 of the order allows the NSDC’s specialized 
departments to have access to any agency and obtain information of any kind from the 
databases of all Ukrainian governmental organizations, including agencies of the UIC.311   
Based on recommendations of the heads of these departments, the Secretary of the 
NSDC can hire intelligence and security officers from the UIC, law-enforcement 
agencies and servicemen of the UIC and other military organizations to work at the 
NSDC.  The officers are assigned to the departments to provide assistance and share 
experience in the issue of enhancing executive oversight of the UIC and other 
governmental institutions.312   
2. Think Tanks of the NSDC  
Two scientific institutions subordinated to the NSDC help the Council to conduct 
intelligence and intelligence budget oversight of the UIC.  The National Institute of 
Problems of International Security and the Institute of Problems of National Security are 
subordinated to the Secretary of the NSDC and provide informational-analytical support 
to the President, the NSDC and the Cabinet of Ministers regarding the issues of national 
security and defense.313  They are responsible for conducting intelligence and defense-
                                                 
310 The Executive order #1008 “On the Administration of the National Security and Defense Council 
of Ukraine.” November 29, 2006. Clause 3.8. Available at http://www.rainbow.gov.ua/about/index.shtml 
(accessed June 30, 2007). 
311 The Executive order #1008 “On the Administration of the National Security and Defense Council 
of Ukraine,” clauses 3.8, 3.9, 4.1. 
312 Ibid., clause 10.  
313 Information regarding the main tasks and responsibilities of those institutions is available at 
http://www.niisp.gov.ua/institute.php?razdel=zavdanna&doc=main and http://www.nbu.gov.ua/ 
pro_inst.php (accessed June 30, 2007). 
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related research and help executive bodies to make decisions in security sector oversight 
and reform.  These institutions assist executive bodies of Ukraine in exercising control of 
the organizational structure, intelligence requirements, budgets and policy of intelligence 
and law-enforcement agencies.  In addition, they also forecast events that can negatively 
influence the integration processes of Ukrainian defense, intelligence and the security 
sector with respect to the EU and NATO structures and develop proposals that the CNSD 
can carry out to make necessary changes.314 
D. THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT CONDUCTED BY THE CABINET 
OF MINISTERS  
1. Organization of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Regarding 
Intelligence and Intelligence Budget Oversight  
According to the Ukrainian Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
(Cabinet) adopts measures to ensure the defense capability and coordinates the work of 
ministries and other executive bodies with respect to the issues of national security and 
defense.315  This Cabinet’s power is also underlined in the law “On the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine,” which was adopted on December 21, 2006.316  The Prime 
Minister is empowered to submit candidates for the appointment of the heads of 
ministries and other central executive bodies.317  Moreover, by law, the Cabinet is 
responsible for preparation of the draft of the State Budget of Ukraine and controlling the 
budget preparation activity and expenditures of any state budget entity.  Thus, the  
 
 
                                                 
314 Extracted from the fundamental research tasks of the institutions. Available at 
http://www.niisp.gov.ua/institute.php?razdel=zavdanna&doc=main (accessed June 30, 2007).    
315 The Constitution of Ukraine. June 28, 1996. Chapter VI: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Other 
Bodies of Executive Power. Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm (accessed June 26, 
2007). 
316 Translated from the Law “On the Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine.” December 21, 2006. Chapter IV: 
Responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers. Article 21. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/ 
document/65557974/Закон%20України%20Про%20Кабінет%20Міністрів%20України.doc (accessed 
July 2, 2007).   
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Cabinet, theoretically, can influence the process of assigning intelligence executives and 
is authorized to conduct intelligence budget oversight at each stage of the intelligence 
budget process. 
The Cabinet conducts intelligence and intelligence budget oversight of the UIC 
primarily through three departments: the Department on Activity of Justice and Law-
enforcement Bodies, the Department of Defense and Mobilization Activity, and the 
Department of Financial Monitoring (see Figure 21).318 
The Current Organization of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers
(regarding intelligence and intelligence budget oversight)
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Figure 21.   The Current Organization of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers 
                                                                                                                                                 
317 According to the State Management Structure of Ukraine, intelligence and law-enforcement 
agencies are the central executive bodies.   
318 The Official Website of the Cabinet of Ministers. 2007. The Department of Justice and Law-
enforcement Bodies. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article%3fshowHidden= 
1&art_id=28730744&cat_id=28552944&ctime=1140104679599 (accessed July 2, 2007); and The 
Department of Defense and Mobilization Activity. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/ 
publish/article%3fshowHidden=1&art_id=28877683&cat_id=28552944&ctime=1140190177734 (accessed 
July 2, 2007). 
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According to the functional oversight duties written in the internal instruction of 
the Cabinet “On the Department on Activity of Justice and Law-enforcement Bodies,” 
the department is responsible for oversight of the Intelligence Body of the State Border 
Service of Ukraine and some issues involving the Security Service of Ukraine.319  The 
Department of Defense and Mobilization Activity is tasked to oversee and monitor the 
Ministry of Defense and, therefore, the Main Directorate for Intelligence of the Ministry 
of Defense.320  There is no information available at the official Website of the Cabinet 
that the Cabinet of Ministers controls the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and its 
budget.  According to the instruction, no one department or service in the Cabinet of 
Ministers is assigned to oversee the Foreign Intelligence Service and control its 
intelligence programs and funds.       
Unfortunately, the official Websites of the Cabinet of Ministers and the 
Secretariat of the Cabinet do not provide information regarding the authority to conduct 
oversight of the UIC, nor do they indicate detailed organizational structures and concrete 
functional tasks of the departments (or services) involved.  However, some public sources 
give information concerning the principle functions of the system of executive oversight 
conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers and recent changes in that system. 
On January 13, 2007, the Ukrainian newspaper “The Facts” reported that based on 
a proposal of the Prime Minister, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted on and approved 
the nomination of the new Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine.  The former Chairman of the 
Security Service of Ukraine and the National Security and Defense Council, Mr. 
Volodymyr Radchenko was assigned on this position.321  The newspaper reported that 
the new Vice Prime Minister would primarily deal with coordination of activities of 
                                                 
319 General Responsibility of the Department on Activity of Justice and Law-enforcement Bodies. 
Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article%3fshowHidden= 
1&art_id=29261204&cat_id=28584895&ctime=1140449578979 (accessed July 2, 2007).  
320 The Cabinet’s Order Regarding the “Responsibilities of the Department of Defense and 
Mobilization Activity.” 2007. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article 
%3fshowHidden=1&art_id=28877683&cat_id=28552944&ctime=1140190177734 (accessed July 2, 2007).  
321 Irina Kotsina, January 13, 2007. The Ukrainian Parliament approved Volodymyr Radchenko for 
the position of a Vice Prime Minister of the Cabinet. The Ukrainian newspaper The Facts. Available at 
www.facts.kiev.ua (archive, accessed July 2, 2007).    
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intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, as well as assist the Cabinet of Ministers to 
oversee other processes taking place in the sphere of national security and defense. 
Based on an executive order of the Cabinet, the Vice Prime Minister organized his 
Office that, together with the Department on Activity of Justice and Law-enforcement 
Bodies, the Department of Defense and Mobilization Activity and the Department of 
Financial Monitoring, was assigned to enhance the role and responsibility of the Cabinet 
in conducting intelligence and intelligence budget oversight.322  This Office became 
operational in February 2007 and immediately started making constructive changes in 
overseeing the governmental budget entities during the preparation phase of the State 
Budget of Ukraine for FY2008.  At roughly the same time, the Prime Minister of 
Ukraine, Mr. Victor Yanukovich, announced that “we urgently need to conduct analysis 
of each independent budget entity in order to safeguard the state budget and later punish 
everyone who used its funds ineffectively.”323       
However, the new Vice Prime Minister was recalled from the position in May 
2007 and a former Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Mr. Oleksandr Kuzmuk, was assigned 
to this position.  On May 25, 2007 he announced that “during the political crisis in 
Ukraine he sees his duties in helping the President and the Cabinet of Ministers to avoid 
using intelligence and law-enforcement agencies in resolving the political crisis.”324   
After his nomination, the Office of the Vice Prime Minister recommended that the 
Ukrainian Parliament support the proposition of the Ministry of Economy in making 
changes to the law “On the State Military Acquisition Order,” which regulates the 
acquisition system for military, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.325  The 
                                                 
322 The Official Website of the Cabinet of Ministers. July 2007. Services of the Secretariat of the 
Cabinet. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article%3fshowHidden 
=1&art_id=28551361&cat_id=9205042&ctime=1139309776621 (accessed July 2, 2007).  
323 Translated form the discussion of the Prime Minister of Ukraine regarding the preparation of the 
draft Law of State Budget of Ukraine of 2008. February 2007.    
324 Oleksandr Kuzmuk, May 25, 2007. Materials of Vice Prime Minister Briefing. Translated from the 
materials of the Ukrainian Information Agency “UNIAN” http://www.unian.net/rus/online/10/20070525 
(accessed July 2, 2007). 
325 The Ukrainian Informational Agency “The Ukrainian News”. May 8, 2007. Available in the 
archive at http://www.ukranews.com/rus/fulltext/all/20070531.html (accessed June 3, 2007). 
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Office also became very active in providing consultations to agencies of the UIC 
regarding the budget preparation and usage of its funds.  
2. Government Oversight Committees and a Specialized Commission 
To be effective in conducting its intelligence oversight functions, the Office of the 
Vice Prime Minister established a working relationship with government committees “On 
National Security” and “On Defense, Security and Law-enforcement Activity.”  
Comprised of the top executives of the Cabinet and people’s deputies of the Parliament, 
the committee “On National Security” has a broader jurisdiction over the state ministers 
and central executive bodies.  The second committee consists of deputy ministers and 
some deputies of central executive bodies and has more specific functions dealing with 
particular oversight issues.   
Moreover, the Office activated its effective connections with the governmental 
specialized commission “On the Issues of Reformation and Development of the Armed 
Services of Ukraine and Other Military Formations,” which was established by executive 
decision of the President of Ukraine on April 14, 2003 (#319/2003) and finalized by the 
executive order of the Cabinet on May 31, 2004 (#298-p).326   
These governmental institutions conduct investigations related to national security 
and defense.  They usually include representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministries 
of Defense, Internal Affairs, Economy and European Integration, Industrial Policy, 
Justice, Finance, as well as the State Border Service of Ukraine, the Security Service, the 
National Institute of Strategic Studies, the National Institute of Problems of International 
Security, the Institute of Problems of National Security and people’s deputies assigned to 
serve in relevant parliamentary oversight committees.   
The Prime Minister is the head of the committee “On National Security.”  The 
Vice Prime Minister on the Issues of National Security and Defense is the head of the 
                                                 
326 The Executive Decision of the President of Ukraine on April 14, 2003 #319/2003. Available at 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/popup_article?art_id=1662368 (accessed July 2, 2007).    
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committee “On Defense, Security and Law-enforcement Activity.” The Deputy Head of 
the Security Service of Ukraine is the head of the specialized commission.   
These institutions are authorized to obtain information, documents, and analytical 
materials of any kind from any governmental agency, including agencies of the UIC.327  
They are allowed to invite intelligence executives to testify at hearings concerning an 
agency’s policy, current activities, budget or expenditures.  Moreover, the law “On the 
Cabinet of Ministers” allows them to obtain information from the Accounting Chamber 
of Ukraine regarding the results of scheduled and operational audits of the UIC in order 
to control and oversee its intelligence budgets and expenditures.328     
They are also authorized to hold regular working meetings, but not less than one 
every three months.  The heads of these governmental committees and the specialized 
commission are assigned and dismissed by the President of Ukraine.329   
No information is available regarding the results of the working meetings 
conducted by these governmental institutions.  However, the official Website of the 
Cabinet of Ministers provides information concerning the table of contents of those 
meetings, which proves that they are scheduled and held regularly.  For example, the 
Government Committee “On Defense, Security and Law-enforcement Activity” held its 
meetings three times in April, three times in May and two times in June 2007 in order to 
discuss urgent issues related to intelligence and security sector reforms.330               
                                                 
327 Translated from the Executive Decision of the President of Ukraine#319/2003. April 14, 2003. 
Clause 5.  Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/popup_article?art_id=1662368 (accessed 
July 2, 2007).   
328 Translated from the Law “On the Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine.” December 21, 2006. Chapter VI: 
Authority of the Cabinet of Ministers. Article 33. Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/document/ 
65557974/Закон%20України%20Про%20Кабінет%20Міністрів%20України.doc (accessed July 2, 
2007). 
329 Translated from the Executive Decision of the President of Ukraine#319/2003. April 14, 2003. 
Clause 5.  Available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/popup_article?art_id=1662368 (accessed 
July 2, 2007).    
330 This information was extracted and translated from http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/ 
meetings/timeframe?d=21.6.2007&cId=73905257&ctx= (accessed July 2, 2007). 
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E. CONCLUSION 
A system of executive oversight of intelligence and its budget has been 
established and currently functions in Ukraine.  It is comprised of the Secretariat of the 
President, the NSDC and the Cabinet of Ministers.  Those executive bodies operate and 
perform oversight functions based on special legislation to oversee activities and budgets 
of intelligence agencies.  The statutory rules also allow them to monitor intelligence 
budgets at each stage of the intelligence budget cycle and use results of audits conducted 
by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.   
The Secretariat of the President is the most influential executive oversight body.  
That is because the Constitution and current Ukrainian legislature provide the President 
with broad executive powers in exercising intelligence oversight and give the Secretariat 
strong and effective mechanisms to conduct oversight of the UIC.  The Secretariat 
provides the leadership of the UIC through its role in the process of nominating 
intelligence executives.  Moreover, subordinated to the President of Ukraine and 
functioning under presidential orders, the Secretariat has an independent authority and is 
not accountable to any other governmental institution in Ukraine regarding its decisions 
toward the UIC.   
In its oversight activity, the Secretariat relies upon the “General Inspectorate 
Under the President of Ukraine,” which serves as a “working tool” to control the UIC, 
and the National Institute for Strategic Studies, which serves as a think tank for the 
Secretariat regarding different issues of national security and defense.  Due to the closed 
nature of those institutions, the results of their work enhancing intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight are difficult to evaluate.       
The intelligence oversight functions of the Secretariat are not fully effective.  The 
Secretariat does not have an independent body devoted primarily to intelligence oversight 
tasks.  The responsibilities of its oversight departments are mixed and directed primarily 
toward law-enforcement agencies.   
The President of Ukraine also controls the UIC through the National Security and 
Defense Council, which has statutory authority and powers to carry out day-to-day 
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control of intelligence agencies.  Two think tanks — the National Institute of Problems of 
International Security and the Institute of Problems of National Security — are assigned 
to help the NSDC in analyzing the current policies of the UIC’s agencies, their 
intelligence requirements, budgets and expenditures.   
However, the NSDC does not have in its organizational structure an independent 
body that deals directly with oversight functions of intelligence agencies.  The mixture of 
intelligence and law-enforcement oversight tasks decreases the efficiency of the 
executive oversight system of the UIC conducted by the NSDC.   
Until 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers had little authority to conduct oversight of 
intelligence agencies.  The current organization of executive oversight still does not allow 
the Cabinet to conduct efficient oversight of the UIC due to the absence in its 
organizational structure of a specialized unit dealing only with intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight issues.  However, current legislation empowers the Cabinet 
to oversee the UIC, influencing assignments of intelligence executives as well as 
intelligence budget preparation and control processes.   
With the establishment of the new Office of Vice Prime Minister on the Issues of 
National Security and Defense, the Cabinet is apparently attempting to enhance its role in 
conducting strict control of the UIC and its budget.  As a result of the political situation in 
Ukraine, the attempts of the Cabinet to enhance its role in conducting oversight of 
intelligence and law-enforcement agencies are likely to be controversial and the 
“competition” with the Secretariat of the President regarding the issue of conducting such 
control will continue.   
It is expected that in order to enhance its control of the UIC, the new Office will 
work closely with the governmental oversight committees and the specialized 
commission, requesting from the Ukrainian Parliament more legislative powers for those 
institutions.  However, due to the closed nature of those governmental institutions and the 
absence of official information from the executive bodies of Ukraine, it is difficult to 
judge their current effectiveness and forecast their role in intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight of the UIC.       
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VII.  SUMMARY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Intelligence reform will always be a vital issue for every democratic nation.  For a 
Ukraine in the process of democratic consolidation, restructuring its intelligence 
community will be vital and tremendously difficult.  It is evident that democratic 
consolidation cannot happen without establishing effective democratic control of the 
intelligence apparatus.  Emerging transnational threats require that allied countries 
evaluate their intelligence organizations to ensure their operational efficiency and use of 
resources.  The experience of older democracies is “that intelligence reform is not a one-
time event but, like democracy itself, requires consistent attention, oversight, and 
institutional engineering, if intelligence is to be effective.”331   
Ukraine has been experiencing political crisis since the Orange Revolution of 
2004.  The latest wave of this crisis began in April 2007, when the President of Ukraine 
made a decision to dissolve the Parliament and to call for new parliamentary elections.  
According to the political agreement between the Ukrainian parliament and the President, 
these elections would be held on September 30, 2007.  However, “the existing multilayer 
system of compromises in Ukraine cannot be dismantled; it can at best be rearranged to 
become more compatible with the goal of reforms.”332        
This political instability retards implementation of intelligence and intelligence 
budget oversight conducted by the Ukrainian parliament and the state executive bodies.  
For example, after September 30 it will be very difficult for both the newly elected 
Ukrainian parliament and state government to conduct effective intelligence budget 
oversight.  They will not have enough time to scrutinize the budget for the UIC and, 
therefore, intelligence appropriations for FY2008 would be issued based on state budget 
                                                 
331 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, Reforming Intelligence. Obstacles to Democratic 
Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007) 331.      
332 Arkady Moshes and Viraliy Silitski, June 2007. Political Trends in the New Eastern Europe: 
Ukraine and Belarus. Ukraine: Domestic Changes And Foreign Policy Reconfiguration, 21. Available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB781.pdf (accessed July 23, 2007).   
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technical procedures and without precise analysis of previous and proposed expenditures.  
This will negatively influence the political image of Ukraine, which officially claimed in 
1998 its willingness to accelerate partnership with the European Union (EU) and NATO 
states.    
This political division does not influence all foreign policy of Ukraine equally.  
Right after the crisis took place, the President of Ukraine informed the international 
community that these political events would not influence Ukrainian foreign policy, 
underlining the priority of its western orientation.  The newly appointed Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, made an official tour to the U.S. and 
Canada at the end of April 2007.  During his official visit to Washington, D.C., he noted 
the economic successes of Ukraine in FY2006-FY2007 and stressed that its foreign 
policy would be oriented toward integration with the EU and NATO states.333  
Another indication of the Ukrainian political inclination to cooperate with the EU 
and NATO was the international forum “The Euro-Atlantic Future of Ukraine,” which 
took place in the Ukrainian capital June 12, 2007.  Some 80 experts from different 
countries discussed the European future of Ukraine and agreed that Ukrainian foreign 
policy is pointed toward the West.  During this forum, the former ambassador of the U.S. 
in Ukraine, Mr. Stiven Paifer, stressed that despite the political crisis, “the door to enter 
the EU and NATO is not closed for Ukraine, and western democracies will help and 
support Ukraine to go this direction.” 334 
Thus, Ukraine continues its initiatives aimed at improving ties to NATO and the 
EU.  In this regard, the systems of parliamentary and executive oversight of the Ukrainian 
Intelligence Community (UIC) remain critical for Ukraine, and should continue to be 
strengthened if Ukraine wants to be accepted by the western world.  
 
                                                 
333 Arseniy Yatsenyuk, H.E. Minister of Foreign Affaires of Ukraine. April 30, 2007. Ukraine: 
Current Developments and Foreign Policy Priorities. Interview in the Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace. Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/ 
index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=985&&prog=zru (accessed June 11, 2007).       
334 Materials of the International Forum “The Euro-Atlantic Future of Ukraine.” June 11, 2007.  
Available at http://5tv.com.ua/newsline/236/0/41595/ (accessed June 11, 2007). 
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B. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
The analysis of norms of western and transitional democracies associated with 
oversight of intelligence communities and examination of the system of parliamentary 
and executive oversight of the UIC suggests that a similar system of intelligence 
oversight is established and operational in Ukraine.  However, this system needs 
improvement.  Compared with other systems, the parliamentary and executive oversight 
of intelligence in Ukraine is at a low to medium level.  Moreover, due to excess secrecy, 
the UIC is not totally accountable to parliamentarians and state executives and, therefore, 
its oversight system does not provide sufficient transparency to the public.   
The organizational structure of the agencies of the UIC is complicated and, thus, 
difficult to control.  Each Ukrainian intelligence agency has multifunctional duties and a 
mixture of foreign intelligence, security and law-enforcement responsibilities.  A 
combination of HUMINT and SIGINT functions in some agencies provides power that is 
available to the ruling political elite.  In addition, the absence in the UIC of an all-source 
analysis intelligence agency and the existence of independent reporting systems among 
the agencies provide unnecessary duplication in intelligence reporting and also influence 
the political decision-making process.  Such organizational and functional “disorder” 
might lead to the inefficient usage of intelligence resources, as well as problems in 
performing effective parliamentary and executive oversight of the UIC. 
Current legislation allows the Ukrainian parliament to monitor intelligence 
organizations and their budgets at each stage of the intelligence budget cycle.  However, 
in practice the power of the Parliament to conduct intelligence oversight tasks is reduced.  
It does not have an independent intelligence oversight committee dealing only with the 
issues related to intelligence.  The effectiveness of its subcommittee is uncertain because 
it also deals with secondary issues that are not purely intelligence-related in nature.  In 
addition, lack of experienced staff in relevant oversight committees decreases the 
capacity of the legislative branch to perform oversight functions.   
The Ukrainian parliament has difficulties in exercising effective control of the 
intelligence budget.  The relevant committees have a short time period for the review and 
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scrutiny of intelligence budgets.  The effectiveness of their control is also decreased 
because, within this period, the parliamentarians need to analyze the budgets of four 
independent agencies.  It is also doubtful that the delegated parliamentarians have enough 
time to check every single intelligence budget item during the process. 
The Ukrainian parliament also oversees intelligence expenditures by authorizing 
the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine to conduct audits in agencies of the UIC.  The 
Accounting Chamber conducts mostly financial audits to check intelligence expenditures, 
not reviewing the compliance of the UIC agencies with existing laws.  It is not clear 
which institution conducts such compliance audits in the UIC and to which institution it 
reports the results.   
The Committee on National Security and Defense and the Accounting Chamber 
of Ukraine do not inform the public concerning all of the results of parliamentary 
hearings and audits related to intelligence.  The public is also not aware whether those 
hearings and audits make any difference in the behavior of intelligence agencies, 
including their budget compliance.     
The organizational structures for executive oversight of the UIC do not have 
independent organs devoted primarily to intelligence oversight tasks.  No such 
intelligence oversight structures exist in the Secretariat of the President, the National 
Security and Defense Council, or the Cabinet of Ministers.  The responsibilities of their 
oversight departments are mixed and directed primarily to law-enforcement agencies.   
The recent statutory attempts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to enhance its 
role in conducting oversight of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies may suggest 
establishment of some new oversight mechanisms in Ukraine that would influence 
executive oversight of intelligence in the future.  After establishment of the Office of 
Vice Prime Minister on the Issues of National Security and Defense, the Cabinet has 
already revised its organizational structure for oversight of the UIC.  It is expected that 
the Cabinet will modify its current control functions, especially in the issue of oversight 
of intelligence budgets and their expenditures.     
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One of the biggest problems of the parliamentary and executive oversight systems 
of the UIC is that information regarding the operational efficiency of those systems is not 
properly reported to the public and strategic partners of Ukraine.  The results of oversight 
activities of relevant parliamentary committees or high executive bodies are difficult to 
find.  Information published on the official Websites of oversight institutions is 
frequently incorrect or out of date, or provides data that shows the intelligence oversight 
system to be an ineffective process.   
Moreover, due to the closed nature of executive oversight institutions and, 
sometimes, the absence of official statements about the results of their work, it is difficult 
for Ukrainian citizens to judge the effectiveness of intelligence oversight activities 
conducted by the executive branch.  It is also not easy for Ukraine’s strategic partners to 
see the important role performed by state executives in providing intelligence and 
intelligence budget oversight of the UIC.  This “seeds” doubt among international 
organizations and foreign allies about the effectiveness of the oversight system of the 
UIC, and encourages misunderstanding that can negatively influence Ukraine’s political 
reputation.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
New parliamentary elections scheduled for September 30, 2007 provide an 
opportunity for the Ukrainian parliament and the government to enhance its system of 
intelligence oversight of the UIC.  Taking into consideration the best western principles 
in conducting oversight of intelligence, they can use the powers available under the 
constitution to adopt new oversight principles and practices in Ukraine to improve upon 
the existing oversight system.  A strategy to pursue such reforms can be summarized as 
follows.  
The legislative branch should ensure that the organizational, management, 
personnel and budgetary structure of the agencies of the UIC is clear for the 
parliamentarians.  In this regard, the Ukrainian parliament should create an independent 
parliamentary committee on intelligence (or a subcommittee within the framework of an 
existing committee) to deal only with intelligence-related issues.  This committee should 
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have broad powers over the UIC and its appropriations.  The members of the committee 
should have the highest state clearance and guaranteed access to information they need to 
carry out intelligence oversight functions.  In addition to this, the number of qualified 
experts supporting the people’s deputies should be increased.       
The committee should consider changing the law “The Budget Code of Ukraine” 
to allow parliamentarians more time to oversee and scrutinize the intelligence budget in 
general and its individual budget items in particular.  The committee should be more 
active in participating in budgeting for intelligence.  It should pay much more attention to 
controlling the intelligence budget at each stage of the budget process: preparation, 
authorization, appropriation and execution.   
The Budget Committee and the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine should also 
enhance their cooperation and participation in the intelligence budget process and in 
controlling its authorization and execution stages in particular.  The Accounting Chamber 
of Ukraine should also prepare to conduct compliance audits of the UIC and report the 
results of its work.   
To conduct effective oversight, the executive branch should provide overarching 
direction for the UIC by defining its missions.  With this purpose, the Secretariat of the 
President, the National Security and Defense Council and the Cabinet of Ministers should 
rearrange their organizational structures in order to establish additional units dealing only 
with intelligence oversight functions.  The heads of these units, as well as staff, should 
have special education in the field of conducting intelligence and intelligence budget 
oversight, as well as professional knowledge regarding the UIC’s operational activities, 
policies and budget.  Moreover, the General Inspectorate Under the President of Ukraine 
and the relevant governmental committees dealing with the issues of national security and 
defense should be given more authority in conducting oversight of the UIC. 
Furthermore, the systems of parliamentary and executive oversight of intelligence 
could be enhanced if the Ukrainian government made changes in the organizational 
structure of the UIC.  For better oversight, it is necessary to provide a minimum set of 
tasks for each intelligence organization of the UIC.  Its agencies should be assigned to 
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perform just one mission.  Oversight may be made more effective if the SIGINT 
functions of different agencies were combined under the responsibility of an independent 
intelligence organization.  It also will be essential to create and add to the UIC an all-
source intelligence analysis agency to avoid informational duplication in the decision-
making process and inefficient usage of intelligence resources and funds.   
Finally, in order to increase transparency and accountability, general information 
concerning the consequences of parliamentary and executive hearings on intelligence 
matters, as well as the results of audits in the UIC should be appropriately reported to the 
public.  However, that information should not place intelligence sources and methods of 
operational activity at risk. 
D. SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.  THE INTELLIGENCE 
OVERSIGHT RADAR 
Parliamentary and executive oversight of intelligence involves innovative 
processes.  These processes require not only knowledge of security studies, but also and 
most importantly applying techniques of systems management and business 
administration.  Ukrainian parliamentary leaders and high state executives should 
continually seek better ways of obtaining objective data regarding the activities, policies, 
budgets and expenditures of intelligence agencies.  This suggests a possibility for further 
research.     
When innovating, the parliament and state executive bodies must consider all 
dimensions of the intelligence oversight system.  To enhance parliamentary and executive 
oversight, an “Intelligence Oversight Radar” (IOR) could be developed and adopted by 
those oversight institutions (see Figure 22).335   
 
                                                 
335 An Intelligence Oversight Radar is Based on the Business Innovation Radar, Proposed by 
Sawhney, Mohanbir, Wolcott, Robert C., and Arroniz, Inigo.  2006. The 12 Different Ways for Companies 
to Innovate. MIT Sloan Management Review. Vol. 47. No. 3, 77. 
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The Intelligence Oversight Radar
Executive Oversight of Intelligence 
Judicial Oversight of Intelligence 
Civilian Oversight of Intelligence 
Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence
UIC
 
Figure 22.   The Intelligence Oversight Radar 
 
An IOR can show the current position of each entity engaged in intelligence 
oversight (parliamentary, executive, judicial, and civilian).  The Radar would analyze and 
evaluate each oversight function independently.  For example, to analyze the efficiency 
of parliamentary oversight of an intelligence agency, the IOR evaluates each important 
feature for that particular oversight, such as the existence of specialized legislation, the 
existence of an independent parliamentary body (committee or subcommittee) dealing 
only with intelligence oversight functions, the ability of parliamentarians to obtain 
information from intelligence agencies, the effectiveness of parliamentarians in 
conducting intelligence budget oversight, the consistency of their oversight functions 




efficiency of a specialized parliamentary body dealing with oversight of intelligence 
expenditures, the number of professional staff, etc.  Examples of the parliamentary 
oversight criteria are shown in Figure 23. 
The Parliamentary Oversight Radar
Parliamentary ability to control 
intelligence budget process 
Existence and ability of the oversight committee 
dealing only with intelligence issues 
Professional staff of 
oversight committees  















Existence of independent 


















Figure 23.   The Parliamentary Oversight Radar 
 
To analyze the efficiency of the system of executive oversight of intelligence, the 
IOR would evaluate such criteria as the number and importance of high executive bodies 
participating in the intelligence oversight process, the existence of independent executive 
units dealing primarily with intelligence oversight tasks, the professionalization of 
executive staff supporting oversight of the UIC, the existence of specialized 
governmental programs and committees to oversee intelligence organizations, the ability 
of executive bodies to obtain information regarding the policies, activities and budgets of  
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intelligence agencies, the ability to influence the intelligence budget at each stage of 
intelligence budget cycle, etc.  Examples of executive oversight criteria are shown in 
Figure 24. 
The Executive Oversight Radar
Ability of executive branch to control 
and influence the  
intelligence budget process 
Existence of the executive oversight commissions 
and governmental committees 
dealing only with intelligence issues 
Professional staff of 
executive oversight bodies 
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Figure 24.   The Executive Oversight Radar 
 
Moreover, the IOR can also analyze the current organization of intelligence 
agencies, using such criteria as the need to separate intelligence tasks from security and 
law-enforcement functions, the existence of an independent SIGINT agency, the creation 
of an all-source analysis intelligence organization, etc.    
The important purpose of this model is also to develop tools for the evaluation of 
the oversight system for intelligence.  Transparency could serve here as a key parameter 
of evaluation.  In other words, as more information is provided for the public by 
parliamentary or executive branches about the results of their oversight activities, a 
higher level of evaluation can be given to a particular oversight function.   
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An Intelligence Oversight Radar can be an interesting subject for future research.  
In any democracy it can serve as a helpful “tool” for the parliament and high state 
executives in overseeing its intelligence and security agencies.  The IOR may also help to 
estimate how far a democracy has improved in the issue of developing its national system 
of intelligence and intelligence budget oversight and what else should be done to enhance 
that oversight system in order to approach transparent models that already exist in many 
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